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THESIS SUMMARY 
This dissertation provides a comprehensive understanding of the problem of DoS attacks 
and the various attack mechanisms. It also classifies the known DoS countermeasures into 
three main categories, namely, prevention, mitigation, and traceback. In this context, the dis­
sertation addresses two challenging problems: (1) the problem of distinguishing attack packets 
from legitimate packets for the purpose of DoS mitigation and (2) the problem of identify­
ing the paths traversed by attack packets (DoS traceback). Specifically, the dissertation first 
develops efficient DoS mitigation schemes that can be performed at the perimeter of an ISP 
network by using suitable packet classification techniques. Then, it develops efficient traceback 
schemes based on a novel integration of packet marking and packet logging concepts. Finally, 
the dissertation identifies several future research issues to counter current and emerging DoS 
attacks effectively. 
XV 
ABSTRACT 
Denial of service (DoS) attacks impose an imminent threat to the availability of Internet 
services. The alarming increase of such attacks coupled with the emergence of sophisticated 
DoS attack techniques, call for efficient defense mechanisms to counter these attacks. Although 
there has been ongoing research in this area - focusing on DoS prevention, mitigation, and 
traceback - the existing countermeasures lack in several qualitative and quantitative metrics. 
In this context, this dissertation makes two key contributions in the design and analysis of 
efficient, scalable schemes for DoS mitigation and traceback. 
First, efficient perimeter mitigation schemes based on novel concepts, such as "protocol-
determinism" and "victim-assistance" are proposed. The proposed schemes enable ISP edge 
routers to perform timely mitigation of both end-host and network exhaustion attacks. The 
proposed mitigation schemes have been evaluated through analytical studies for classical and 
advanced attacks quantifying security metrics, such as false positive and false negative rates, 
and performance metrics, such as effective attack rate and connection establishment latency 
increase. Our analysis shows that the proposed schemes offer very low false positive and 
false negative rates, and reduce attacker's effective attack rate significantly with an acceptable 
increase in connection establishment latency. 
Second, hybrid IP traceback schemes that integrate the concepts of packet marking and 
packet logging in a novel manner are proposed. The goal is to achieve a drastic reduction 
in the number of attack packets required to conduct the traceback process. The proposed 
traceback schemes have been evaluated through a combination of analytical and simulation 
studies quantifying performance metrics, such as number of attack packets, storage overhead, 
and attack localization distance. Our studies show that the proposed traceback schemes are 
xvi 
superior in comparison to the well known PPM scheme. 
This dissertation opens up several directions for future research which includes (1) designing 
efficient mitigation schemes in the context of inter-domain network, (2) designing efficient 
mitigation schemes that employ traceback, and (3) designing a comprehensive DoS defense 
mechanism that integrates DoS prevention, mitigation, and traceback in an efficient manner. 
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CHAPTER 1. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
The phenomenal growth of the Internet, and its entry into many aspects of daily life, has led 
to the dependency on its services very often. Unfortunately, it has been shown [l]-[5] that it is 
easy to disturb the functionality of the Internet by attacking its infrastructure taking advantage 
of the vulnerable Internet elements and protocols. Denial of Service (DoS1) attacks are among 
the top threats to the Internet infrastructure [6], These attacks can quickly incapacitate a 
targeted business, costing victims thousands, if not millions, of dollars in lost revenue and 
productivity. The objective of this dissertation is to develop efficient countermeasures for 
these attacks. The dissertation outline is as follows. In this chapter, we devise a classification 
of DoS attacks. In Chapter 2, we survey the main research efforts to counter DoS attacks. In 
Chapter 3, we present the proposed DoS mitigation schemes. In Chapter 4, we present the 
proposed IP traceback schemes. Finally, we present the conclusion and the future work in 
Chapter 5. 
In this chapter, we discuss the problem of DoS attacks focusing on their original causes, 
and on their various mechanisms. Also, we discuss the research challenges associated with this 
problem. Finally, we describe the organization of this dissertation. 
1.1 The Increasing Threat of DoS Attacks 
DoS attacks are malicious means of denying Internet services to legitimate users or pro­
cesses. These attacks continue to pose a significant threat for today's Internet as they are 
growing in number and sophistication. The recent attack incidents confirm the devastating 
effects of these attacks. For example, in October 2002 eight out of the thirteen root servers 
'Throughout this dissertation, the term DoS attacks is used to refer to multiple source attacks (i.e., dis­
tributed denial of service) as well as single source attacks. 
2 
were significantly affected by a massive DoS attack [7]. Many other attacks were reported sub­
sequently in 2003 and 2004 (e.g., [8, 9]). In a recent study by D. Moore et. al., [10], the DoS 
activity in the Internet was estimated using a method called "backscatter". The study found 
that nearly 4,000 DoS attacks are launched each week. Some systems studied were attacked 
as often as once per minute, usually with attacks of up to 1,000 packets per second, though 
some attacks ran as much as 600,000 packets per second. 
The spread of attack tools and the easy access to them through search engines have con­
tributed to the popularity and criticality of DoS attacks. When coupled with the script driven 
nature and widespread availability of attack tools, it is relatively simple for the average com­
puter user to create a vast amount of disruption using limited resources. Moreover, attackers 
are becoming increasingly more creative and are using distributed computing techniques to 
multiply and amplify their damaging efforts. In fact, DoS attacks are developing more quickly 
than the defenses used to fight them. This explains why such attacks are easy to conduct, yet 
difficult to defeat. 
Although any system connected to the Internet is considered to be a potential target, most 
of the reported DoS attacks are against high profile sites that include online gaming sites, Web 
hosting and to some extent against financial services. The outages caused by these attacks 
usually lead to significant financial losses. The motive behind launching DoS attacks varies 
across a spectrum of reasons including economical, political, and personal. Despite the research 
efforts done to counter DoS attacks, the fear that future attacks could do even worse damage 
still exists. Therefore, it is evident that a lot of issues need to be addressed, and a more 
effective countermeasures need to be developed. In this context, the research presented in this 
dissertation provides effective countermeasures for a class of DoS attacks that represent an 
imminent threat. 
1.2 Roots of the DoS Problem 
Looking back to the evolution of the Internet, one can explain how the Internet has become 
ubiquitous. Most of the R&D efforts in the past had been on improving the performance 
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and scalability of Internet protocols. However, little attention was paid to securing these 
protocols. This resulted in several vulnerabilities that were exploited to adversary's advantage. 
Adversaries have always abused the following characteristics of Internet protocols to perform 
DoS attacks. 
• Destination oriented routing: The routing protocols were designed to be destination 
oriented. Packet forwarding is the main task of Internet routers. A router places a 
packet on the interface that takes it to the next hop on its way to the destination, 
without bothering about where it came from. 
• Stateless nature of the Internet: Routers do not maintain any state information about 
forwarded packets. Because of this, accountability and computer forensics are difficult 
to conduct. 
• Lack of authenticity over the Internet: Without authentication, malicious Internet users 
can claim the identities of other users without being easily detected or located. 
• Deterministic nature of Internet protocols: This is not a design flaw, but is often neces­
sary to the proper operation of Internet protocols (e.g., TCP connection establishment 
procedure and TCP congestion control mechanisms). 
The first three characteristics have greatly facilitated the task of source address spoofing, 
which is widely used in DoS attacks. Source address spoofing alters a packets source address 
so that the packet appears to have come from a source other than the actual sender. An 
attacker uses source address spoofing for two reasons: to gain access to resources that only 
accept requests from specific source addresses, or to hide the source of an attack. The fourth 
characteristic of the Internet contributes directly to a class of DoS attacks that exploits the 
predictable operation of Internet protocols. Examples of such attacks are discussed in the 
following section. 
4 
1.3 Classification of DoS Attacks 
DoS attacks are emerging in various forms and becoming more sophisticated. The scope of 
these attacks spread over wide range of Internet protocols to prevent users from gaining access 
to a spectrum of Internet services. Generally, the various attack types share a common nature 
in the sense that they rely on the deterministic behavior of most Internet protocols and the lack 
of authentication over the Internet. To launch a powerful DoS attack, an attacker has to secure 
enough resources to achieve the desired damage to the victim. A single attacker could mobilize 
thousands of compromised computers (known also as zombies or slaves) from unsuspected 
users. Compromising this many computers is done in a phase, known as the recruitment 
phase, that precedes the actual DoS attack. The systematic way of attack recruitment phase 
includes gaining remote unauthorized access to large number of computers. The basic steps of 
the recruitment phase are outlined as follows. 
• The attacker performs extensive scanning of remote machines searching for vulnerabilities 
and security holes. 
• The discovered vulnerabilities are exploited to break into the scanned systems. At this 
point, the attacker gets access to these systems, which are then called zombies or slaves. 
• The attacker installs the attack tool on the compromised computers. At this point, the 
compromised computers become ready to participate in the attack, or even to be used 
in the recruitment of other computers. 
It is also possible to perform attack recruitment via spreading of viruses and Trojan horses. 
In this chapter, we assume that attackers have the ability to compromise and recruit sufficient 
number of end systems to perform an attack. However, the actual methods used to scan remote 
machines, exploit their vulnerabilities, and compromise them are not discussed. We refer the 
reader to [11] for a detailed discussion about this topic. Our focus will be mainly on DoS attack 
characterization and classification. We follow a systematic approach to devise an attribute-
based characterization of DoS attacks. Also, we provide two alternative classifications of DoS 
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attacks in order to reflect how these attacks can be viewed from different angles. The first 
classification is based on the means of DoS attacks, while the second classification is based on 
the impact of DoS attacks. 
1.3.1 Attribute-based Characterization of DoS Attacks 
Before launching a DoS attack, an attacker should configure the attack tool in such a 
way as to achieve the desired damage to the victim. This involves the specification of several 
attack attributes that shape the overall nature of the attack. The term "attribute" here refers 
to certain aspect of an attack. In this subsection, we specify the following attributes that 
apply for a variety of DoS attacks: (1) header spoofing, (2) attack indirection, (3) attack 
amplification factor, (4) attack rate dynamics, (5) number of attackers vs. number of victims, 
and (6) attacker's reaction to the victim's defense. These attributes provide a systematic way 
for characterizing DoS attacks. Under this approach, an instance of DoS attack (DoS-inst) 
would be characterized using the corresponding values of the attributes of that instance as 
follows: DoS-inst(Ai, A2, ...An). Where, A; is the i-th attribute of the attack. Figure 1.1 
shows a summary of DoS attack attributes and their classifications. It is to be noted that 
these attributes are common to most of the DoS attacks. 
L» 
Packet 
volume-based 
Packet 
size-based 
TTL 
TOS 
Direct 
Source 
address 
Reflector 
based 
Equal to 1 
Attack 
Indirection 
Classical attacks 
Advanced attacks 
(discrete, high) 
Greater than 1 
Amplification 
factor 
Attack rate 
dynamics 
(discrete, low) 
(Continuous, high) 
(Continuous, low) 
Header 
Spoofing 
Single attacker-
multiple victims 
Single attacker-
single victim 
Multiple attackers-
single victim 
Multiple attackers-
multiple victims 
DoS Attack Attributes 
Number of attackers 
vs. number of victims 
Attacker's reaction to 
victim's defense 
Figure 1.1 Summary of DoS attack attributes. 
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1.3.1.1 Attribute 1: Header Spoofing 
Spoofing the content of TCP/IP header is a common practice in most DoS attacks. While 
this practice is essential in certain attacks (e.g., reflector-based DoS attacks [12]), it is usually 
employed by attackers to gain additional advantages such as confusing the victim in a way 
that reduces its ability to characterize attack traffic. Also, forensic investigation becomes 
much harder when attackers employ header spoofing. In this context, many fields in the 
TCP/IP header can be spoofed. This include the source address field, Type of Service (TOS) 
field, and the Time To Live (TTL) filed. While spoofing of the source address filed is the most 
common, spoofing of other fields (i.e., TOS and TTL) is useful in certain attack scenarios. For 
example, TOS field spoofing can be used in stealing network resources in a DifFServ domain 
[13]. Spoofing a packet's TTL field means that the attacker will set the packet's initial TTL to a 
value different than the default TTL value used by the operating system of the attack machine2. 
This has the impact of disguising the actual distance between the source of the attack and 
the destination (i.e., the victim). TTL spoofing makes DoS defense much harder especially if 
the victim uses TTL field to characterize incoming attack traffic, or when performing packet 
filtering based on the distance traveled by packets as in the hop count filtering scheme [15]. 
1.3.1.2 Attribute 2: Attack Indirection 
Attack indirection refers to the flow direction of DoS attack traffic from attack machines 
(the zombies) to their victim. There are two major types of DoS attack indirection. The first 
type is direct, where attackers employ a simple concept: sending bogus packets directly from 
a remote node, under attackers control, to a given target. Attackers usually gain access to 
as many as thousands of vulnerable zombie computers in order to magnify and direct their 
full-scale assault against a single victim from all directions. Fig. 1.2 illustrates the basic steps 
to generate a direct DoS attack. 
The second type, called reflector-based, is more complicated as it introduces one more level 
in the attack structure. Instead of flooding the target directly, the compromised machines 
2According to [14], most modern operating systems use only a few selected initial TTL values, 30, 32, 60, 
64, 128, and 255. 
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(zombies) are instructed to continuously send request packets to a set of Internet reflectors 
(an Internet reflector is an IP host that will reply to any request packet). The source address 
of each of these request packets is spoofed to be the address of the targeted machine. As a 
result, the reflectors send their replies to the given target address causing packet flooding at 
that machine. It is to be noted that source address spoofing is essential in this type of attack 
indirection. Fig. 1.3 shows the basic steps to conduct a reflector-based DoS attack. 
1.3.1.3 Attribute 3: Attack Amplification Factor 
Attack amplification refers to the amount of gain in resource (e.g., bandwidth) an attacker 
achieves for each emitted attack packet. If the attacker emits an attack packet of size x, for 
which the victim receives an amount of traffic of size y, then we say that the amplification 
factor for this attack is / = |. Most of direct DoS attacks have an amplification factor of 1. 
This is because each attack packet reaches the victim without any increase in its size. However, 
in reflector-based DoS attacks, an amplification factor of more than one is usually noticeable. 
In this context, there are two main types of attack amplification. The first is number-based 
amplification. The second is packet size-based amplification. Smurf attack [16] is a typical 
example of number-based amplification reflector DoS attack. The attacker sends an ICMP 
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Figure 1.3 Reflector-based DoS attack scenario. 
echo request (ping) to a broadcast address. The source address of the echo request is the IP 
address of the victim (uses the IP address of the victim as the return address). After receiving 
the echo request, all the machines in the broadcast domain send echo replies (responses) to 
the victims IP. Victim will crash or freeze when receiving larger-sized packet flood from many 
machines. 
DNS-based reflector DoS attack [17] is a typical example of packet size-based amplification. 
In this attack, a large number of UDP-based DNS requests are sent to a name server using a 
spoofed source IP address that is identical to the victim's IP address. Any name server response 
is sent back to the spoofed IP address as the destination. Because name server responses can 
be significantly larger than DNS requests, there is a potential for bandwidth amplification. In 
other words, the responses may consume more bandwidth than the requests. It is obvious, 
that the attack amplification is due to the increase of the packet size rather than due to the 
increase in the number of packets volume. Hence, the name packet size-based amplification is 
used to describe such attacks. 
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1.3.1.4 Attribute 4: Attack Rate Dynamics 
An important attribute of DoS attacks is the rate of arrival of attack packets at the vic­
tim. Setting a pattern and a value for the attack rate is a basic step in configuring attack 
tools. Generally, attack rate can be described using the ordered pair (continuity, intensity). 
Continuity specifies whether the attack is continuous or discrete, while intensity specifies the 
severity of the attack (e.g., high, low, etc.). Generally, the amount of damage at the victim 
is proportional to the attack rate. Higher the attack rate, higher the damage. However, there 
is an inherent tradeoff from the perspective of an attacker between the attack rate and the 
ability to elude attack detection. For example, continuous high rate attack has severe impact 
on the victim, but, it is very easy to detect. While continuous low rate attack has less impact 
on the victim, but, it is more difficult to detect. For this reason, attackers tend to manipulate 
attack rate dynamics in a manner that causes significant damage at the victim, while making 
attack detection much harder. 
1.3.1.5 Attribute 5: Number of Attackers vs. Number of Victims 
DoS attacks can be classified as follows based on the number of attackers and the number 
of victims. CI: Single_attacker Single.victim, C2: Single_attacker Multiple.victims, C3: Mul-
tiple_attackers Single_victim, and C4: Multiple_attackers Multiple.victims. Among these, C3 
is the most common and the worst one from the perspective of an individual victim because 
the intensity of the attack is expected to be very high. Usually, victims tend to tolerate DoS 
attacks with low intensity as in CI and C2 because the overhead associated with mitigating 
such attacks is very high compared to the benefit of mitigation. However, mitigating high 
intensity attacks, such as in C3 and C4 is extremely important for each victim. 
1.3.1.6 Attribute 6: Attacker's Reaction to Victim's Defense 
Current DoS attack tools are automated and pre-configured by attackers ahead of time 
before an attack onset. In most cases, the attacker does not react to defenses employed by 
the victim during attack period. We refer to such attacks as classical attacks. However, it is 
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expected to see more sophisticated attacks, in which the attacker monitors victim's reaction 
and acts accordingly. We call such attacks advanced attacks. In fact, advanced attacks impose 
a real threat, because traditional countermeasures can be bypassed by attackers. A recent 
study [18] showed that advanced attacks have a significant impact on statistical packet filters. 
We believe that attacker's awareness is going to be an important attribute in future DoS attack 
tools. 
1.3.2 Means-based Classification of DoS Attacks 
In this subsection, we devise a classification of DoS attacks from attacker's viewpoint. 
This classification takes into consideration the the means of performing a DoS attack. In 
this context, we classify DoS attacks into two main categories: (1) Brute force-based attacks, 
and (2) Protocol exploitation-based attacks. Attacks in the first category adopt the idea of 
brute force resource exhaustion to achieve their goal. Attacks in the second category adopt 
the idea of exploiting the deterministic nature of certain Internet protocols to significantly 
degrade their throughput without injecting a lot of traffic in the Internet. A classification of 
DoS attacks in each category is shown in Figure 1.4. In the following discussion, we provide 
detailed description of these attacks. 
1.3.2.1 Brute Force-based DoS Attacks 
The main objective of brute force-based DoS attacks is to overpower the victim while 
concealing attacker's identity. This goal is achieved by overwhelming the victim by an amount 
of traffic, requests, or computational tasks, that are much larger than what can be handled 
by the victim. The premise here is that overwhelming the victim by an intensive load will 
render it unavailable for legitimate users. The targeted resource could be victim's buffer space, 
bandwidth, CPU cycles, or a combination of them. These attacks are further classified based 
on the location of the targeted resource into the following types. 
• End system brute force-based DoS attacks: The aim of these attacks is to occupy a dispro-
portional amount of victim's resources for maximum amount of time. Attacks of this type 
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Figure 1.4 Means-based classification of DoS attacks. 
are classified into light processing-based (LP-based) attacks, and heavy processing-based 
(HP-based) attacks. This classification is based on the load imposed on the system by 
each attack packet (or request) individually. LP-based attacks are usually characterized 
by a very intensive attack rate that brings the total load beyond the victim's capacity. 
The targeted resources in this attack include victim's bandwidth, buffers, memory, and 
CPU cycles. Flooding based attacks, such as SYN flooding [19], and smurf [16] which is 
an ICMP based flooding attack, belong to this category. On the other hand, HP-based 
attacks are usually characterized by submitting a large number of heavy processing tasks 
to the victim. A heavy processing task is basically a computationally intensive task. For 
example, it can be in the form of an authentication process, or it can be in the form 
of downloading huge files from a Web or FTP server in overwhelming numbers. Such 
attacks target higher layer resources such as CPU cycles, disk bandwidth, and database 
bandwidth. According to [20], these attacks profile the victim and mimic legitimate Web 
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browsing behavior of a large number of clients. These attacks are hard to defend against 
as the malicious requests differ from the legitimate ones in intent but not in content. 
• Network brute force-based, DoS attacks: In addition to targeting critical Internet in­
frastructure elements, such as DNS root servers and BGP routers, the primary target of 
network brute force-based DoS attacks are applications with sensitive timing constraints, 
such as multimedia applications and real-time communication services, in general. There 
have been several proposals to provide real-time support for such applications through 
network resource reservation. Differentiated services (DiffServ) architecture [21] is a typ­
ical example. Network brute force-based DoS attacks that target a DiffServ domain are 
also known as Quality of Service (QoS)-based attacks [13; 22, 23]. These attacks aim at 
stealing or exhausting DiffServ domain resources such as bandwidth and router queues 
in order to degrade the service perceived by subscribed multimedia applications. For ex­
ample, an adversary within the same stub network as that of a multimedia server, or at 
a neighboring network that is connected with the same ISP (Internet Service Provider), 
can passively monitor the ongoing traffic toward ISP edge routers. The adversary can 
then impersonate as legitimate sources by flooding spoofed data packets that have the 
same IP header as valid data packets (including Type of Service field). The packet fil­
ters that work based on packet header information only, cannot screen out these spoofed 
packets. As a result of traffic shaping at the network egress, legitimate packets maybe 
dropped blindly, leading to significant service degradation. 
It is worth mentioning that the majority of the reported DoS attacks are based on a brute-
force approach. These attacks are proven to be very effective and powerful. However, most of 
them can be easily detected, which is viewed as a weakness from the attacker's perspective, 
because attack detection is usually followed by activation of a certain countermeasure whenever 
possible. This issue has led researchers to believe that attackers will soon follow more efficient 
approaches in performing DoS attacks without being easily detected. The following subsection, 
describes several approaches that are more likely to be used by attackers in the near future. 
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1.3.2.2 Protocol Exploitation-based DoS Attacks 
The deterministic nature of Internet protocols opens the doors for attackers to tune their 
attack traffic dynamics and parameters in a manner that abuses Internet protocols and causes 
significant throughput degradation, if not complete denial of service, to legitimate users. Pro­
tocol exploitation-based DoS attacks are mostly feasible in the TCP and the 802.11 MAC 
protocols as well as in QoS networks. The protocol exploitation and abuse in these protocols 
can take place either in the control plane, or in the data plane. The following discussion 
provides a classification of DoS attacks in both planes. 
Control plane protocol exploitation-based. DoS attacks: Lack of authenticity of control 
messages in many Internet protocols combined with the predictable reaction of communicating 
parties, enable attackers to take over valuable end system and network resources with minimum 
effort. Therefore, denying service to legitimate users. In this context, we discuss the following 
two control plane-based DoS attacks. 
• TCP's connection establishment procedure-based DoS attack: TCP uses a three-way 
handshaking procedure to set-up a connection, it works as follows. 
1. A connection is set up by the initiating side sending a segment with the SYN flag 
set and the proposed initial sequence number in the sequence number field (ISN = 
x ) .  
2. The receiver then returns a segment with both the SYN and ACK flags set with the 
sequence number field set to its own assigned value for the reverse direction (ISN 
=y) and acknowledge field of x + 1 (ack = x + 1). 
3. On receipt of this, the initiating side records y and returns a segment with just the 
ACK flag set and an acknowledgment field of y + 1. 
A TCP listen port has a finite number of slots in its listen queue and normally this 
number is relatively small. When an attacker sends enough faked SYN packets, the listen 
queue can be fully occupied and subsequently deny any legitimate SYN packet from 
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entering into the listen queue. Therefore, until the connection establishment process 
times out, a disproportional amount of system resources are occupied: a slot in the 
attacked port's listen queue, memory to maintain connection information, and CPU and 
network bandwidth to retransmit the SYN-ACK packet. Such attacks are also known as 
SYN flooding attacks [19]. 
• Resource reservation procedure-based DoS attack: To provide QoS guarantees, the Re­
source Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [24] has been proposed. This protocol is basically a 
signaling technique used to reserve bandwidth on each router for a particular flow along a 
given data path. The routers along the path must support RSVP functionality. The lack 
of authenticity in RSVP makes it a tempting target of DoS attacks. In such an environ­
ment, an intruder can steal network bandwidth by initiating bogus reservation messages. 
Therefore, leaving little resources for genuine reservation requests. Such attacks are also 
known as QoS-based attacks. 
Data plane protocol exploitation-based DoS attacks: Both of TCP and 802.11 MAC 
protocols were designed to adapt to abnormal network conditions such as congestion and 
collisions. This adaptation behavior is always necessary to achieve a stable and an efficient 
utilization of network bandwidth given that the Internet hosts adhere to the rules of the 
adaptation mechanism. Recent research studies, in wired networks (e.g., [25, 26, 27]) and 
in wireless networks (e.g., [28, 29, 30]), have shown that protocol adaptation mechanisms 
can be exploited in several ways so as to create service outages and a significant throughput 
degradation. The main objective of protocol exploitation-based DoS attacks is to achieve 
a severe throughput degradation without using the conventional brute force packet flooding 
approach. Therefore, avoiding detection by affected systems. The following discussion is mainly 
focused on attacks that are based on exploiting the TCP protocol3. 
TCP protocol is characterized by its ability to adapt to network conditions in a manner 
that leads to congestion avoidance. This is achieved by using congestion window at the sender 
3To the best of our knowledge, none of these TCP exploitation-based approaches have been used yet sys-
temically by attackers in today's Internet. 
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side. At any given time, the congestion window indicates the maximum amount of data that 
can be sent out on a connection.without being acknowledged. Starting by a congestion window 
of size one, TCP enters slow start where congestion window is incremented by one for each 
acknowledgment of a new data. TCP remains in the slow start phase as long as no congestion 
is detected. TCP detects congestion when it fails to receive an acknowledgment for a packet 
within the estimated timeout, or upon the receipt of three or more duplicate ACKs indicating 
a data segment is lost. If packet loss occurs and three duplicate ACKs are received, then 
TCP enters fast recovery. However, if packet loss occurs and less than three duplicate ACKs 
(DACKs) are received, TCP, waits for a period of retransmission timeout to expire, sets the 
slow start threshold to half of the current congestion window, reduces its congestion window 
to one packet and resends the packet, performs slow start to the new threshold and then 
enters congestion avoidance phase, where additive increase multiplicative decrease (AIMD) is 
performed. 
Recent studies showed that the TCP congestion control mechanism is vulnerable to several 
types of attacks. These attacks exploit different stages of the congestion control mechanism. 
The following discussion focuses on attacks that are based on exploiting the TCP's time out 
mechanism, the AIMD behavior in the congestion avoidance phase, and the rate of bandwidth 
capture at different stages of the TCP's congestion control operation, referred to as inter 
connection-based DoS attack. 
• Time out exploitation-based DoS attacks: It has been shown in [25] that an attacker can 
force TCP connections passing through a given link or router to time out repeatedly, 
Thereby degrading their throughput. To achieve this goal, an attacker targets that 
link (or router) using short duration traffic bursts having RTT-scale burst length, and 
repeating the burst periodically at slower RTO (Retransmission Time Out) timescales. 
Such timely traffic bursts forces the targeted TCP connections to time out. Most of the 
modern TCP implementations have the base RTO = 1 sec, which means that all affected 
TCP connections will initiate retransmission after 1 second since the first attack burst 
is observed. The attacker waits approximately for 1 second before injecting the second 
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burst to ensure that retransmitted packets will be dropped as well. The same process 
repeats in a periodic fashion. The targeted TCP connections will be throttled to near-
zero throughput while the attacker will have low average attack rate, making it difficult 
to detect. 
• AIMD exploitation-based DoS attacks: This attack aims at forcing the targeted TCP 
connection (at the sender side) to frequently enter the fast recovery state. Different 
than the time out-based attack, an AIMD-based attack induces traffic bursts in such 
a way that some packet loss in the targeted TCP connection occurs, but a sufficient 
number of DACKs can still be received by the sender. This condition is to ensure that 
the connection will enter fast recovery state rather than entering time out. This attack 
becomes eventually similar to the time out-based attack if the congestion window drops 
below a certain level, because in such case there may not be enough DACKs to trigger 
fast recovery mechanism. The work presented in [26] describes two versions of this attack, 
one is synchronous in the sense that attack epochs always coincide with a fixed set of 
congestion window values. The second is asynchronous in the sense that attack pulses are 
generated with a fixed period, and they do not necessarily coincide with a pre-specified 
congestion window values. 
• Inter connection-based DoS attacks: The fact that TCP's congestion window evolves 
exponentially in the slow start phase, while it evolves linearly in the congestion avoid­
ance phase indicates that TCP flows in slow start rapidly secure greater proportion of 
bandwidth as compared to TCP flows who are in the congestion avoidance phase. Since 
short-lived TCP flows spend their lifetime in slow start phase, while long-lived TCP 
flows spend most of their lifetime in the congestion avoidance phase, it is possible to use 
short-lived TCP flows to attack long-lived TCP flows. The work presented in [27] was 
the first to show scenarios in which short-lived flows attack long-lived flows so as to dras­
tically impact their performance. The authors in [27] used a combination of simulations, 
analysis, and experiments to study the dependence of the severity of impact on ling-lived 
flows on key parameters of short-lived flows. 
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1.3.3 Impact-based Classification of DoS Attacks 
In this subsection, we devise an impact-based classification of DoS attacks. This classi­
fication takes into consideration the attack impact on the victim. The impact of an attack 
refers to the aftermath of an attack on the targeted resource. In this context, DoS attacks 
can be classified into two main categories: (1) Resource exhaustion-based attacks. (2) Re­
source stealing-based attacks. This classification is inline with the primary objective of any 
DoS attack- that is to render the targeted resource unavailable. Our intention here is to put 
the attacks described in subsection 1.3.2 in a new skeleton that reflects this view. Therefore, 
the discussion provided about these attacks will be brief. Figure 1.5 summarizes the attacks 
in each category. 
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• Resource exhaustion-based DoS attacks: Attacks in this category target end system re­
sources as well as network resources. End system resource exhaustion-based attacks in­
clude LP-based attacks, HP-based attacks, TCP's connection establishment exploitation-
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based attack, with the targeted resources are mainly buffers, memory, CPU cycles, and 
disk bandwidth. On the other hand, network resource exhaustion-based attacks include 
attacks against infrastructure elements such as DNS servers and routing protocols. Also, 
it includes data plane QoS-based attacks, where attackers exhaust the resources available 
for genuine users. 
• Resource stealing-based DoS attacks: Attacks in this category target network resources 
mainly, aiming at stealing network resources from legitimate users either by capturing 
these resources or by creating the illusion to legitimate users that the requested resources 
are not available. Resource capturing-based attacks include the control plane QoS-based 
attacks, in which an attacker uses bogus reservation messages to block significant amount 
of network resources from valid users, and the inter connection-based DoS attacks, in 
which an attacker uses short lived-TCP flows to capture more network resources as 
compared to long-lived TCP flows. Resource unavailable-based attacks include the time 
out-based attacks, and AIMD-based attacks. These attacks force legitimate TCP clients 
to back off repeatedly thinking that the available network resources are not sufficient to 
accommodate them. 
1.4 Research Challenges in Countering DoS Attacks 
Dealing with DoS attacks has proven to be extremely difficult. The following are the main 
challenges that face researchers in this field. 
• Distinction between attack traffic and legitimate traffic before reaching the target: Mali­
cious packets differ from the legitimate ones in intent not in content. This is due to the 
fact that attackers use the same Internet protocols used by legitimate users and generate 
packets that appears to be genuine. Therefore, attack traffic characterization is a very 
challenging problem. DoS countermeasures should perform accurate traffic characteriza­
tion. Otherwise, legitimate traffic can be affected considerably. 
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• Deployment of DoS countermeasures: Coming up with DoS countermeasures4 that are 
transparent to existing Internet protocols represents a major challenge. Most of the 
known DoS countermeasures require either a network support, an end-system support, 
or a protocol modification. Such requirements may stand against deploying these coun­
termeasures, because it is very difficult to enforce deployment of DoS countermeasures 
in an uncontrolled domain such as the Internet. 
• Handling huge volume of attack traffic at high Internet speeds: As discussed in Section 1.3, 
most of the reported DoS attacks are based on brute force approach, where overwhelming 
number of packets overload the victim. On the other hand, DoS countermeasures usually 
involve some kind of packet processing such as marking, validation, storage, filtering, etc. 
Given the fact that DoS attacks are characterized by huge packet volumes, performing 
these tasks at very high Internet speeds is a major challenge. 
• Detection and handling of sophisticated DoS attacks: New generation of sophisticated 
DoS attacks are emerging in different forms as explained in Section 1.3. These attacks 
can lead to degradation of service rather than complete blocking of service. Moreover, 
these attacks use much lower amount of traffic as compared to the flooding-based attacks. 
Therefore, conventional DoS detection methods will not be able to identify the existence 
of an attack. Developing fast and accurate detection schemes is an important issue in 
this context. Also, it is equally important to develop effective prevention and mitigation 
schemes to handle these attacks. 
• Determining the number of attackers: Since attackers employ source address spoofing 
widely, it is difficult to know if the attack traffic is originating from a single source or 
from multiple sources, and if it is originating from multiple sources, then what is the 
actual number of these sources. Knowing the number of attack sources may lead to 
strategic defense decisions in certain cases. 
4DoS countermeasures are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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1.5 Dissertation Organization 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
• In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the state of the art research in countering DoS 
attacks. The chapter's focus will be on prevention, mitigation, and traceback as the 
main countermeasures of DoS attacks. Also, we motivate for the work proposed in this 
dissertation, and we list its main contributions. 
• In Chapter 3, novel concepts for DoS mitigation are proposed namely, victim-assistance 
and protocol-determinism, respectively. The proposed concepts are used in the context 
of a perimeter based DoS mitigation architecture as complementary methods for edge 
routers to perform online attack packet identification. The proposed mitigation schemes 
have been evaluated through analytical studies for classical and advanced attacks quan­
tifying security metrics, such as false positive and false negative rates, and performance 
metrics, such as effective attack rate and connection establishment latency increase. 
• In Chapter 4, hybrid IP traceback schemes that integrate the concepts of packet marking 
and packet logging in a novel manner are proposed. The goal is to achieve a drastic 
reduction in the number of attack packets required to conduct the traceback process. The 
proposed traceback schemes have been evaluated through a combination of analytical and 
simulation studies quantifying performance metrics, such as number of attack packets, 
storage overhead, and attack localization distance. 
• In Chapter 5, some concluding remarks are made and potential future research directions 
are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART IN DoS COUNTERMEASURES 
The alarming increase in the number of DoS attacks against e-commerce companies and 
other organizations, the emergence of newly sophisticated attacks, and the growing fear from 
potential powerful coordinated attacks have led to a significant amount of research in recent 
years aiming at countering these attacks on all fronts. However, by considering the different 
ways by which attacks can be conducted (as explained in Chapter 1), it can be seen that 
winning the battle against attackers is not easy at all. In fact, the research done so far in this 
field provides partial solutions to the problem, or in some cases, solutions to specific instances 
of DoS attacks rather than providing a comprehensive solution. 
This chapter presents the state of the art research in countering DoS attacks, focusing 
mainly on the major defense mechanisms, their pros and cons, and their applicability to known 
DoS attacks. Before going into the details of DoS countermeasures, we provide the following 
discussion about the main criteria that are typically used for qualitative evaluation of these 
countermeasures. 
• Proactiveness: DoS countermeasures can be either proactive or reactive in nature. Proac­
tive countermeasures are those who work all the time. While reactive countermeasures 
are those who are activated only during an attack period. Obviously, there are several 
implications regarding a scheme being proactive or reactive. Generally, proactive schemes 
are more effective than reactive schemes because they start defense at an early stage of an 
attack. However, this comes at an additional cost represented by an additional overhead 
and a need for a wide scale deployment. 
• Effectiveness: The performance of a given DoS countermeasure is usually evaluated 
through several metrics (e.g., false positive rate, false negative rate, processing over­
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head, storage overhead, communication overhead, etc.). The effectiveness of a scheme is 
determined by taking all performance metrics into account. 
• Generality: A challenging issue in countering DoS attacks is that these attacks vary and 
change from time to time. Typically, DoS countermeasures should be generic in the 
sense that they should be applicable to a wide range of attacks. Although this feature 
is preferred whenever possible, it is not always necessary because each attack instance 
involves limited number of protocols, and because generic mitigation schemes are usually 
expensive and difficult to implement. 
• Deploy ability: Deployment of DoS countermeasures is an important issue that must be 
considered. A practical DoS countermeasure should be easy to deploy in the sense that 
it minimally interferes with existing Internet protocols and settings. Also, the scale of 
deployment should be reasonable. Countermeasures that require local deployment are 
usually preferred over those which require global deployment. However, if a DoS coun­
termeasure requires global deployment, then this deployment should be incrementally 
feasible. 
• Static versus dynamic: As discussed in Chapter 1, based on attacker's awareness of the 
defense mechanism, a DoS attack can be classical or it can be advanced. DoS counter-
measures should take this issue into account. Static DoS countermeasures are expected 
to be effective against classical attacks. However, they are expected to fall short in the 
face of advanced attacks. DoS countermeasures should be dynamic in the sense that they 
should be able to detect attacker's awareness of the defense scheme in use, and to act 
accordingly in a dynamic manner. 
It is important to mention that the above criteria should be considered collectively when 
evaluating DoS countermeasures. Obviously, a typical countermeasure would be reactive, ef­
fective, generic, locally deployable, and dynamic. In practice, it is acceptable to have coun­
termeasures that meet some of these criteria rather than meeting them all. We employ this 
evaluation methodology in the following discussion which provides a broad classification of 
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DoS countermeasures. Based on their primary objectives, DoS countermeasures are classified 
into three major categories, namely, prevention, mitigation, and traceback. Figure 2.1 shows a 
classification of DoS countermeasures and summarizes the main approaches in each category. 
Denial of Service Countermeasures 
Network-based Statistical-based 
Victim-based 
Source-based 
Path-based 
Rate limiting-based 
Traffic Engineering 
Packet logging 
Packet marking 
Mitigation Prevention Traceback 
Figure 2.1 Taxonomy of DoS countermeasures. 
• DoS Prevention: Preventing DoS attacks aims at avoiding the occurrence of these attacks 
in the first place. Since DoS attack mechanisms vary, attack prevention techniques vary 
as well. In fact, there are few and not very effective schemes for preventing various types 
of DoS attacks. Most of these schemes (e.g., [31, 32, 33, 34]) are especially useful for 
preventing attacks that employ source address spoofing. Therefore, aiming at stopping 
attack packets from reaching their target by performing some sort of source address 
validation. Other schemes, however, apply for attacks that do not necessarily rely on 
source address spoofing. For example, lightweight authentication is used for preventing 
QoS-based attacks [13], while TCP's time-out randomization is used for preventing low-
rate TCP attacks [25]. Prevention schemes are usually proactive in nature, generally 
require global deployment in order to be effective, and they are usually static in nature. 
In section 2.1, we further classify DoS prevention schemes based on the location of their 
deployment as: (i) source-based, (ii) network-based, and (iii) victim-based. 
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• DoS Mitigation: Mitigation of DoS attacks is a reactive countermeasure that is usually 
initiated by the victim after detecting an attack. The main challenge in DoS mitigation 
is to accurately identify attack packets and filter them without causing collateral damage 
to legitimate traffic destined to the victim. There has been three major approaches to 
perform DoS mitigation, namely, rate limiting-based (e.g., [35, 36, 37, 38]), statistical-
based (e.g., [39, 40, 41]), and path-based (e.g., [15, 42, 43, 44]). Rate limiting-based 
schemes deal with DoS attacks either as a congestion control problem or as a resource 
management problem. In both cases, the main idea is to characterize attack traffic 
and rate limit it. This approach is reactive, does not require wide scale deployment in 
most cases, generic in the sense that it applies to flooding attacks of any protocol type. 
However, it is not effective since it does not avoid collateral damage. Statistical-based 
schemes are based on the fact that attack traffic is more likely to hold a combination 
of attributes that were rarely seen by the victim. Therefore, incoming packets that hold 
attributes that do not match the attributes of an up-to-date traffic profile maintained 
at the victim are filtered directly. This approach is not effective as it introduces high 
false positive rates. Path-based schemes perform attack traffic filtering based on the 
identification of the paths traversed by attack packets (e.g., [42, 43]), the length of the 
paths followed by attack packets (e.g., [15]), or even by controlling the paths followed 
by legitimate packets (e.g., [44]). In section 3, we discuss DoS mitigation approaches in 
more detail. 
• DoS Traceback: IP traceback, defined as the process of identifying the actual sources 
of IP packets, is an important countermeasure for DoS attacks that employ source ad­
dress spoofing. In this context, IP traceback schemes usually rely on Internet routers in 
performing certain functions that eventually aid in locating attackers. IP traceback has 
the benefit of holding attackers accountable for abusing the Internet1. Also, it helps in 
mitigating DoS attacks either by isolating the identified attack sources, or by filtering 
attack packets coming from these sources far away from the victim. Using IP traceback 
1 Personal identification of attackers can be done by further investigation and analysis of the compromised 
systems discovered by the IP traceback process. 
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for DoS mitigation was considered in [43]. The IP traceback problem has received con­
siderable research attention since the early days of DoS attacks [51]-[68]. This research 
has resulted in many IP traceback schemes that are broadly classified into three main 
categories, namely, packet marking-based schemes, packet logging-based schemes, and 
traffic engineering-based schemes. In section 2.3, we survey the main research efforts in 
this field focusing on the main ideas of the existing schemes and highlight their major 
deficiencies. 
In the following sections we discuss the state of the art research in each DoS countermea­
sures category. Also, we motivate the work proposed in this dissertation, and highlight the 
main contributions. 
2.1 DoS Prevention Schemes 
In this section, we classify DoS prevention schemes based on the location of their deployment 
as: (i) source-based, (ii) network-based, and (iii) victim-based. The following subsections 
discuss the main schemes in each category. 
2.1.1 Source-based DoS Prevention Schemes 
In the source-based DoS prevention approach, the verification of the legitimacy of IP packets 
is performed at the periphery of the Internet, typically at the link between a customer network 
(i.e., the source of the packets to be validated) and an ISP network. This approach has been 
adopted by schemes such as ingress filtering [31], DWARD [46, 47], and IP Easy-pass [13]. 
Ingress filtering is mainly intended for filtering IP packets with spoofed source addresses. This 
filtering is done by configuring the edge router that connects the customer network to the 
ISP network so as to block packets that arrive with source addresses having prefixes that 
do not match the customer's network prefix. DWARD performs a proactive identification 
and filtering of suspicious flows originating from a customer network. This is achieved by 
monitoring the nominal per destination type traffic arrival and departure rate of TCP, UDP, 
ICMP packets, as well as any abnormal asymmetrical behavior of the two-way traffic at the edge 
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router connecting to a stub-network. IP Easy-pass, on the other hand, adopts a lightweight 
authentication scheme in order to prevent DoS attacks that target real-time applications within 
a DiffServ architecture [21]. 
Typically, preventing DoS attacks at their sources is the best solution because it protects the 
Internet from unwanted traffic at the earliest possible location. Therefore, preventing malicious 
flows from consuming network and end system resources. However, the major problem of this 
approach is that the deploying networks (i.e., those who adopt source-based prevention) should 
perform proactive detection and prevention of attacks originating from them. This leads to an 
extra overhead that discourage network administrators from adopting such approach, especially 
that the benefits of source-based prevention cannot be felt directly by the deploying network. 
Also, it may violate some existing setups and protocols such as Mobile IP and multi-homing (as 
in the case of ingress filtering). In addition, the success of this approach (especially in the case 
of ingress filtering and DWARD) depends directly on its wide scale deployment. Moreover, 
each scheme has its own limitations. For example, the scope of IP-Easy pass is limited only to 
environments similar to the DiffServ domain, and DWARD cannot prevent colluding attacks 
in which attackers generate traffic in both directions (i.e., inbound and outbound). 
2.1.2 Network-based DoS Prevention Schemes 
As a proactive solution to DoS attacks, several filtering schemes, which must execute on 
Internet routers, have been proposed to prevent spoofed IP packets from reaching intended 
victims. In this approach, if the source address of a given packet does not map to an expected 
router's interface, then the packet is dropped. The main challenge in this approach is to estab­
lish a valid mapping between a router's interface and a source address space. This approach 
has been adopted by the distributed packet filtering architecture (DPF) [32], in which it has 
been shown that an edge router of an AS (autonomous system) can perform proactive packet 
filtering by utilizing the routing information to determine whether an incoming packet is valid 
with respect to the packet's inscribed source and destination IP addresses. Also, this approach 
has been adopted by the SAVE protocol [33], which provides Internet routers with information 
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to build incoming tables that map source address spaces to router's interfaces. 
Generally, the main problem with this approach is that IP packets with enroute spoofed 
source address cannot be filtered [11], because an attacker would spoof the address of a node 
that is located along the path between the attack node and the intended victim. Also, this 
approach requires wide scale deployment to be effective. Moreover, due to frequent route 
changes, legitimate traffic may get filtered even in the absence of an attack. In addition, each 
scheme has its own problems. For example, the major challenge in the DPF architecture is to 
make source-based routing information available to routers such that they can perform spoofed 
packet filtering. This issue was left as an open problem. SAVE protocol, on the other hand, 
is still subject to several problems that include incoming table's poisoning due to attacker's 
ability to inject false update messages, and incoming table's inconsistency due to frequent 
route changes, leading to false packet filtering. 
2.1.3 Victim-based DoS Prevention Schemes 
Deploying DoS prevention schemes at potential targets is more incentive as compared 
to their deployment at the source of an attack or inside the network. This is because the 
benefit of DoS prevention is felt directly by the deploying system or network. TCP's time­
out randomization [25, 48], and spoofing prevention method (SPM) [34] have adopted this 
approach. TCP's time-out randomization requires a slight modification to the TCP stack such 
that TCP clients can avoid the effects of low rate TCP attacks [25]. Generally, TCP's time-out 
randomization has limited benefit because an attacker can still degrade the performance of the 
targeted TCP connections. SPM, on the other hand, requires installation of packet filters at 
the edge of a network to filter IP packets with spoofed source addresses. In order to achieve this 
functionality, the scheme requires each IP packet leaving a source network towards a certain 
destination to be tagged by a key that is associated with that (source network, destination 
network) pair. The dependency of SPM on authentication makes it similar to IP Easy-pass 
[13]. The main difference is that IP Easy-pass performs lightweight authentication at a single 
domain scale, while SPM performs lightweight authentication at an Internet scale. Although 
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such scheme is more incentive to deploy as compared to ingress filtering, mutual cooperation 
among large number of ISP networks is still required. Moreover, SPM imposes additional 
overhead at the source network (due to key tagging) as well as at the destination network (due 
to key verification). 
2.2 DoS Mitigation Schemes 
DoS mitigation is a strategic defense mechanism that is usually activated after detecting 
an attack. A core issue in DoS mitigation is the ability to make a distinction between attack 
packets and legitimate packets. There have been three major approaches in the literature in 
order to achieve this distinction. The following subsections are mainly devoted to discuss these 
approaches. 
2.2.1 Rate Limiting-based DoS Mitigation Schemes 
DoS attacks are usually characterized by huge packet volumes that lead to a network 
congestion and to an end system overloading. Therefore, it is logical to deal with this problem 
as a congestion control problem as in the Pushback scheme [35, 36, 37, 38], or as a resource 
management problem as in the max-min fair server-centric router throttles [49]. In both cases, 
the main objective is to throttle attack flows, such that legitimate flows obtain fair share 
of the available resources. This goal can be achieved by applying rate limiting on incoming 
flows selectively. Pushback adds a functionality to each router to detect and preferentially 
drop packets that probably belong to an attack flow. In the max-min fair server-centric router 
throttles, the routers along forwarding paths to a server under DoS attack are asked to regulate 
the contributing packet rates to more moderate levels such that overall packet arrival rate at 
the server falls within acceptable range. 
The deployment requirement of rate-limiting based DoS mitigation varies from one scheme 
to another. For example, Pushback scheme requires wide scale deployment in order to be 
effective. While the max-min fair server-centric router throttles requires local deployment. In 
terms of effectiveness, rate-limiting approach affects legitimate traffic significantly. Also, this 
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approach requires Internet routers to characterize malicious traffic precisely before being able 
to throttle it. This seems to be difficult to achieve given the dynamic nature of various types 
of flooding attacks. In fact, the characterization process is left as an open problem as pointed 
out in [35]. Moreover, attackers who are aware of the existing defense mechanisms can change 
their traffic dynamics in such a way as to avoid the filtering rules. 
2.2.2 Statistical-based DoS Mitigation Schemes 
Attack packets are more likely to hold attributes that were rarely seen by the victim. This 
observation is mainly due to the fact that attackers usually employ random spoofing of source 
addresses, TTL values, TOS field, and other packet attributes. By keeping an up-to-date profile 
of legitimate traffic, a system under attack can use this profile to perform per-packet filtering. 
Packets with attributes that are rarely seen in the traffic profile are dropped during attack 
time. History-based filtering [39] and Packetscore [40, 41] have adopted this approach. During 
an attack, history-based filtering drops packets from sources that rarely communicate with the 
targeted system in the absence of an attack, while allowing packets with source addresses that 
regularly visit the network. Packetscore enables each edge router of an ISP network to compute 
a "score" for each suspicious packet and ranks the likelihood of the packet being an attacking 
packet, given the attribute values it carries, using a Bayesian-theoretic approach. Statistical-
based DoS mitigation has several drawbacks. For example, the traffic profiles maintained at 
the victim or at the edge routers can be poisoned before launching an attack, and sophisticated 
attackers can generate packets with attributes that match these traffic profiles. 
2.2.3 Path-based DoS Mitigation Schemes 
Since attackers, in most cases, do not have control over the actual paths traveled by attack 
packets, it is possible to filter these packets either by identifying the paths followed by them 
(e.g., path identifier [42], and traceback-based intelligent packet filtering [43]), by inspecting 
certain attributes of these paths (e.g., hop-count filtering [15]), or even by controlling the 
paths followed by legitimate packets (e.g., Secure Overlay Services [44, 45]). Pi [42] and 
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IP traceback-based intelligent packet filtering [43] are based on the fact that attack packets 
originating from the same source are more likely to traverse the same path (assuming routing 
stability). Therefore, by identifying a single attack packet, it is possible to filter all subsequent 
packets coming along the same path. Hop count-based filtering [15] is based on the fact that the 
distance (i.e., number of hops) traveled by a packet that holds a spoofed source address is more 
likely to be different than that traveled by a packet emitted from the spoofed source itself. 
SOS architecture [44]is basically an overlay network, composed of nodes that communicate 
with one another atop the underlying network substrate. This architecture performs access 
verification at several nodes distributed throughout the Internet, then authorized traffic is 
forwarded through the overlay to a secret node. A perimeter that surrounds the protected 
target allows traffic coming from the secret node only while filtering any other traffic. 
The main advantage of the path-based DoS mitigation approach is that it is generic in 
the sense that it is protocol independent (i.e., it can be applied to any type of attack traffic). 
However, its major drawback is that it requires a network support (e.g., [42, 43, 44]) or an 
up-to-date hop count profiles (e.g., [15]) in order to perform accurate distinction between 
attack packets and legitimate packets, which makes its deployment less incentive. In terms of 
the scale of deployment, some path-based schemes (e.g., [42, 43]) require global deployment, 
some schemes require an overlay network support (e.g., [44]), while other schemes require local 
deployment (e.g., [15]). In terms of effectiveness, although the collateral damage in [42, 43] is 
low in general, it still exists, especially when the paths followed by legitimate packets share 
large portions with the paths followed by attack packets because, in this case, both types of 
packets are more likely to have the same path identifier by the time they reach the victim. The 
effectiveness of hop-count filtering [15] is determined by the accuracy of the hop-count profile 
maintained at the victim. Although the SOS architecture can theoretically filter all attack 
traffic2, it introduces a significant increase in the the latency across the communication path 
which estimated to be in the order of 10 times larger than in the direct communications case. 
2It is important to emphasize that SOS architecture is applicable only for mission-critical systems where 
authentication is a prerequisite for using these systems, and it is not intended for mitigating DoS attacks 
against public systems such as Web servers. 
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2.3 IP Traceback Schemes 
The focus of this section will be mainly on the major IP traceback approaches, namely, 
packet marking, packet logging, and traffic engineering. 
2.3.1 Packet Marking-based IP Traceback Schemes 
Packet marking-based IP traceback schemes employ a simple concept. As IP packets tra­
verse their paths, Internet routers proactively augment them with traceback information. Once 
an attack is detected, the victim extracts the traceback information from the received attack 
packets and uses it to reconstruct the path followed by attack packets. Therefore, packet 
marking-based IP traceback schemes usually consist of two algorithms. One is the packet 
marking algorithm that is running at the Internet routers. The other is the traceback algo­
rithm that is initiated by the victim to trace the attackers using the marking information 
found in the received attack packets. Packet marking schemes are usually constrained by the 
limited space available in the IP packet header that can be used to accommodate traceback 
information. Based on the fact that packet fragmentation is very infrequent in today's Internet 
[50], the focus has been always on utilizing the 16-bits ID fragmentation field and few other 
unused bits in the IP packet header for this purpose. 
Packet marking approach has been adopted originally by the probabilistic packet marking 
scheme (PPM) [51]. In this scheme, routers perform probabilistic marking on forwarded pack­
ets. For this purpose, three marking fields are reserved in each packet: start, end and distance. 
The scheme is designed such that at any node along a packet's path, the distance field would 
represent the number of hops between the edge defined by the pair (start, end) and that node. 
In other words, if a packet reaches its destination with the marking fields (start, end, distance) 
set to (x,y,d), respectively, the destination infers that the packet had been forwarded through 
the edge (x,y) which is d hops away. The actual marking procedure is performed by Internet 
routers as follows: If a router decides to mark a packet according to certain probability, q, it 
writes its IP address in the start field and initializes the distance field to zero. Otherwise, if 
the distance field is zero it writes its IP address to the end field and increments the distance 
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field. 
Once an attack is detected by the victim, it has to collect sufficient number of attack 
packets and extract marking information (i.e., edges and their distances) from them. It then 
combines them together to reconstruct the attack path (or attack tree if multiple attackers are 
involved). This scheme requires 64 bits for the start and end fields and 8 bits for the distance 
field. Therefore, a total of 72 bits would be allocated in each packet for marking purposes. 
To overcome this practical limitation, the authors in [51] proposed an encoding scheme that 
reduces the marking requirements to 16-bits. In addition to the fact that PPM itself is not 
immune to the spoofed marking field problem [52], there are a lot of problems associated with 
the marking information encoding which includes the requirement of huge number of attack 
packets to conduct the path (or tree) reconstruction process, the high overhead imposed on 
the victim in enumerating and combining a significant number of IP addresses' portions in the 
tree reconstruction process, and the high false positive rates in the case of multiple attackers. 
Several other schemes (e.g., [53, 54, 55]) have been proposed subsequently in order to 
enhance the performance and the functionality of PPM. The focus of these schemes was mainly 
on issues related to traceback authenticity and robustness, especially when there is a very large 
number of attackers. Although, many improvements have been made, these schemes still suffer 
from problems that were inherited originally from the PPM scheme, such as the requirement of 
a very large number of packets, and the spoofed marking field problem. Another approach for 
IP traceback is to locate attack nodes without identifying the paths followed by attack packets. 
This approach was adopted by the deterministic packet marking (DPM) scheme [56, 57]. In 
this approach, packet marking is performed only at the interface closest to the source of the 
packet on an edge ingress router. This scheme inherits some of the problems of ingress filtering 
[31] especially from the deployment point of view. 
As an alternative for inscribing the marking information within the IP packets themselves, 
S. M. Bellovin [58] proposed to inscribe the marking information within separate ICMP mes­
sages (called ICMP traceback). In this scheme, each router decides with some probability, 
q, to send an additional ICMP message about a given forwarded packet to the destination 
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rather than writing the marking information into the packet itself. A major problem with this 
scheme is that it introduces additional communication overhead in the sense that it increases 
the network traffic even without having a DoS attack. To address this issue, intention driven 
ICMP traceback (iTrace) was proposed in [59], where ICMP tracebak messages are emitted 
only toward destinations that already indicated their interest in receiving such messages. To 
achieve this functionality, iTrace scheme suggests utilizing the BGP routing information ex­
change as the vehicle to distribute system's interest in obtaining ICMP traceback messages. A 
similar scheme, called path information caching and aggregation (PICA), was proposed in [60]. 
The main difference is that message generation is router-driven rather than destination-driven. 
The scheme has the advantage of triggering traceback messages only when the aggregate count 
of packets going to the same subnet exceeds certain threshold during a specified interval of 
time. The main problem with PICA is that in large scale DoS attacks, the specified threshold 
may never be exceeded, especially at routers far away from the victim. 
2.3.2 Packet Logging-based IP Traceback Schemes 
Packet logging is the counterpart of packet marking in the sense that instead of writing 
router's information into IP packets, packet's information (digests, signature, or even the 
packet itself) is written into router's memory. Once an attack is detected, victim's upstream 
routers are queried to check if their memories contain attack packet's information or not. If 
attack packet's information is found in a given router's memory, then that router is assumed 
to be part of an attack path. Obviously, the major challenges in packet logging are the storage 
requirements at intermediate routers, maintaining privacy, and collecting packet's information 
from Internet routers. This approach was adopted by [61], wherein routers log information 
about traversing packets and then use the logged data to trace each packet from its final 
destination back to its source hop by hop. The major problems of this traceback method are 
the high storage demand, especially at high Internet speeds, and the high false positive rate. 
The fact that today's Internet link speeds could reach multiple G bps suggests that classical 
packet logging at Internet routers would require huge amount of storage resources. A. Snoeren 
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et.al., [62] came up with an innovative approach to reduce the storage requirement significantly. 
Their basic idea was to store packet digests at a given router using a storage efficient data 
structure known as Bloom filter [69]. This approach provides a significant reduction in the 
storage requirements at each router. Also, it maintains privacy because packet's digests stored 
at a router does not reveal any of its content. A hardware design was proposed in [63] to support 
the implementation of this scheme at a very high Internet speeds. The major drawbacks of 
Hash-based traceback is that it incurs relatively large processing and storage overhead due 
to its deterministic nature. Also, the method employed to download packet information from 
network routers is inefficient and requires special resources. Moreover, a major concern in 
Hash-based traceback is the small window of time through which packets can be successfully 
traced. 
2.3.3 Traffic Engineering-based IP Traceback Schemes 
Traffic engineering-based traceback schemes involve changing the network traffic in a con­
trolled manner during the attack period. This approach has been adopted mainly by Cen-
terTrack [64] and link-testing [65]. Centertrack is a reactive IP traceback scheme that aims 
at locating the link through which attack flows enter an ISP network, by selective rerouting 
of packets that have common attack signature through an overlay network consisting of IP 
tunnels that connect ISP's edge routers to special tracking routers. The major problems of 
this scheme is that it incurs a lot of management of overhead. Also, it is applicable only to 
large flow attacks. In link-testing, a short burst of traffic, generated using the UDP chargen 
service [70], is applied to a link under test to see whether it is part of the attack path or not. 
The major problems with this scheme is that it is not useful in multiple attackers case, or in 
variable rate attacks. Also, it includes multiple branch points and communication overhead 
due to message exchange. In addition, it represents a denial-of-service attack by itself. 
On the positive side, these schemes are reactive in the sense that they are initiated only 
when there is an attack, which means that the overhead associated with them is limited to 
the attack period rather than all the time. In addition, they are usually easier to deploy as 
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compared to packet marking and packet logging-based approaches. However, on the negative 
side, they have limited effectiveness, in the sense that they are not applicable for tracing 
DoS attacks that involve many attackers, also in the sense that the whole traceback process 
should be performed while the attack is going on, which imposes timing constraints on network 
administrators. From legal point of view, these schemes cannot be used to hold attackers 
accountable, because they do not collect evidence about attack packets and their sources. 
2.4 Motivations 
Considering the three major DoS countermeasures discussed in this chapter, DoS prevention 
is the most desirable solution. However, complete DoS prevention is not feasible in today's 
Internet due to: (1) the fact that DoS attacks are emerging in various forms and becoming 
more complicated, and (2) the proactive nature of prevention schemes makes their deployment 
less incentive, especially because DoS attacks are the exception rather than the norm. On the 
other hand, DoS mitigation is a more practical solution as compared to prevention for two 
main reasons: (1) at any given time, portion of the Internet rather than the whole Internet 
can be under attack, and (2) DoS mitigation schemes can be activated reactively based on the 
type of ongoing attack. It is implicitly assumed that only the targeted system or network may 
elect to mitigate an ongoing attack. Given that neither DoS prevention nor DoS mitigation can 
provide a clue about attacker's location, IP traceback remains a very important requirement 
for forensic investigations. 
Based on the previous discussion, the work presented in this dissertation focuses mainly 
on DoS mitigation and IP traceback. Despite the considerable amount of research done in 
these two areas, the existing mitigation and traceback schemes lack in several qualitative and 
quantitative metrics, which forms the motivation for the work presented in this dissertation. In 
the following subsections, we motivate the need for efficient DoS mitigation and IP traceback 
approaches. In particular, we briefly discuss the major drawbacks of existing schemes in both 
areas, and lay the ground for the work presented in this dissertation. 
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2.4.1 The Need for Efficient DoS Mitigation Approaches 
Table 2.1 provides a qualitative comparison between major DoS mitigation schemes in 
terms of practical aspects such as deployability, and in terms of performance aspects such as 
collateral damage, network exhaustion, and victim exhaustion. It can be seen that existing 
schemes have several practical and performance limitations. With respect to practicality, some 
schemes (e.g., Pushback, Pi, and Traceback-based filtering) rely on direct network support 
for their operation. Other schemes (e.g., PacketScore, History-based, and Hop-count) require 
up-to-date time variant traffic profiles or path length records to be maintained at the victim 
side. With such requirements, the practicality of these schemes becomes limited. 
With respect to performance, collateral damage is not avoidable under rate limiting ap­
proaches. In certain scenarios, false positive rates will be high in the case of statistical-based 
approaches. A typical DoS mitigation scheme should provide protection from both end system 
exhaustion attacks and network exhaustion attacks. It is clear that this feature is not available 
in many of the schemes listed in table 2.1. Based on the above discussion, it is obvious that 
none of the existing DoS mitigation schemes combines good features in terms of practicality 
and performance. These shortcomings establish the need for more efficient and practical DoS 
mitigation schemes. Different than earlier work, the proposed research presented in Chapter 3 
of this dissertation promotes a new paradigm for DoS mitigation. The spirit of the proposed 
work is in devising new concepts that aid in performing online (i.e., without network sup­
port and without traffic profiling) DoS mitigation far away from the victim (e.g., at an ISP's 
perimeter). 
2.4.2 The Need for Efficient IP Traceback Approaches 
Among the three major IP-traceback approaches discussed in Section 2.3, packet marking 
and packet logging approaches have dominated the area of IP traceback. At the same time, less 
attention has been paid to the traffic-engineering based approach due to its limited benefit and 
little efficiency. However, despite their popularity and despite their promising features, packet 
marking and packet logging-based traceback approaches still lack in several aspects. Table 
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Table 2.1 Qualitative comparison of existing DoS mitigation schemes 
Approach Scheme Deployability Collateral 
Damage 
Network 
Exhaustion 
End System 
Exhaustion 
Rate 
Limiting 
Based 
Pushback [35] network support reqd. high low low 
Max-Min fair 
router throttles [49] 
perimeter-based high low low 
Statistical 
Based 
PacketScore [40] traffic profiling reqd. low/medium low low 
History based [39] traffic profiling reqd. low/medium high low 
Path 
Based 
Pi [42] network support reqd. low low low 
IP traceback based [43] network support reqd. low low low 
Hop count-based [15] traffic profiling reqd. low high low 
2.2 provides a qualitative comparison between these two approaches. The comparison takes 
into account the basic method employed in each approach, the number of packets required to 
conduct the traceback process, router's processing and storage overhead, packet's overhead, 
and the issue of collecting path information from Internet routers. 
It can be seen that neither packet marking nor packet logging performs well in all aspects 
of comparison. Specifically, these approaches require either a large number of attack packets 
to be collected by the victim to infer the paths (packet marking), or a significant amount of 
resources to be reserved at intermediate routers (packet logging). This lacking in performance 
motivates the need for more efficient IP traceback approaches that offer better performance 
in all aspects. In this context, the proposed research presented in Chapter 4 adopts a hybrid 
traceback approach in which packet marking and packet logging are integrated in a novel 
manner to achieve the best of both worlds, that is, to achieve small number of attack packets 
to conduct the traceback process and small amount of resources to be allocated at intermediate 
routers for packet logging purposes. 
2.5 Dissertation Contributions 
The contributions of this dissertation span the areas of DoS mitigation and IP traceback. 
With respect to DoS mitigation, we promote the concept of perimeter-based online DoS miti­
gation, wherein edge routers of an ISP network take advantage of the inherent features of the 
ongoing attack to perform per-packet classification and filtering. In this context, we advocate 
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Table 2.2 Qualitative comparison between packet marking and packet log­
ging-based IP traceback approaches 
Traceback approach Packet Marking Packet logging 
Basic 
method 
routers write their IDs (IP addresses) 
in the forwarded packets 
(deterministic/probabilistic) 
packet information (digests or 
signatures) is written into 
router's buffer 
Number of attack 
packets needed to 
infer an attack path 
a large number of attack packets (probabilistic); 
single attack packet (deterministic) 
Same as packet marking 
Overhead no buffer overhead at routers; but 
high packet overhead; router 
CPU overhead for marking 
high buffer overhead at routers; 
but no packet overhead; router 
CPU overhead for logging 
Collecting path 
information 
not a big issue, i.e., can be done 
using the attack packets 
coordination among 
routers required 
two new concepts to supplement ISP's edge routers by special mechanisms in order to perform 
online attack mitigation. In particular we make the following contributions. 
• Advocating the concept of protocol determinism-based online DoS mitigation: In this 
dissertation, we utilize the deterministic nature of Internet protocols and the inherent 
features of DoS attacks in performing online DoS mitigation. We apply this concept 
within a novel scheme, called intentional dropping-based filtering, for mitigating SYN 
flooding attacks. 
• Advocating the concept of victim-assisted based online DoS mitigation: In this disserta­
tion, we show that the victim of a DoS attack can play a direct role in mitigating the 
attack. Specifically, we show how a victim can guide its ISP's edge routers to filter pack­
ets that do not comply with a pre-specified rules enforced by the victim itself during an 
attack period. Two DoS mitigation schemes are proposed based on this concept, namely, 
the SYN number based filtering and the distributed packet pairing based filtering. 
• Performance analysis of the proposed DoS mitigation schemes: The proposed DoS mit­
igation schemes are evaluated through a probabilistic analysis under different scenarios 
that include classical attacks as well as advanced attacks. 
With respect to IP traceback, we design, analyze, and study the performance of two novel 
hybrid IP traceback schemes employing packet marking and packet logging. In particular, we 
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make the following contributions. 
• Design and analysis of Distributed Link-List Traceback (DLLT): In this dissertation, we 
employ the concept of a "distributed link list" in the context of a novel IP traceback 
scheme, called DLLT. The basic idea of DLLT is to establish a link between routers that 
perform probabilistic marking for a given packet, such that the identity of these routers 
can be retrieved by following the pointer of that list. 
• Design and analysis of Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM): In this disserta­
tion, we employ the concept of a "pipeline" in the context of a novel IP traceback scheme 
called PPPM. The basic idea of PPPM is to identify the identities of routers that perform 
probabilistic packet marking for a given packet by propagating the marking information 
from one marking router to another, within packets destined to the same destination, so 
that it eventually reaches the destination. 
• Performance evaluation of the proposed IP traceback schemes: We evaluate the proposed 
IP traceback schemes through a combination of simulation and analytical studies. In 
particular, the proposed schemes are evaluated in terms of the number of packets required 
to construct full attack path and in terms of their storage requirement. In addition, new 
performance metrics are defined to evaluate the proposed schemes. 
Fig. 2.2 shows a summary of the novel contributions of this dissertation. 
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Figure 2.2 Summary of the work presented in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 3. PERIMETER BASED ONLINE DOS MITIGATION 
In this chapter, we advocate two novel concepts, namely, victim-assistance and protocol-
determinism, for DoS mitigation. These concepts are mainly useful for supplementing edge 
routers of an ISP network with special mechanisms that enables them to distinguish attack 
traffic from legitimate traffic. In this context, the novelty of the proposed concepts is due to 
their benefit in performing online DoS mitigation at an ISP's perimeter. A feature that is not 
available in current perimeter-based DoS mitigation schemes. 
The concept of victim-assistance aims at making effective use of the information available at 
the victim about an ongoing attack. The spirit of this concept is envisioned via the cooperation 
between the victim of an attack and the edge routers of the ISP network where the victim is 
located. This cooperation is performed in a manner that enables edge routers to identify and 
filter attack traffic before reaching its target. For the sake of illustration, two DoS mitigation 
schemes are developed based on this concept, namely, packet pairing-based filtering, and SYN 
number-based filtering. 
The concept of protocol-determinism, on the other hand, aims at mitigating DoS attacks 
in a transparent manner. Without any communication (except for attack detection) between 
the victim and the ISP's edge routers, each edge router can perform packet classification and 
filtering independently by taking advantage of the proposed concept. Protocol-determinism 
concept takes advantage of the deterministic nature of Internet protocols in order to identify 
attack packets. The premise here is that while attackers usually exploit the deterministic 
nature of Internet protocols to perform DoS attacks (e.g., SYN flooding, low-rate TCP, etc.), 
they do not fully adhere to the rules of these protocols. Hence, the main objective of the 
proposed concept is to force attackers to fully adhere to the protocol rules, which results in a 
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significant reduction of attack traffic. Intentional dropping-based filtering is developed around 
this concept to mitigate SYN-fiooding attacks. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we discuss the possible 
deployment options for DoS attack detection and mitigation and we motivate the need for a 
perimeter-based architecture. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we describe the proposed concepts and 
show how they can be utilized for DoS mitigation. Finally, summary is presented in Section 
3.5. 
3.1 Perimeter-based DoS Mitigation - Why? 
It is well known that a DoS attack against an end-system has a direct impact not only 
on that system, but also on the network in which the targeted system is located. This is 
due to attack traffic aggregation near the victim, which leads to network resource exhaustion. 
Therefore, it is of primary importance to filter attack traffic as far from the victim as possible. 
In this context, the location of DoS detection and mitigation schemes involves several tradeoffs 
between efficiency and practicality that need to be considered. At one extreme, these schemes 
can be placed at the victim itself. At another extreme, these schemes can be placed at the 
ISP's perimeter. Between the two extremes, the location could be along an optimal boundary 
defined by the victim. The following discussion explains the tradeoffs introduced in each case. 
• At the victim: With respect to DoS detection, the victim is the best location for fast 
and accurate attack detection in most attack scenarios. With respect to DoS mitigation, 
the victim is also the best location from deployment point of view, because the DoS 
mitigation module would be installed at a single system (i.e., at victim), which has 
complete knowledge about the attack, and, in most cases, it can easily classify incoming 
traffic as attack or legitimate. Unfortunately, this ability does not alleviate the effect 
of attack packets as they consume significant network and end system resources by the 
time they are identified. 
• At the ISP's perimeter: With respect to DoS detection, edge routers along an ISP's 
perimeter cannot precisely detect the existence of an attack because the amount of at­
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tack traffic seen by each edge router individually is very small as compared to that seen 
by the victim. This is especially valid for flooding based attacks. However, with re­
spect to DoS mitigation, installing the DoS mitigation schemes far away from the victim 
(e.g., perimeter) provides protection for the network as well as for the targeted system. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to install the DoS mitigation schemes at the ISP's edge routers 
to form a line of defense at the ISP's perimeter, because (1) any traffic destined to the 
victim has to pass through one of the ISP's edge routers, (2) edge routers are usually 
computationally capable and can perform the task of packet classification and filtering. 
However, the major problem with this approach is that edge routers cannot perform 
accurate traffic classification by themselves due to the lack of knowledge about the on­
going attack and about how to make a distinction between attack packets and legitimate 
packets. 
• At an optimal boundary: An optimal boundary is a conceptual term that refers to the 
periphery around the victim where it is possible to protect against end system exhaus­
tion as well as bandwidth exhaustion. Such periphery is located somewhere between the 
ISP's perimeter and the victim itself. The DoS detection/mitigation schemes installed 
along that periphery can (1) detect attacks that are hard to detect at the ISP's perime­
ter, (2) perform more efficient DoS mitigation as compared to mitigation at the victim 
itself. Although such placement policy achieves the best of both worlds (i.e., protec­
tion from bandwidth exhaustion with accurate detection and efficient mitigation), it has 
several practical limitations that prevent its deployment. For example, the conceptual 
optimal boundary is victim-oriented. Moreover, it requires modification at core routers. 
Therefore, it raises several deployment concerns. 
Fig. 3.1 depicts the tradeoffs introduced by the placement of the DoS detection/mitigation 
schemes. Obviously, performing DoS mitigation at the ISP's perimeter has several benefits 
that can be summarized as follows. 
• Early filtering: Attack traffic is filtered before it enters the ISP network that contains 
the victim. Therefore, providing protection from bandwidth exhaustion as well as end 
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system exhaustion. 
• Fruitful deployment: The direct benefit of deploying an attack mitigation scheme is 
felt by the deploying network, which convinces network administrators to adopt this 
architecture. 
• Ease of deployment: Perimeter-based DoS mitigation is easy to deploy, manage, and 
operate due to its intrinsic feature of being under a single administrative domain such 
as an ISP network. 
In this dissertation, we adopt the perimeter-based DoS mitigation architecture. However, 
different than earlier work that adopted the same architecture (e.g., [71, 72]), we introduce the 
concept of online perimeter-based DoS mitigation wherein edge routers of the ISP network take 
advantage of the inherent features of the ongoing attack to perform per-packet classification 
and filtering. In this context, ISP's edge routers are supplemented by special mechanisms in 
order to perform online DoS mitigation. Two new concepts, namely, victim-assistance and 
protocol-determinism, are proposed in the following sections, respectively, in order to realize 
this objective. 
3.2 Victim-Assisted Schemes for DoS Mitigation 
Victim-assistance refers to the direct role of the victim in identifying attack traffic before 
reaching its target. This definition implies that the victim is required to cooperate with an 
ISP's edge routers in a manner that leads to accurate classification of incoming traffic. The 
basic idea of this concept is to involve the victim in guiding an ISP's edge routers to filter 
packets that do not comply with a pre-specified rules enforced by the victim during the attack 
period. In this section, we illustrate the use of this concept within two schemes that are 
designed to mitigate a class of attacks known as reflector-based DoS (RDoS) attacks. The first 
scheme is generic in the sense that it is applicable to any type of RDoS attacks. However, the 
second scheme is specific in the sense that it is mainly applicable for TCP-based RDoS attacks. 
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Figure 3.1 Tradeoffs introduced in the placement of DoS detection and 
mitigation schemes within an ISP network. 
3.2.1 An Overview of RDoS Attacks 
Recently, RDoS attacks are being used by attackers frequently to affect the availability 
of high profile servers [12, 73]. In these attacks, a large number of compromised computers 
under attackers' control (the slaves) are instructed to continuously send request packets to 
a set of Internet reflectors (an Internet reflector is an IP host that will reply to any request 
packet). The source address of each of these request packets is spoofed to be the same as 
the address of the targeted site. As a result, the reflectors send their replies to the system 
specified by the given address. Therefore, flooding it by significant amount of traffic. Using 
Internet reflectors complicates the problem of DoS attacks. Researchers are more concerned 
about these attacks because (1) attack packets (reply packets originated from the reflectors 
themselves) carry legitimate IP source addresses making it difficult to trace original attack 
sources, (2) these attacks are usually characterized by an amplification factor that increases 
their intensity. 
The analysis presented in [12] shows that RDoS attacks are feasible in variety of re­
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quest/reply based protocols, including TCP, UDP, ICMP, and DNS. For example, in Smurf 
attacks [16], the attacker sends ICMP echo requests (pings) to the broadcast address of a 
network, so the victim is hit by many more packets. The Fraggle (UDP packet magnification) 
attack uses UDP echo packets in the same fashion as the ICMP echo packets. In TCP-based 
RDoS attacks [73], attackers take advantage of the availability and connectivity of large num­
ber of Internet reflectors. This can be done by abusing the TCP protocol in the following way: 
an attacker, A, selects a set of Internet reflectors R={Ri,R.2, ...,RN}• It then sends low rate 
faked SYN packets to each of these reflectors with a spoofed source address equals to that 
of the final target, V. For each received SYN packet, the reflectors reply with a SYN-ACK 
packet to the given address, V. Therefore overwhelming the victim, V, by high aggregate rate 
of SYN-ACK packets. The following subsection highlights the importance of mitigating this 
type of attacks in particular. 
3.2.1.1 The Need for Protection from TCP-based RDoS Attacks 
In TCP-based RDoS attacks, the target can be a web server that accepts connections from 
clients throughout the Internet. In most cases, a web server does not initiate TCP connections 
by itself. Therefore, TCP-based RDoS attacks against such systems can be mitigated by 
filtering any incoming SYN-ACK packet. However, there exist several scenarios where the 
targeted system requires to initiate TCP connections with other systems across the Internet. 
Protection of such systems from reflected attack SYN-ACK packets is not trivial because it is 
difficult to distinguish these packets from legitimate SYN-ACK packets that are necessary for 
connection establishment. Here, we list few examples of servers that initiate TCP connections. 
These servers are potential targets of TCP-based RDoS attacks. 
• FTP Server [74]: In active mode FTP, the client connects from a random unprivileged 
port (Port Number PN > 1024) to the FTP server's command port, port 21. Then, the 
client starts listening to port PN + 1 and sends the FTP command "PORT PN + 1" 
to the FTP server. The server will then connect back to the client's specified data port 
from its local data port, which is port 20. 
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• Proxy Server [75]: A proxy server receives a request for an Internet service (such as a 
Web page request) from a user. If it passes filtering requirements, the proxy server looks 
in its lpcal cache of previously downloaded Web pages. If it finds the page, it returns the 
page to the user without needing to forward the request to the Internet. If the page is 
not in the cache, the proxy server, acting as a client on behalf of the user, uses its own 
IP address to request the page from the server out on the Internet. When the page is 
returned, the proxy server relates it to the original request and forwards it on to the user. 
Although using a proxy server in some cases is optional and can be avoided if it is under 
attack, some ISP's make all their users use a proxy server to block sites with unsuitable 
content. Therefore, a lot of management overhead would be incurred if ISP customers 
were asked to reconfigure their web browsers to avoid connecting to the Internet via a 
proxy server that is under attack. 
• SOCKS Server [76]: SOCKS server is a function that is used to manage the connections 
between clients/servers on a secure internal network and clients/servers on an untrusted 
network such as the Internet. The SOCKS server sits between the trusted and untrusted 
systems. The server regulates which connections are allowed, logs information regarding 
the connections, and hides the internal network information (such as internal IP ad­
dresses). Hosts outside the secured network perceive the SOCKS server as the source of 
the communication. The server resends requests and responses between the trusted and 
untrusted systems. 
In addition to their potential damaging effects on FTP, Proxy, and SOCKS servers, TCP-
based RDoS attacks have gained a special importance due to the following reasons. 
• TCP carries 95% of today's Internet traffic and 80% of the total number of flows in 
the Internet [77]. Therefore, attackers prefer using TCP based traffic in order to avoid 
detection. 
• Any general purpose TCP connection-accepting Internet server could be used as a packet 
reflection server. This provides attackers with a large pool of servers to be used as 
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reflectors. 
• Several incidents of TCP-based reflector attacks have been reported (e.g., in addition 
to the reported attacks against GRC.com [73], many TCP-based reflector attacks were 
captured at Los Nettos ISP network [78]). 
It is worth mentioning that the special importance of TCP-based RDoS attacks does not 
imply that other types of RDoS attacks do not pose a threat. In fact, mitigating these attacks 
is equally important. In the following subsections, we propose two schemes for mitigating TCP-
based RDoS attacks1. These schemes are based on the proposed concept of victim-assistance. 
3.2.2 Scheme I: Packet Pairing-based Filtering (PF) 
Based on the concept of victim-assistance, we propose a scheme for RDoS attack mitigation. 
The proposed scheme, called pairing based filtering (PF), works by informing edge routers of 
an ISP network about TCP connection establishment requests initiated by the victim such that 
incoming reply packets can be paired with them, while replies that represent attack packets 
can be filtered directly. It is important to mention that the basic idea of request/reply pairing 
is not new as it has been used earlier for DoS attack detection and mitigation (e.g., D-WARD 
project [47], SYN-dog [79], and TCP flooding blocking [80]). However, different than earlier 
work, request/reply pairing in our scheme is performed at the perimeter that is composed of 
an ISP's edge routers. This is more challenging as compared to performing the request/reply 
pairing at the single edge router of a customer network as in [47, 79, 80]. The benefit of this 
approach is that attack packets can be filtered before they enter the ISP network. In this 
subsection, we discuss the design and implementation of the PF scheme and characterize its 
behavior. Also, we perform statistical analysis to study the effects of traffic unpredictability 
(represented by routing instability and routing asymmetry) and other design parameters on 
the performance of the PF scheme. 
1It is to be noted that the PF scheme, proposed in subsection 3.2.2, is applicable to other types of RDoS 
attacks as well. 
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3.2.2.1 Assumptions 
Our methodology in mitigating the effect of TCP-based RDoS attacks is based on inherent 
features of the attack itself and the deterministic nature of the TCP protocol. We observe 
that an attacker has some constraints that shape the overall attack. Among these constraints 
is the total number of reflectors that an attacker can use, and more importantly, the mapping 
between theses reflectors and the edge routers of the ISP network which contains the targeted 
system. By this mapping we mean that each subset of reflectors used by the attacker have to 
forward their attack packets through the same edge router during the attack period. 
This conclusion is based on the assumption of routing stability2, referred to as the situation 
of having the same ingress router for all packets sent from a given source to a destination 
located in the ISP network. It is important to distinguish routing stability from routing 
symmetry which refers to the situation of having identical egress and ingress edge router for 
a SYN packet and its corresponding SYN-ACK packet. Although having routing symmetry 
facilitates the pairing of SYN packets generated by the victim and their corresponding SYN-
ACK packets (this is the basis of our proposed scheme), we do not necessarily assume routing 
symmetry. Instead, we assume that a mechanism such as loose source routing [75] can be used 
to force a SYN packet generated by the victim to pass through the edge router at which the 
corresponding SYN-ACK packet is expected to arrive. 
3.2.2.2 An Overview of the PF Scheme 
The PF scheme is a SYN-ACK packet classification and filtering scheme to be implemented 
at the edge routers of an ISP network. The scheme is assumed to be reactive in nature, 
which means that it should be activated only after detecting a TCP-based RDoS attack. The 
main idea of the proposed PF scheme is as follows: since an attacker keeps using the same 
set of reflectors continuously during an attack, subsequent SYN-ACK packets from the same 
reflectors can be filtered at their ingress points to the ISP network unless they correspond to 
previously sent SYN packets by the victim. 
2This assumption is relaxed in subsection 3.2.2.4. 
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The basic architecture of PF scheme can be viewed as a two level filter. Generally, SYN-
ACK packets destined to the victim can be classified as legitimate, attack, or suspicious. The 
filter is designed such that legitimate packets are passed directly, attack packets are dropped 
directly, and suspicious packets are marked and passed. Initially, all packets are assumed 
to be suspicious. However, by taking advantage of the nature of the RDoS attack and the 
deterministic behavior of the TCP protocol itself, subsequent packets can be classified with 
high accuracy. The following data structures are required at each edge router to implement 
the classification and filtering functions of the PF scheme. 
• Legitimate Packet List (LPL): LPL contains a list of SYN-ACK packets that are expected 
to arrive at the edge router. We use a combination of source IP address and ACK-number 
to uniquely identify each packet. LPL is updated frequently by forcing SYN packets 
generated by the victim for a given destination to exit the ISP perimeter at the same 
edge router at which the corresponding SYN-ACK packet is expected to arrive3 (this is 
achievable using loose source routing [75]). The knowledge about expected SYN-ACK 
ingress point is obtained by keeping an up-to-date table at the victim, in which the ingress 
point of each received suspicious SYN-ACK packet is recorded. This can be achieved by 
marking these packets (at their ingress points) by a code that uniquely specifies the edge 
router through which the packet has been forwarded4 (i.e., the ingress point). 
• Source Filtering List (SFL): The SFL contains a list of the reflectors that are being 
continuously used by an attacker. It is built gradually while passing suspicious packets 
deterministically. When a suspicious packet is passed, its source address is inserted into 
the SFL, such that subsequent packets from the same source are filtered unless they are 
found to be in the LPL. 
The PF scheme is activated by the victim upon detection of a TCP-based RDoS attack. All 
ISP's edge routers are informed (through an authentic multicast message) to activate the PF 
3If the victim does not have knowledge about the expected ingress point of the corresponding SYN-ACK 
packet, then the SYN packet is sent normally. 
4This issue is discussed in subsection 3.2.2.3. 
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scheme. It is important to mention that the same procedure is performed at all edge routers 
of a given ISP, and this procedure is applied only to SYN-ACK packets destined to a given 
victim. 
3.2.2.3 The PF Algorithm 
In practice, any data structure could be used to implement the LPL and SFL. However, 
for efficient packet processing and storage, we adopt using Bloom filters [69] to implement 
LPL and SFL. We refer the readers to Appendix B for a detailed description of Bloom filters. 
For the purpose of discussion, we use Bloom filters that are characterized by k hash functions 
and false positive rate of Pf, unless otherwise specified. Fig. 3.2 shows the PF algorithm. In 
this algorithm, an incoming SYN-ACK packet, P, is inspected for legitimacy (step 1). This 
is done by inspecting the LPL bits indexed by Hi (f .source, P.ack-number), #2 (f-source, 
P.ack-number), ..., (P.source, P.ack-number). This combination (i.e., P.source and P.ack-
number) should be the same as the combination of the destination's IP address and the (SYN 
number+1) of the corresponding SYN packet that is supposed to be already inserted in the 
LPL. If the packet is found to be legitimate, then it is passed (step l.a), and its entries are 
erased from the LPL table (step l.b). 
The packet is dropped if its legitimacy cannot be established and its address is found to be 
in the SFL (step 2). SFL membership test (i.e., to check if certain source is in the SFL) is done 
by inspecting the bits indexed by iJi(P.source), %(P source), ..., Hk{P-source). Otherwise, 
the packet is classified as suspicious (step 3) and its address is inserted in the SFL by setting 
the SFL bits indexed by the same values used for membership test such that future SYN-ACK 
packets from the same source are classified as attack packets if they fail the legitimacy test. 
The packet is also marked by a mark that is composed of a 1-bit flag that indicates that the 
packet is suspicious, and a code that uniquely represents the edge router through which the 
packet is passed. For an ISP network with N edge routers, [log2 N] bits would be required 
to represent each edge router. Table 3.1 shows the number of edge routers in different ISP 
networks. It can be seen that the number of bits required for edge router encoding is ISP 
52 
dependent, and in most cases, it is less than 13 bits. Such code can be written in the 16 bit 
ID field of the IP packet header. 
Algorithm name: Packet pairing-based filtering (PF) 
Input: SYN-ACK packet, P, destined to victim V 
1. if (Packet P is in the LPL) 
(a) pass P 
(b) erase P from the LPL 
2. else if (P.source is in the SFL) drop P 
3. else 
(a) insert P.source in the SFL 
(b) mark P with edge router ID 
(c) pass P 
Figure 3.2 The PF algorithm. This algorithm is to be performed at each 
edge router of an ISP network. 
The purpose of marking suspicious packets is two fold. (1) By receiving a suspicious packet, 
SP, the victim knows that the source address of the given packet has been inserted in the SFL 
of the edge router represented by the router ID obtained in the marked packet. If the packet is 
found to be legitimate, the victim should send an erase request to that edge router to remove 
the source address of the packet from its SFL. This is done by resetting the SFL bits indexed 
by Hi(SP.somce), /^(SP.source), ..., Hk(SP.source). Failing to do so may result in setting 
all SFL bits as a result of continuous insertions of newly seen sources, which leads to complete 
blocking of legitimate packets. 
(2) The marking at an edge router helps the victim in updating its information about 
the mapping between different packet sources and ISP edge routers. This information is used 
to update LPLs whenever a TCP connection is established by the victim. Whenever an edge 
router receives a SYN packet from the victim itself to establish a connection with certain system 
outside the ISP perimeter, the combination of the packet destination and (SYN number + 1) 
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ISP Number of edge routers ( N )  [log2 N~\ 
AT&T (US) 8044 13 
Ebone (Europe) 108 7 
Exodus (US) 49 6 
Level 3 (US) 875 10 
Sprintlink (US) 5990 12 
Telstra (Australia) 2249 12 
Tiscali (Europe) 182 8 
Verio (US) 2846 12 
VSNL (India) 10 4 
Table 3.1 Number of edge routers in various ISP networks. This informa­
tion was extracted from the Rocketfuel [81] ISP topology raw 
traces 
is inserted in the LPL by setting the bits indexed by Hi (P.destination, P.SYN-number + 1), 
^(^destination, P.SYN-number + 1), ..., Hk(P.destination, P.SYN-number + 1). 
3.2.2.4 Theoretical Analysis of the PF Scheme 
Ideally, the PF scheme should filter all attack packets without causing any collateral damage 
to legitimate packets. However, due to design and implementation factors of the scheme, and 
due to Internet traffic unpredictability, ideal operation of the scheme cannot be achieved. The 
following properties characterize the behavior of the PF scheme. 
• PF scheme does not provide instant filtering of attack packets at the moment the scheme 
is activated. This means that the edge routers will experience some delay before being 
able to classify incoming SYN-ACK packets with high accuracy. This delay is due to the 
gradual process of building the SFL at each edge router. 
• Ideally, all legitimate SYN-ACK packets destined to the victim are allowed to pass the 
ISP perimeter. The validity of this property depends on the knowledge of the victim 
about the expected ingress point for each SYN-ACK packet, and on the symmetry of 
egress/ingress of request/reply packets from/to the victim. This is because failing to 
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inform the correct edge router about an incoming legitimate SYN-ACK packet may lead 
to filtering of that packet. 
• Ideally, only one packet from each attack source is allowed to pass the ISP perimeter. 
This is because when the source address of the first attack packet from a given source is 
inserted in the SFL, all subsequent packets from the same source are going to be filtered. 
However, this property does not hold always due to routing instability, which changes 
the ingress point (to the ISP network) of incoming packets originating from the same 
source. If an attack packet from certain source enters the ISP perimeter at an edge router 
different than the one at which previous packets from the same source arrived, then such 
packet would be allowed to pass since its source address is not in the SFL of the current 
edge router5. 
Our aim is to evaluate the PF scheme in terms of the the following performance metrics 
which map to the previous properties. 
• Transient defenseless period (TDP): the period since the scheme is activated until all 
distinct attack sources are identified. 
• Pf. probability of filtering a given legitimate SYN-ACK packet. 
• Pa\ probability of allowing more than one packet from a given attack source (i.e., from 
a reflector) to pass the ISP perimeter. 
TDP Analysis: It is imperative to mitigate the effect of a DoS attack within short period 
of time. Complete mitigation6 of an attack is achieved only by identifying all distinct attack 
sources (i.e., reflectors being used by the attacker) because attack packets will be subject to 
deterministic dropping if their sources are found to be in the SFL. There is a tradeoff from the 
perspective of an attacker, between available resources (e. g., available bandwidth), detection 
avoidance by the reflectors themselves (e. g., high rate SYN packets from certain source may 
5An exception to this is when a false positive occurs to the packet's source address. In this case the packet 
would be filtered. 
6This is in ideal situation. 
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be considered as an indication of ongoing reflector attack), and the amount of damage desired 
at the targeted system. 
Assuming that a given edge router receives attack packets from n different reflectors with 
a Poisson rate of A packets/second from each reflector (i.e., an aggregate rate of An pack­
ets/second), then we need to find the average number of attack packets, M, required to insert 
all attack reflector addresses in the SFL of a given edge router, ERX. This problem is an instant 
of the well known coupon collector problem. It has been shown that M = n(l + ... + + ^) 
[82]. Therefore, the average time to collect all distinct attack reflector addresses can be ex­
pressed as This value represents the average transient defenseless period at router ERX. 
In practice, the average time would be larger due to the ramp up behavior observed in DoS 
attacks in general [78]. 
Pi Analysis: The probability of dropping a legitimate SYN-ACK packet depends on 
whether the packet source is new to the victim (i.e., the first time destined to the victim 
since the scheme is activated), or it is old (i.e., it has been destined to the victim earlier since 
the scheme was activated). The following analysis focuses on estimating the percentage of 
legitimate traffic that may get dropped. This analysis applies for packets that arrive after the 
transient defenseless period. 
The importance of an address being new or old reflects the knowledge of the mapping 
between the source address and the ingress point to the ISP network that contains the victim. 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) show the probability of blocking a legitimate packet originating from 
a new source, Pbnew, and the probability of blocking a legitimate packet originating from an 
old source, Pboid, respectively. 
where Pasymm represents the probability of egress/ingress asymmetry (i.e., the probability 
that a given SYN packet exits the ISP perimeter at certain edge router, while the corresponding 
SYN-ACK packets enters the ISP perimeter at different edge router), Pinst represents the 
asymm* f mew (3.1) 
Pbold — Pinst Pf (3.2) 
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probability of routing instability, and Pf represents the false positive rate of the Bloom filter 
that represents the SFL. 
The value of Pf depends on different design parameters including m: the size of the SFL, 
k: the number of hash functions used, and n: the number of source addresses inserted in the 
SFL. Obviously, the number of reflectors that are being used by the attacker which map to 
certain edge router depends on the actual network topology, routing protocol, and attacker's 
choice. Therefore, parameter n is expected to be different for different edge routers. We can, 
however, make some simplifying assumptions in order to derive an upper bound on the false 
positive rate of the SFL at each edge router by assuming that up to nmax reflectors out of those 
used by an attacker map to any edge router. For the purpose of discussion, SFL's parameters 
m, k, and nmaz were set to 128k bits, 4, and 5000, respectively, which corresponds to a Pf of 
0.0004, unless otherwise specified. 
In order to obtain an expression for the probability of blocking a legitimate SYN-ACK 
packet, Pi, we define Pnew to be the probability that the source of a legitimate SYN-ACK 
packet is new to the victim, and we combine Equations (3.1) and (3.2) to obtain: 
Pi — PnewPasymmPf + (1 ~ Pnew)PinstPf (3.3) 
It is important to realize that Pnew is not fixed. Initially, all legitimate SYN-ACK sources 
are new to the victim. However, as time proceeds, most of the legitimate SYN-ACK sources 
become old. To study the effect of routing instability and routing asymmetry separately, we fix 
one of them and vary the other along the possible values of P0id (the same as 1 — Pnew). Fig. 
3.3 shows the effect of routing instability on Pi. It can be seen that the blocking probability of 
legitimate packets increases when the routing instability increases, which can be explained by 
recalling that a legitimate SYN-ACK packet coming from an old source cannot be paired with 
the corresponding SYN packet if it arrives at an edge router different than the expected one. 
Fig. 3.4 shows the effect of routing asymmetry on Pi. It can be seen that Pi increases 
when the routing asymmetry increases, which can be explained by recalling that a legitimate 
SYN-ACK packet coming from a new source cannot be paired with the corresponding SYN 
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Figure 3.3 Probability of filtering a legitimate SYN-ACK packet (Pi). 
asymm and Pf were fixed to 0.2 and 0.0004, respectively. 
packet if it arrives at an edge router different than the one at which the SYN packet departed 
the ISP perimeter. Overall, the small values of Pi, which are in the range of 10-3, indicate 
that collateral damage under PF scheme is minimal. 
Figure 3.4 Probability of filtering a legitimate SYN-ACK packet (Pi). Pinst 
and Pf were fixed to 0.2 and 0.04, respectively. 
Pa Analysis: The probability of allowing more than one packet from the same attack 
source can be expressed as: 
Pa = Pinst( 1 - Pf) (3.4) 
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Figure 3.5 Probability of allowing more than one packet from the same 
attack source (i.e., the same reflector). 
For the purpose of discussion, we will consider using a SFL of size 128K bits with four 
hash functions. We assume different values for Pinst ranging from 0.05 to 0.2. Fig. 3.5 shows 
the value of Pa as a function of nmax. It is clear that stable routing (i.e., low values for Pinst) 
reduces the chances for more than one attack packet per source to pass the ISP perimeter. We 
also observe that Pa decreases slightly by increasing nmax. In fact, increasing nmax beyond the 
range shown in the figure leads to a sharp decrease in Pa. This can be interpreted by recalling 
that increasing nmax corresponds to higher values of Pf. This represents one of the constraints 
imposed on the attacker by the PF scheme, which prevents the use of very large number of 
reflectors, because this would lead to higher Pf and consequently lower Pa. The effect of nmax 
on Pi can be seen in Fig. 3.6 which plots Pi under the same conditions. It is clear that Pi 
increases slightly (observe that Pi remains in the 10~3 range) by increasing nmax, which is due 
to the corresponding increase of Pf. By looking at figures 3.5 and 3.6 together, one can infer 
the tradeoff regarding nmax from attacker's viewpoint. 
3.2.3 Scheme II: SYN-Number based Filtering (SNF) 
TCP connection establishment procedure is characterized by its deterministic nature re­
garding the type and content of messages exchanged between the communicating parties. This 
forms the basis of our second victim-assisted scheme for defense against TCP-based RDoS at-
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Figure 3.6 Probability of filtering a legitimate SYN-ACK packet (Pi). Pnew 
and Pasymm were fixed to 0.5 and 0.2 respectively. 
tacks. Theoretically, an incoming SYN-ACK packet (destined to the victim) can be validated 
by inspecting its sequence number to see if it matches the ISN of the corresponding SYN packet 
plus one. Although such validation could be done very effectively at the victim itself, it would 
not be useful to stop network resource exhaustion attacks. 
The proposed scheme, called Sequence Number based Filtering (SNF), enables edge routers 
of the ISP network to validate incoming SYN-ACK packets destined to the victim without 
maintaining state information about individual SYN packets sent originally by the victim. 
The main idea of the SNF scheme is to restrict the choice of the Initial Sequence Numbers 
(ISNs) of SYN packets generated by the victim to certain pattern, such that corresponding 
SYN-ACK packets can be validated at the ISP perimeter. In the following subsections, we 
develop three variants of the SNF scheme to counter both classical and advanced TCP-based 
RDoS attacks. As discussed in Chapter 1, classical attacks are those in which the attacker does 
not react to defenses employed by the victim during attack period, while advanced attacks are 
those in which the attacker monitors victim's reaction and acts accordingly. We develop a 
simple analytical models to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme focusing on the 
following performance metrics: 
• False positive rate (FPR): The percentage of attack SYN-ACK packets that are falsely 
60 
allowed to pass the ISP perimeter toward the victim. 
• False negative rate (FNR): The percentage of legitimate SYN-ACK packets that are 
falsely filtered. 
Clearly, both metrics need to be minimized. 
3.2.3.1 Countering Classical TCP-based RDoS Attacks 
In the classical TCP-based RDoS attacks, SYN packets generated by attack nodes will 
continue to hold ISNs according to the rules specified originally by the attack tool itself. To 
counter such attacks, we propose the Basic-SNF scheme in which the victim chooses a secret 
pattern for its ISNs. The secret pattern, Cs, is set by fixing a randomly chosen fc-bits out 
of the 32-bits used to represent the sequence number. To activate the schemes, the victim 
initiates a filtering request by multicasting a message to all edge routers of the ISP network. 
The message includes the specific secret pattern, Cs, that should be used to validate incoming 
SYN-ACK packets. Edge routers inspect incoming SYN-ACK packets destined to the victim 
according to the algorithm shown in Figure 3.7. In this algorithm, if the (ACK number - 1) of 
the SYN-ACK packet contains the secret pattern, Cs, then the packet is passed. Otherwise, it 
is filtered. 
Algorithm name: Basic-SNF 
Input: SYN-ACK packet, P, destined to the victim, V 
Output: A decision whether to pass or drop P 
1. X=P.ACK_number-l 
2. i f  ( X  contains Cs) pass P 
3. else drop P 
Figure 3.7 Basic-SNF algorithm. This algorithm is performed at each edge 
router while attack is going on. It is applied only to SYN-ACK 
packets destined to the victim. 
Assuming that the ISNs of attack packets are generated randomly, the probability that 
a given attack packet will contain a bit pattern that matches the secret pattern currently in 
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use, Cs, is equal to where k is the length of Cs. This implies that the Basic-SNF scheme 
is very effective against classical attacks. However, a major weakness of the this scheme is 
that the attacker does not have to discover the actual secret pattern used by the victim. In 
fact, it is sufficient to intercept a single legitimate SYN or SYN-ACK packet and using its 
corresponding ISN as an input to subsequent attack packets. In order to address this issue, 
we propose to change the secret pattern, Cs, in a way that it significantly reduces attacker's 
chances of launching replay attacks (i.e., using previously used secret pattern). To achieve 
this, the secret pattern can be changed either periodically where the Cs is changed regularly 
every T time units or reactively where Cs is changed whenever a replay attack is detected by 
the victim. 
3.2.3.2 Countering Advanced TCP-based RDoS Attacks 
In this model, we assume that an attacker experiences, some delay, Da before being able 
to reconfigure its attack tool to generate SYN packets that carry valid SYN-numbers to the 
reflectors (i.e., packets that hold the secret pattern currently in use by the victim). This delay 
consists of the time required to intercept SYN packets generated by the victim itself, the com­
munication time to the zombies under attacker's control, and the attack tool reconfiguration 
time. To deal with this type of attacks, we propose two modified versions of the Basic-SNF 
scheme. The first version involves changing the secret pattern periodically. Hence, it is called 
the Periodic-SNF. The second version involves changing the secret pattern reactively. Hence, 
it is called reactive-SNF. 
Analysis of Periodic-SNF: In this scheme, we propose changing the secret pattern of 
the SYN number periodically (i.e., every T time units). This is done by dividing the time 
since an attack is detected into fixed intervals, each of length T. A secret pattern, Q, is then 
assigned for each interval. It is assumed that interval length and secret pattern assignment are 
known to edge routers via authentic multicasting. Any SYN packet generated by the victim 
during the i-th interval must hold C; as part of its ISN. For SYN-ACK packet validation, each 
edge router acts independently according to the filtering algorithm shown in Fig. 3.8. 
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The edge router specifies the interval in which the packet to be inspected has arrived (step 
1). It is expected that SYN-ACK packets that correspond to SYN packets which are sent at 
the end of a given interval (e.g., the (i — l)-th interval) may arrive at the edge router during 
the subsequent interval (i.e., the i-th interval). Such packets will be dropped if the validation 
is done based on the current secret pattern in use (i.e., Q) alone. To reduce the impact of this 
problem, a packet is considered to be valid if its secret pattern matches either of Q or Cj_i 
given that its arrival time falls between (i — 1)T and (?' — ! + a)T, where 0 < a < 1 (step 3). 
Otherwise the validation is performed based on Q alone (step 4). 
Algorithm name: Periodic-SNF 
Input: SYN-ACK packet, P, destined to the victim, V 
Output: A decision whether to pass or drop P 
1. i = r^i 
2. X=P.ACK-1 
3 .  * / ( ( » -  1  ) T  <  P a t  < { i -  1  +  a ) T )  
(a) if ((X contains C,) OR (X contains Q-i)) pass P 
4. else if (X contains C\) pass P 
5. else drop P 
Figure 3.8 Periodic-SNF algorithm. This algorithm is performed at each 
edge router while attack is going on. It is applied only to 
SYN-ACK packets destined to the victim. P.at denotes the 
packet arrival time. P. Cj denotes the secret pattern assigned 
for interval i. a is the overlapping ratio. 
Fig. 3.9 shows two scenarios for connection establishment by the victim assuming a to be 
zero. In scenario 1, the request (i.e., a SYN packet) is sent by the victim at time t\ during the 
(i — l)-th interval, the reply (i.e., the corresponding SYN-ACK packet) takes x\ time units to 
arrive at the ISP perimeter. Since (ti + X\ < T), the reply is passed. In scenario 2, the reply 
that corresponds to the request made at f2 arrives the ISP perimeter at ^ + X2 > T (i.e., in 
the i-th interval. The reply is filtered in this case because it holds a secret pattern (Q_i) that 
is no longer in use. 
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Scenario 1: The victim sends SYN packet at time t1, the 
response arrives the ISP perimeter at time t,+x1<T -> Passed 
c5 i-1 xZ 
t. 
Interval (i-1) 
— T 
C, 
time 
Interval (i) 
Scenario 2: The victim sends SYN packet at time t%, the 
response arrives the ISP perimeter at time t2+x2>T —» filtered 
Figure 3.9 The impact of changing the secret pattern of the ISN for con­
nections generated by the victim. The secret pattern is set to 
Cj_i during the (i — l)-th interval, and to Q during the %-th 
interval. 
Generally, because of the attacker's ability to generate valid attack packets after Da seconds 
each time a new secret pattern is applied (recall that Da represents the amount of delay 
experienced by the attacker before being able to reconfigure its tool), it can be seen that the 
attacker can pass its packets during the window of time specified by (1 + a)T — Da. It is 
clear that the choice of T and a introduces a tradeoff that shapes the false positive and false 
negative rates. The following analysis focuses on evaluating both metrics. 
FPR for Periodic-SNF (FPRperiodic): FPRperi0(nc can be expressed as the expected value 
of the ratio of time in which the attack traffic is allowed to pass the ISP perimeter. Let Aperio(ac 
represent this ratio. It is clear that: 
'  i f D . < ( l  +  a ) T ;  
0 otherwise. 
Aperiodic 
Assuming that Da has an exponential distribution7 with rate /z0, the expected value of 
Aperi0dic is given by Equation (3.5). 
F P R  'periodic E [ A  •periodicJ 1 + 
1 
;(e' -f4a(l+a)T 1) (3.5) 
/xa(l + a)T 
It is to be noted that the value of FPRperi0,nc does not depend on the actual values of 
(ia and T. Instead, it depends on the relationship between them which can be expressed as 
= 4^, where r is a positive real number. Fig. 3.10 plots the effect of a on the percentage of 
rThis assumption is made because actual measurements of Da are not available. 
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false positives for different values of r. It is obvious that as a increases, FPRperiocac increases 
as well in all cases. This can be explained by recalling that increasing a allows the attacker 
to pass more attack packets. Also, it is clear that FPRperiodic increases by increasing fj,a 
(equivalent to decrease r), given that T is fixed. This is expected because larger values of /za, 
indicates faster reaction by the attacker. In practice, it is difficult to predict attacker's reaction 
rate. Therefore, fixing T to a high value may result in a large false positive rate. This is due 
to the fact that increasing T provides larger window of time for the attacker to pass his traffic 
toward the victim, especially when his reaction rate is very high. 
False poattve rate - Periodic-SNF 
Figure 3.10 The effect of a on the percentage of false positives for different 
rates of attacker's reaction as captured by the relation between 
fj>a and T. 
FNR for Periodic-SNF (FNRperiodic)•' In order to gain an insight on the performance of 
the periodic SNF scheme in terms of the false negative rate, FNRperi0dic, we assume that 
the victim is generating TCP connections at a Poisson rate of A per unit time, and that the 
distribution of connection response time, X, (defined as the time between sending the SYN 
packet by the victim and receiving the corresponding SYN-ACK at the perimeter) is given by 
X = c + y, where c is a constant and Y is a variable component. This assumption is based 
on the definition of the round trip time (RTT), which consists of a fixed component given 
by the sum of link propagation latencies and transmission and processing delays on all nodes 
in the forward and reverse direction, and additional variable components due to queuing and 
processing delays at overloaded routers and end-hosts. Assuming that Y can be expressed as 
the summation of n identical exponentially distributed random variables each with rate /?, Y 
is said to be an Erlang random variable with parameters f3 and n. 
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Based on these assumptions, we are interested in finding an expression for FN Rperiodic, 
which is the same as the probability of filtering a legitimate packet. The following Equation 
represents the probability distribution function of X : 
f /r(=-cr-y('-=) if x>c. 
Mx) = ^ ' 
| 0 if x < c. 
We proceed in our analysis for x > c. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X is 
given by: 
,3.6, 
fc=0 
It can be seen that Pr(a legitimate packet P is filtered | P is sent at time t) = Pr(X > 
(1 + a)T — t | P is sent at time t) — 1 - Pr(X < (1 + a)T — t | P is sent at time t). We call 
this probability the conditional probability of legitimate packet filtering CPLPperiodic• This 
probability is given by the following Equation: 
= 1- Fx((l + a)T- t) (3.7) 
Substituting (3.6) with (x — (1 + a)T — t) in 3.7, we obtain: 
CPLP^ = E (38) 
k=0 
Unconditioning on the time at which each request is generated, we obtain: 
rT 
FNR, •periodic = j, J CPLPperiodicdt (3.9) 
In practice, each end-to-end path is characterized by its own minimum possible RTT (i.e., 
the fixed component c of the RTT along the given path). Also, the variable component 
represented by the Erlang random variable, Y, has its own parameters f3 and n for each TCP 
segment due to the diversity of destinations and the variability of load on network routers. 
However, for the purpose of obtaining an upper bound on the probability of a legitimate SYN-
ACK packet being filtered, due to secret pattern change, we can assume worst case values for 
c, j3, and n. 
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We performed extensive simulation experiments to evaluate the value of FNRperi0dic for 
several values of a and T. It is to be noted that FNRperi0diC does not depend on A since 
all arrivals are independent. However, the value of A was fixed to 0.004 just for the sake of 
experimentation. To obtain a worst case value for the random variable X, we assigned a value 
of 1 second to the constant c, which was found to be the maximum reported minimum RTT 
[83]. Also, to eliminate the variability of parameters n and j3, we assigned the values 30 and 
2 for them, respectively. This corresponds to the maximum reported path length [84], and a 
relatively large queuing and processing delay at intermediate routers, a was varied along the x 
axis in the range of 0 to 0.2. Fig. 3.11 plots the effect of a on the percentage of false negatives 
for different values of T. 
By recalling that aT represents the amount of extra time in which a secret pattern of a given 
interval remains valid throughout the subsequent interval, it is easy to explain the decrease of 
the false negative rate by increasing a. This is expected since secret pattern change will be 
less frequent, resulting in lower percentage of legitimate packets being dropped. The results we 
presented about FPRperiodic and FNRperi0dic lead to an important conclusion: The Periodic-
SNF scheme is expected to perform well in terms of false negative rate. However, it is expected 
to perform well in terms of false positive rate only if the value of T happens to be close to 
the rate at which the attacker reconfigures its tool with a valid secret pattern. Since this is 
difficult to predict in practice, we propose the following reactive solution. 
False Negative»- Periodic SNF 
I 
I 
Figure 3.11 The effect of a on the percentage of false negatives for different 
values of T. fj,a, A, /?, and n were fixed to 0.004, 5, 2, and 30, 
respectively. 
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Analysis of Reactive-SNF: Periodic changing of secret pattern may result in unnecessary 
legitimate packet loss, especially if Da > (1 + a)T. As an alternative solution, we propose 
changing the secret pattern reactively. In this solution, we assume that the victim incurs some 
delay, Dv, before detecting that the attacker is generating attack packets that hold the secret 
pattern currently in use. Therefore, the attacker can pass its packets during the window of 
time specified by Dv. It is to be noted that the secret pattern of the legitimate packets SYN 
number would change every D = Da + Dv time units. For simplicity, we do not adopt the 
notion of overlapping ratio (a) in this version of SNF. Fig. 3.12 illustrates the reactive solution 
in which the secret pattern of the ISN for connections generated by the victim is changed from 
C s to Cs* after D time units. The figure also shows that a legitimate response packet may still 
be filtered due to the secret pattern change. 
Scenario 1: The victim sends SYN packet at time t,, the 
response arrives the ISP perimeter at time t1+x1<D Passed 
c A 
ti 4 v 
x2 time 
" 
Da * 
« D 
* Dv » 
Scenario 2: The victim sends SYN packet at time t2, the 
response arrives the ISP perimeter at time t2+x2>D —» filtered 
Figure 3.12 The reactive SNF scheme. The secret pattern of the ISN for 
connections generated by the victim is changed from Cs to Cs„ 
after D units of time. 
The distributions of Da and Dv are assumed to be exponential with rates yua and [iv, 
respectively. This assumption is made because actual measurements of Da and Dv are not 
available. The distribution of D is given by: 
fo(t) = 
_ e-M) if ^ 
fi2te if — — /u. 
As in the previous subsection, we are interested in finding the false positive and false 
negative rates. 
FPR for Reactive-SNF (FPRreactiVe): Similar to the Periodic-SNF, the false positives rate 
can be expressed as the expected value of the ratio of time in which the attack traffic is allowed 
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to pass the ISP perimeter. Let Areactive represent this ratio. It is clear that: 
Areactive = n ^ n (3.10) J-Ja i Uy 
It can be shown8 that the expected value of AreactiVe is as follows: 
FPRreactive = E[Areactive] = (log — + — - 1) (3.11) y f x v  f x a j  f x a  f i v  
The actual values of p,a and \iv depend on the reaction of the attacker and the victim, 
respectively. We can generally assume that detecting that the attacker is using valid ISNs is 
much faster than the process of reconfiguring attack tools to generate attack packets with valid 
ISNs. This means that /ia should be less than fiv. In general, we can say: = fjia. Where 
/ > 1 is called the reaction factor. This means that victim's reaction is / times faster than 
attacker's reaction. Taking this assumption into account, Equation (3.11) can be rewritten as: 
FPRreact ive  =  E[A r eact ive\  ~  (l°g / + — — 1) (3.12) 
FNR for Reactive-SNF (FNRreact ive)•' The FNRreact ive  is the same as the probability of 
filtering a legitimate packet under Reactive-SNF. This can be obtained by unconditioning on 
T in Equation (3.9) as follows: 
roo 
F N Rreactive = / F NRperiodicfd{T)(IT (3.13) 
JO 
Fig. 3.13 (a) captures the effect of the reaction factor on the false positive rate. As 
expected, the victim's reaction determines the percentage of attack SYN-ACK packets that 
can pass the ISP perimeter toward the victim. It can be seen that faster reaction, represented 
by higher values of /, results in lower false positive rate. We performed extensive simulation 
experiments to evaluate the false negatives rate. Fig. 3.13 (b) shows the effect of fia on the 
false negatives rate. The reaction factor, /, is assumed to be 10 to indicate that the victim is 
10 times faster than the attacker in detecting attackers discovery of the secret pattern in use. 
S m a l l  v a l u e s  o f  \ i a  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  l a r g e  v a l u e s  f o r  d e l a y  e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  t h e  a t t a c k e r  ( i . e . ,  D a )  
before being able to reconfigure its tool with a valid secret pattern. In such cases, the secret 
8The derivation of FPRreactive is provided in appendix A. 
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pattern change by the victim will be less frequent. This explains the low false negatives rate 
when na is relatively small (e.g., 0.005). However, if the attacker is very fast in secret pattern 
discovery, the victim will be forced to change its secret pattern more frequently, leading to 
higher false negatives rate, because many legitimate SYN-ACK packets will be dropped after 
each secret pattern change. Different than the periodic SNF which performs well only if the 
secret pattern change period is close to Da , the reactive SNF achieves the best of both worlds; 
low percentage of false positive and false negative regardless the value of Da. 
False Positives- Reactive SNF - Reactive SNF 
! 
reaction factor (f) 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.13 (a) Effect of the reaction factor, /, on the false positive rate. 
(b) Effect of Ha on the false negative rate. A and / (the reaction 
factor) were fixed to 2 and 10, respectively. 
3.3 Protocol Determinism-based DoS Mitigation 
In this section, we employ the proposed concept of protocol-determinism in a novel scheme 
for SYN flooding attack mitigation. The scheme, called intentional dropping based filtering, 
is based on the observation of client's persistence (i.e., client's reaction to packet loss by 
subsequent retransmissions) which is very widespread as it is built in TCP's connection setup. 
The main idea in this scheme is to intentionally drop the first SYN packet of each connection 
request. Subsequent SYN packet from a request is passed only if it adheres to the TCP's 
timeout mechanism. Our analysis shows that the proposed scheme reduces attacker's effective 
attack rate significantly with an acceptable increase in connection establishment latency. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows: An overview of SYN flooding attacks is 
provided in subsection 3.3.1. Previous work is discussed in subsection 3.3.2. The proposed 
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scheme is described in subsection 3.3.3. Performance studies are discussed in subsection 3.3.4. 
3.3.1 An Overview of SYN Flooding Attacks 
TCP continues to be the dominant transport protocol used by several popular Internet 
applications (e.g., http, email, and ftp). Recent studies show that TCP carries 95% of today's 
Internet traffic and 80% of the total number of flows in the Internet [77]. Therefore, it is no 
wonder that TCP-based DoS attacks are the most common. TCP traffic itself can be generally 
classified as control traffic (e.g., SYN, SYN-ACK, FIN, etc.) and data traffic. Although 
an attacker can flood its target by any type of traffic, the magnitude of damage caused to 
the target and the difficulty of attack mitigation is maximized when TCP control packets 
are used as the weapon of an attack. Among TCP control packets, SYN packets are the most 
dangerous if used by an attacker in the form of SYN flooding, because every faked SYN packet, 
in addition to bandwidth consumption, can disproportionately consume a system's resources 
for a disproportional amount of time. 
In SYN flooding attacks [19, 85], the victim is overwhelmed by very large number of spoofed 
SYN packets (i.e., packets that hold spoofed IP source addresses). This consumes victim's 
bandwidth and forces it to allocate resources for connections that will never complete. A TCP 
listen port has a finite number of slots in its listen queue and normally that number of slots is 
relatively small. When an attacker sends enough faked SYN packets, the listen queue can be 
fully occupied and subsequently deny any legitimate SYN packet from entering into the listen 
queue. Therefore, until the connection establishment process times out, a disproportional 
amount of system resources are occupied: a slot in the attacked port's listen queue, memory 
to maintain connection information, and CPU and network bandwidth to retransmit the SYN-
ACK packet. 
As in any other DoS mitigation schemes, the main challenge in SYN flooding mitigation 
is to accurately identify attack packets and filter them without causing collateral damage 
to legitimate traffic designated to the victim. The proposed scheme takes the TCP client's 
persistence behavior into account to distinguish legitimate connection requests from attack 
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connection requests far away from the victim, leading to protection from bandwidth exhaustion 
attacks as well as victim's exhaustion attacks. We perform simple analysis to evaluate the 
proposed scheme focusing on its effectiveness in reducing attacker's effective attack rate, and 
showing its impact on connection establishment latency. 
3.3.2 Previous Work 
Previous work on mitigating SYN flooding attacks aimed at avoiding allocating resources 
for TCP connections before proving their legitimacy (e.g., SYN cookies [86] and SYN cache 
[87]), or by freeing the allocated resources when certain conditions are satisfied (e.g., Synkill 
[85]). SYN cookies work to alleviate SYN floods by calculating cookies that are functions of 
the source address, source port, destination address, destination port, and a random secret 
seed. When a SYN packet is received, the server calculates a SYN cookie and sends it to the 
requesting client as part of the SYN-ACK packet without allocating resources for that request. 
When ACK packet is received, the connection is established if a valid cookie is included. 
With the SYN cache, when the SYN backlog queue overflows, a minimal amount of state 
is stored for each SYN request in a data structure known as the SYN cache, and a SYN-ACK 
response is sent. If a valid ACK comes back, a complete connection is created. If there is no 
route or a TCP RST or ICMP Unreachable comes back, the entry is deleted. Otherwise, the 
entries will just time out. In both cases, since state is not kept, the SYN backlog queue is not 
exhausted, and normal TCP communications can continue. Synkill, on the other hand, frees 
allocated resources by following two methods: (1) it basically sends RST packets whenever it 
observes connection establishment attempts from suspicious IP addresses, and (2) it completes 
TCP connections by generating the third message of the three-way handshake, and sending 
it to the destination. The major problem with these approaches is that they cannot alleviate 
bandwidth exhaustion attacks resulting from SYN flooding. 
Generally, filtering of spoofed IP packets leads indirectly to TCP flooding mitigation. For 
example, in ingress filtering [31], routers are configured to block packets that arrive at the 
edge router of the source network with illegitimate source addresses. This may violate some 
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existing setups and protocols such as Mobile IP and multi-homing. It is also difficult to convince 
ISP administrators to support ingress filtering because the benefit is not felt directly by the 
deploying ISP. Another example is the SAVE protocol [33], which is designed to provide routers 
with the information needed for source address validation. The main problem of this protocol 
is that legitimate packets may be filtered even in the absence of an attack. This is due to 
routing instability which leads to errors in the source address validation tables maintained at 
the SAVE enabled routers. In general, such schemes require large scale deployment to prevent 
IP source address spoofing efficiently. 
3.3.3 Intentional Dropping-based Filtering 
3.3.3.1 Intentional Dropping Concept 
Consider the client server model shown in Fig. 3.14. It is assumed that packets from client 
C to server S pass through router R. When the client issues a "connectQ" command, the 
stack sends a SYN packet, P. If R is overloaded, it may drop packet, P. We call this dropping 
accidental because it is not under the router's control. However, if R is not overloaded and 
yet decides to drop packet, P, then we call this dropping intentional because it is under the 
router's control. The effect of dropping packet, P, either accidentally or intentionally, is the 
same from the client's viewpoint. Since the server does not get the SYN packet, the client never 
gets the corresponding SYN-ACK packet. So the client waits for some time, To, thinking that 
the packet might be lost on its way, and sends a SYN packet again. This behavior is known as 
client persistence. We assume that end-points adhere to a TCP-Reno style congestion control 
mechanism [88]. Therefore, the client initiates subsequent retransmissions before aborting its 
connection. According to [89], the initial timeout value before the first connection attempt is 
To = 3 seconds. After each retry, the amount of time to wait is doubled (i.e., the time to wait 
a f te r  the  z - th  re t ransmiss ion  i s  T  =  2*To seconds ,  i  = 1 , 2 , . . . ) .  
Client (C) Server (S) 
Figure 3.14 Client-Server model. Bidirectional arrows represent communi­
cation channels between C, R, and S. 
3.3.3.2 Intentional Dropping-based Filtering 
A recent study by Jamjoom et. al., [90] shows that client persistence is very widespread as 
it is built in TCP's congestion control. This behavior can be observed whenever network con­
gestion occurs. For example, during flash crowd event (FCE), very large number of legitimate 
clients try to establish connections with a popular server. Theses clients keep retransmitting 
their SYN packets until they gain access or they give up. Also this behavior is observed during 
a SYN flooding attack, where very large number of fake SYN packets mixed with few legit­
imate SYN packets overload a given server. In this scenario, attackers continue to flood the 
server, and legitimate clients, due to their persistence behavior, keep trying to gain access to 
the targeted server before giving up. In both cases, we emphasize that SYN packets are the 
main contributing factor to network and end server congestion. 
During a SYN flooding attack, we apply intentional dropping on incoming SYN packets 
destined to the victim to prevent network congestion, and yet cause client persistence, which is 
a basic characteristic of legitimate clients. Typically, it is impossible to distinguish legitimate 
SYN packets from attack SYN packets by inspecting each packet alone. However, by taking 
advantage of the client persistence behavior, we can make an educated guess of whether a given 
connection request is malicious or legitimate. We emphasize here that the distinction is made 
at the connection level rather than at the packet level. The main idea is to intentionally drop the 
first SYN packet of each connection request. Subsequent SYN packet from a request is passed 
only if it adheres to the TCP's time out mechanism. Since attackers do not adhere to TCP's 
timeout mechanism, and in most cases they assign random addresses to their SYN packets, all 
SYN flooding packets are supposed to be filtered. In contrast, due to their persistence behavior, 
legitimate clients can be identified and allowed to pass one SYN packet per connection request. 
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Supporting intentional dropping requires state information to be maintained about connec­
tion requests and their arrival times. It is clear that performing this scheme at the victim itself 
reduces resource exhaustion without eliminating bandwidth exhaustion. However, performing 
it at the edge routers9 of an ISP network has the advantage of eliminating bandwidth exhaus­
tion as well as victim's resource exhaustion10. This conclusion is based on the assumption of 
routing stability, referred to as the situation of having the same ingress router for all pack­
ets sent from a given source to a destination located in the ISP network, which implies that 
there is a mapping between attack nodes and the edge routers of the ISP's edge routers. By 
this mapping we mean that each subset of attack nodes have to forward their attack packets 
through the same edge router during the attack period. 
3.3.3.3 An Illustrative Example 
To illustrate the operation of the proposed scheme, consider the two timing diagrams shown 
in Fig. 3.15. These diagrams reflect the reaction of a legitimate client (X) and an attacker 
(Y) to intentional dropping. It is assumed that both of them forward their traffic to server 
S through edge router R. Our objective is to show how router R can distinguish a legitimate 
request from a fake request. The following two cases are considered: 
• Legitimate request: At time t\, X initiates a TCP connection to S. The corresponding 
SYN packet, Px, arrives the router R at time at\ = t\ + tlXR, where tlXR represents the 
time it took the packet to travel from X to R. At this instant, R drops Px intentionally, 
and records connection request information, such as: connection ID and arrival time. 
As a result, X repeats its request by sending another identical SYN packet, P^, at time 
h — t\ + To- When the packet arrives R at time at^ = <2 + ^xr, it is considered to be 
valid if the following inequality holds: T0 — A < (at2 — ati). Theoretically, t\R — tlXR. 
However, due to variability of network load, the two values are expected to be different. 
A, called the delay tolerance parameter, is introduced here to tolerate this difference. 
9TCP header should be accessed by edge routers. 
10In this dissertation, we assume that the scheme is to be implemented at the edge routers. 
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The inequality requires the interarrivai time between the first two SYN packets of a given 
connection request to be at least To — A. 
• Attack request: We assume that Y attacks S by sending randomly spoofed SYN packets 
at a constant rate of 1 packet/second. Applying intentional dropping to incoming SYN 
packets (P\, Pg, Pç, etc. with spoofed source addresses A, B, C, etc.), at router R, 
leads to filtering of all of them because each SYN packet represents a new connection in 
R's viewpoint. Even if subsequent SYN packets hold the same spoofed source address, 
they are filtered because their interarrivai time is < To — A. 
X R S Y R S 
Legitimate case Attack case 
Figure 3.15 Timing diagrams that show the impact of intentional dropping 
on connection establishment. Left: legitimate request. Right: 
attack requests. Pg represents the i-th SYN packet with source 
address S. 
3.3.3.4 SYN Packet Filtering Algorithm 
By taking client's persistence into account, connection establishment request can be viewed 
as a sequence of SYN packets generated repeatedly at time instants specified by the TCP's 
congestion control mechanism until a response is received or a maximum number of retrans­
missions is reached. Therefore, SYN packets can be generally categorized into classes that 
reflect the client's persistence level. A class of a packet is defined as the actual or estimated 
number of retransmissions of that packet. For example, class 0 SYN packets represent new 
connection requests, class 1 SYN packets represent repeated connection requests for the first 
time (i.e., first retransmissions), class 2 SYN packets represent repeated connection requests 
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for the second time, and so on. Generating the i-th SYN packet for a particular connection, 
implicitly implies the loss of the previous (i — 1) SYN packets of that connection11. 
For security purposes, the proposed scheme can be generalized such that intentional drop­
ping is applied to the first k consecutive SYN packets from each connection request, where 
k is called the dropping parameter. In this case, subsequent SYN packet from each request 
(i.e., the (k + l)-th) is passed only if it adheres to the TCP's time out mechanism. Obviously, 
the value of k has direct impact on the connection establishment latency as it determines how 
many SYN packets to drop within each connection. The effect of k is discussed in section 3.3.4. 
The proposed scheme is initiated by the victim upon detection of SYN flooding attack. 
The victim informs its ISP's edge routers (e.g., through an authentic multicast message) to 
activate the filtering scheme. Fig. 3.16 shows the SYN packet Filtering Algorithm (SFA) to 
be performed by each edge router of the victim's ISP. It is important to mention that this 
algorithm is applied only to SYN packets destined to the victim. When a SYN packet, P, is 
received, its class, i, is determined (step 1). Clearly, if P is a new connection request, then its 
class is equal to zero. However, if P is a repeated connection request, then its class is equal to 
the class of the preceding SYN packet of the same connection plus one12. Based on the class 
of the packet, i, and the dropping parameter, k, a decision is taken whether to pass the packet 
or to drop it. If (i < k) (step 2), P is dropped and request information, such as connection 
ID, arrival time, and class are recorded. If (i — k) (step 3), the packet is passed given that its 
interarrivai time is at least 2®-1To — A. It is to be noted that the value 2*_1To represents the 
timeout value after retransmitting a packet of class i — 1. The packet is dropped if it does not 
adhere to the timing constraints (step 4). 
3.3.4 Performance Evaluation 
The proposed scheme has a dual impact. On the positive side, it reduces the attack 
rate significantly. On the negative side, it increases the connection establishment latency for 
legitimate clients. We assume that clients would favor extra latency to gain access to a web 
"This claim is based on the assumption that packet loss is observed on the forward direction only. 
12We assume that connection request information is already recorded at the edge router. 
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Algorithm name: SYN filtering algorithm (SFA) 
Input: SYN packet, P, destined to the victim, V 
Output: A decision whether to pass or drop P 
1. i= class of packet P 
2. if (i < k) 
(a) drop P 
(b) record (P.ID, P.at, i) 
3. else if (i = k AND P.iat > 2*_1To - A )  
(a) pass P 
4. else drop P 
Figure 3.16 SYN packet filtering algorithm. P represents SYN packet des­
tined to the victim, V. P.ID denotes the packet's ID, P.at 
denotes packet's arrival time, P.iat denotes packet's interar­
rivai time, k is the dropping parameter, and A is the delay 
tolerance parameter. 
server over a complete blocking of service. We quantify the performance of the proposed scheme 
in terms of the following performance metrics13: 
3.3.4.1 Attacker's Effective Attack Rate (EAR) 
EAR is defined as the number of attacker's SYN packets that pass filtering per time unit. 
This should be distinguished from attacker's actual attack rate (AAR) which is defined as the 
number of attacker's generated SYN packets per time unit. Theoretical maximums for AAR 
depend on the connection type (e.g., using analog modem, ISDN, TI, the maximum AAR is 87, 
200, 2343 SYNs/sec, respectively [91]). Under intentional dropping scheme, what determines 
the EAR is the way the attack is performed. In our analysis, we consider the following types 
of SYN flooding attacks: 
• Type 1: Attack SYN packets are generated at the rate specified by the attacker with 
randomly spoofed source addresses. 
13It is to be noted that the aggregate traffic before and after applying the scheme will increase by the same 
amount approximately due to packet retransmissions in both cases. 
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• Type 2: Attacker mimics the behavior of a legitimate client. Therefore, attack SYN 
packets that hold the same spoofed source address are generated at time instants as if 
the attacker is experiencing real packet loss. 
• Type 3: Attacker mimics the behavior of a legitimate client for a group of spoofed source 
addresses. This type is similar to type 2 except that the attacker changes the source 
addresses alternatively. 
Currently, type 1 is the most common as attacker's are not aware of the proposed scheme. 
However, type 2 and type 3 are expected to appear if intentional dropping is deployed as a 
defense mechanism. It is easy to see that EAR is exactly zero for type 1. This is due to the 
fact that the first k SYN packets are dropped from each connection request. In fact, it would 
be sufficient for k to be equal to one for the EAR to be zero. In type 2, the attacker is able to 
pass one SYN packet every o seconds. Therefore, 
EAR = —r—r packets / second (3.14) 
This explains why we introduced the dropping parameter, k. Fig. 3.17 (a), supports our 
intuition that intentional dropping scheme results in drastically low EAR for type 2 attacks14. 
It also shows the effect of the dropping parameter, k, on EAR; k denotes the number of SYN 
packets that are intentionally dropped, it is varied from 1 to 4 as most TCP implementations 
abort connection establishment after 4 to 6 failures. As expected, larger k results in lower EAR, 
because a single SYN packet of a given connection request is passed on the &-th attempt. In 
its current form, intentional dropping scheme does not mitigate type 3 attacks effectively. 
Extensions to the proposed scheme that would make it effective against type 3 attacks are 
going to be the focus of our future research. 
3.3.4.2 Connection Establishment Latency Increase (CELI) 
Originally, in addition to the round trip time, connection establishment latency is due to 
SYN packet loss in the forward direction (i.e., client to server), SYN-ACK packet loss in the 
14It is to be noted that the EAR shown in the figure is for a single attacker. 
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reverse direction (i.e., server to client). The loss in both directions is accidental as it is caused 
by network congestion. Obviously, intentional dropping of SYN packets in the forward direction 
increases the connection establishment latency. It can be seen that accidental dropping affects 
the operation of the SFA algorithm in the sense that SYN packet's class (defined in subsection 
3.3.3.4) can be inaccurate if SYN packets experience congestion loss. For example, if the second 
SYN packet of a given connection request is lost before reaching the intentional dropping filter, 
the sender will retransmit the packet after 2To seconds. The retransmitted packet is the third 
from sender's view point. However, when it reaches the intentional dropping filter it will be 
wrongly classified as the second packet. To avoid this confusion, we modify the SFA to become 
aware of congestion loss. The only modification required is to determine packet's class, i ,  
based on the inter arrival time, T, of successive SYN packets for the same connection attempt. 
Theoretically, 
T = 2i-1T0 (3.15) 
Therefore, 
i = 1 + log2(^) (3.16) 
However, since T is not going to be exactly 2i-1Tq, the fraction ^ must be rounded to the 
closest exponent of 2 before substituting in Equation (3.16). It is to be noted that this analysis 
does not take into consideration consecutive packet loss from the same connection. 
The maximum connection establishment latency increase, CELImax, happens when there 
is no congestion loss for the first k SYN packets of a given connection request. Therefore, 
fc-i 
CELImax = ^ 2 2-J_1To seconds (3.17) 
j=o 
Fig. 3.17 (b) shows the value of CELImax  that correspond to k intentional droppings of 
SYN packets that belong to certain connection request. It can be seen that as k increases, 
CELImax increases drastically. This increase, in general, is within acceptable range (3 to 27 
seconds) that are typically tolerable by legitimate clients. It is also important to observe the 
tradeoff introduced by k between EAR and CELImax .  
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Figure 3.17 (a) Effect of the dropping parameter, k, on the attacker's ef­
fective attack rate, (b) Effect of the dropping parameter, k, 
on the maximum connection establishment latency increase. 
3.4 Practical Considerations 
There are several important issues that determine the practicality of the DoS mitigation 
schemes presented in this chapter. In this section, we discuss the issue of inspecting the TCP's 
packet header, which is required by the three proposed schemes. Also, we discuss issues related 
to the practicality of the PF scheme, and the impact of restricting the ISN to a specific pattern, 
which is a specific issue to the SNF scheme. 
3.4.1 The Need to Perform TCP's Header Inspection 
The proposed schemes require that all edge routers of the ISP network that contains the 
victim to inspect each packet closely enough to determine if it is a TCP SYN-ACK packet 
(in the case of TCP-based RDoS attacks), or if it is a TCP SYN packet (in the case of SYN 
flooding attacks), so the scheme can more closely analyze the packet to see if it is a legitimate 
or not. This requires, at least for all TCP packets destined to the victim, examining the TCP 
header fields. Although modern routers [92] have started implementing this capability, most of 
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the existing edge routers may not have this capability. So installing such mechanisms at those 
routers would slow them down. To reduce the overhead imposed on edge routers, a lightweight 
algorithm similar to the one proposed in [93] could be used to distinguish TCP control packets 
from TCP data packets. Based on that algorithm, a router can tell TCP control packets from 
data packets without accessing the TCP header by checking the "total length field" in the IP 
header. If the total length of an IP packet is 40, then it is most probably a TCP control packet 
(given that its protocol type is TCP and its fragmentation offset is zero). By following this 
approach, among the IP packets destined to the victim, only TCP control packets undergo 
TCP header inspection by edge routers. Once a TCP control packet is identified, the edge 
router has to inspect the corresponding flags in the TCP header to determine its type. This 
implementation based modification reduces the overhead of TCP header inspection. The actual 
TCP header inspection can be done by the router itself or by a special device attached to it. 
3.4.2 Practicality of the PF Scheme 
In this subsection, we consider the following issues, which basically determine the practi­
cality of the PF scheme. 
• Generality of the PF scheme: It is important to emphasize that the PF scheme is not 
specific to TCP-based reflector attacks since it has the ability to filter incoming reply 
packets of any protocol type (assuming that it would be activated according to the 
attack packets type). In practice, an attacker can just generate random packets from 
his zombies and flood the target's link. If the attacker particularly likes sending TCP 
SYN-ACK packets, for some reason, he can fabricate them and send them directly to the 
target without the help of reflectors. Although this is generally true, it is not useful for 
the attacker because: (1) the amplification effect cannot be achieved this way, and (2) 
the zombies under attacker's control can be located if a traceback scheme is employed. 
• Avoiding filtering of legitimate packets: We have shown in Subsection 3.2.2.4 that legit­
imate reply packets may get filtered due to routing asymmetry, routing instability, or 
lack of knowledge about the edge routers at which these packets are expected to arrive. 
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Therefore, all reply packets originating from a certain source may get filtered. To avoid 
this kind of filtering, the PF scheme can be modified as follows. Instead of notifying a 
single edge router about an expected reply packet, the victim can notify several edge 
routers at the same time, which means that packet pairing can be performed at any of 
these routers. Given that an ISP network usually has few edge routers that are connected 
to other ISP networks, the number of notification messages that are to be sent by the 
victim for each request it initiates will be limited as well. 
• SFL table blackholing: An attacker may attempt to force an edge router to filter legiti­
mate reply packets originating from certain sources by filling the SFL table at that edge 
router with the addresses of these sources. Therefore creating a black hole in that SFL 
table. Although nothing can prevent an attacker from doing so, the PF scheme can still 
pass legitimate reply packets based on the fact that the legitimacy of incoming reply 
packets is first determined by inspecting the LPL table rather than inspecting the SFL 
table. 
3.4.3 The Impact of Restricting the ISN to a Specific Pattern in the SNF scheme 
It is known that when an end system sends its SYN packet to establish a TCP connection, 
it chooses an (ISN) for that connection. Typically, the ISN should change over time, so that 
each connection has a different ISN. New instances of a connection may be established if the 
connection is opened and closed in quick succession, or if the connection breaks with loss of 
memory and is then reestablished. The TCP should be able to identify duplicate segments 
from previous instances of the same connection. To achieve this, RFC 793 [94] specifies that 
the ISN should be viewed as a 32-bit counter that is incremented by one every 4 microseconds. 
Although this practice is common in most TCP implementations, it is not necessary for proper 
functionality of the protocol, and it can be violated in favor of mitigating the effect of an ongoing 
attack. The main impact of restricting the choice of the ISN is the increase the possibility of 
duplicate segment problem (i.e., having duplicate segments from previous instances of the same 
connection) if multiple instances of the same connection are created frequently. However, this 
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drawback can be tolerated during TCP-based RDoS attack, because it is more important to 
mitigate the effect of the attack. It is also, important to point out that restricting the ISN 
to certain pattern does not increase the vulnerability of connection hijacking through TCP 
sequence number guessing. This argument is based on the fact that for a connection to be 
hijacked, the sequence number of the server, rather the client, needs to be guessed. 
3.5 Chapter Conclusions 
DoS attacks represent an imminent threat to the Internet infrastructure. Effective mitiga­
tion of these attacks is an extremely important and strategic counter measure. The focus of this 
chapter has been on supplementing ISP's edge routers with special mechanisms that aid them 
in performing online DoS mitigation, wherein each edge router becomes independently capable 
of distinguishing attack packets from legitimate packets. This feature addresses many of the 
performance and practical problems of existing DoS mitigation schemes. Two novel concepts 
were advocated in order to envision this functionality, namely, the concept of victim-assistance 
and the concept of protocol-determinism. 
We have shown how to utilize the concept of victim-assistance to counter a class of attacks 
known as TCP-based RDoS. In particular, we proposed two victim-assisted schemes to mitigate 
these attacks. The first scheme, called pairing-based filtering (PF), is based on the idea of 
pairing request packets and their corresponding reply packets in a distributed manner. Packet 
pairing is performed at the edge routers of the ISP network that contains the victim, such 
that attack reply packets can be identified and filtered directly, leading to protection from 
bandwidth exhaustion. Through analytical studies, we showed that PF scheme offers protection 
for legitimate packets going to the targeted system during a RDoS attack, while filtering attack 
packets. Our analysis shows that the probability that a legitimate packet being dropped under 
the PF scheme is less than 0.001, when suitable parameters are chosen. 
The second scheme, called SYN number Based Filtering (SNF), is based on the idea of 
restricting victim's choice of the initial sequence numbers of the generated connection estab­
lishment requests during an attack, such that legitimate incoming SYN-ACK packets can be 
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verified at the ISP perimeter by checking specific bit combination. Our analysis shows that 
the percentage of false positives is extremely low in the case of classical attacks. For advanced 
attacks, the analysis shows that periodic SNF performs very well in terms of false positives and 
false negatives rates only when the period of changing the secret pattern is close to attacker's 
response time. However, reactive SNF performs very well for both cases. 
Obtaining victim's assistance represents the basis for defending against TCP-based RDoS 
attacks in both schemes. The importance of this approach is reflected in the fact that a new 
source of information (i.e., the victim) is now available to make distinction between attack 
and legitimate packets. This approach opens new directions of research in designing efficient 
defenses for DoS attacks, which includes (1) integrating the proposed schemes in such a way to 
provide a hybrid service of attack prevention and mitigation and (2) investigating the viability 
of victim's assistance in defending against other types of DoS attacks. In this context, several 
issues needs to be addressed. For example, what information should be provided by the victim? 
How this information is to be communicated to edge routers? When to activate/terminate the 
mitigation scheme and on which edge routers? How to extend the concept of victim-assistance 
to inter-domain setting? Does collaboration among edge routers help in anyway? 
We have shown how to utilize the concept of protocol-determinism in mitigating SYN 
flooding attacks. In this context, a novel scheme, called intentional dropping based filtering, 
has been proposed. The proposed scheme enables edge routers of an ISP network to distinguish 
between legitimate and fake connection requests taking into account the persistent behavior of 
legitimate clients. The main idea of this scheme is to intentionally drop the first SYN packet 
of each connection request. Subsequent SYN packet from a request is passed only if it adheres 
to the TCP's timeout mechanism. We showed that the proposed scheme reduces the effective 
attack rate significantly. However, it imposes additional delay on connection establishment. 
Several issues need to be addressed in the future. For example, what improvements should be 
made in order to take the parallelism of HTTP 1.0 connections into account? How to mitigate 
type 3 attacks? Is it possible to perform adaptive activation and termination of the filtering 
scheme by each edge router individually? 
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It is clear that the co-existence of the SNF and intentional dropping-based filtering schemes 
can effectively mitigate TCP-based DoS attacks which are the most common and the most 
challenging. The issue of co-existence of these two schemes with the PF scheme or with 
any other mitigation scheme opens up future research directions with respect to scalability, 
interference, and effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 4. NOVEL HYBRID SCHEMES EMPLOYING PACKET 
MARKING AND LOGGING FOR IP TRACEBACK 
Tracing DoS attacks that employ source address spoofing is an important and challenging 
problem. As explained in Chapter 2, traditional traceback schemes provide spoofed packets 
traceback capability either by augmenting the packets with partial path information (i.e., 
packet marking), or by storing packet digests or signatures at intermediate routers (i.e., packet 
logging). Such approaches require either a large number of attack packets to be collected by 
the victim to infer the paths (packet marking), or a significant amount of resources to be 
reserved at intermediate routers (packet logging). We adopt a hybrid traceback approach in 
which packet marking and packet logging are integrated in a novel manner, so as to achieve 
the best of both worlds, that is, to achieve small number of attack packets to conduct the 
traceback process and small amount of resources to be allocated at intermediate routers for 
packet logging purposes. 
Based on this notion, two novel traceback schemes are presented. The first scheme, called 
Distributed Link-List Traceback (DLLT), is based on the idea of preserving the marking infor­
mation at intermediate routers in such a way that it can be collected using a link list based 
approach. The second scheme, called Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM), employs 
the concept of a "pipeline" for propagating marking information from one marking router to 
another so that it eventually reaches the destination. We evaluate the effectiveness of the pro­
posed schemes against various performance metrics through a combination of analytical and 
simulation studies. Our studies show that the proposed schemes offer a drastic reduction in 
the number of packets required to conduct the traceback process and a reasonable saving in 
the storage requirement. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the attack 
traceback problem in order to motivate our work. In Section 4.2, we present the first scheme: 
distributed link-list traceback. In Section 4.3, we present the second scheme: probabilistic 
pipelined packet marking. Practical considerations are discussed in Section 4.4. In Section 
4.5, we evaluate the proposed schemes through combination of theoretical and experimental 
analysis. Finally, summary is given in Section 5. 
4.1 Background and Motivation 
4.1.1 Attack Traceback Problem 
Let Rn, Ri2, ..., Rin be the ordered list of routers between attacker (Ai) and victim (V). 
This ordered list of routers defines the attack path for Ai. We call each of these routers involved 
in forwarding malformed packets to the victim, as an Attack Router. For any attack router Rij 
in the list, all routers between Rij and the victim are called the Predecessor List of Rij, while 
all routers between attacker and Rij are called Successor List of R^. The main objective of 
attack traceback problem is to identify the attack router connected directly to A, (i.e., router 
Rii which has empty successor list). In our view, this is equivalent to identifying the end point 
of a link list starting at the victim, where each element in the list represents an intermediate 
router along the path from victim to attacker as can be seen in Fig. 4.1. Multiple attackers 
case corresponds to a tree of link lists rooted at the victim (V), where each leaf represents a 
link list end point. 
JFjjjL jggg Qj| -gggfr- Qgj 4P 
A, nn Ri2 R|3 Rin v 
Figure 4.1 An instance of the attack traceback problem. The list of routers 
Rn, Rl2, ..., Rin represents the attack path followed by packets 
sent from A, to V. 
The main assumptions made in our work are outlined as follows: 
• The attackers overwhelm the victim by large number of packets. This is a valid assump­
88 
tion which reflects the nature of most common DoS attacks. However, different than the 
assumptions made in [51, 53, 54], we do not necessarily assume that individual attack 
sources has to send numerous packets. 
• Routing paths are stable (i.e., all packets follow the same path for a given (source, 
destination) pair). This is not necessarily true for all packets due to load balancing or 
network configuration changes. However, it can be accepted since these route changes 
are infrequent and can be ignored for the sake of simplifying the problem. 
• Packets travel from source to destination in a relatively short time (i.e., few milliseconds). 
• Attackers are aware of the traceback scheme in use. Therefore, they try every possible 
way to mislead the victim. 
• Routers are not widely compromised. Our schemes rely on well behaved routers. 
4.1.2 Motivation and Contributions 
The imminent threats imposed by DoS attacks call for efficient and fast traceback schemes 
that enjoy the following features: 
1. Providing accurate information about routers near the attack source rather than those 
near the victim. 
2. Recognition and exclusion of false information injected by the attacker. 
3. Avoiding the use of large amount of attack packets to construct the attack path or attack 
tree. 
4. Low processing and storage overhead at intermediate routers. 
5. Efficient collection of marking information stored at intermediate routers (if any). 
Previous schemes failed to satisfy the above features collectively. For example, in PPM 
[51], routers that are far away from the victim have very low chance to pass their marking 
information to the victim because intermediate routers overwrite this information, which leads 
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to the loss of valuable marking information written by routers near the attacker(s). This 
is contradictory to our goal of having more knowledge about these routers. PPM requires 
considerable amount of packets to be collected at the victim before conducting the traceback 
process. Waiting for a large number of attack packets to be collected at the victim will 
significantly increase the response time of countering an attack. This argument may not be 
valid when a small value (e.g., 0.05) for the marking probability is used in PPM. However, 
such marking probability introduces a serious vulnerability in PPM that was pointed out in 
[52], where the attacker has the ability to pass spoofed marking information to mislead the 
victim. 
The major drawback of Hash-based traceback [62] is that it incurs a heavy burden on 
routers by requiring them to log information about every forwarded packet. Moreover, the 
method employed to collect packet information from network routers is inefficient and requires 
special resources; the scheme assumes that a central management unit is available in each 
domain to download and search all packet digests looking for specific packet footprints. This 
results in a tedious process and an unnecessary overhead. The deterministic storage algorithm 
increases the memory requirement of the scheme. Moreover, a major concern in Hash-based 
traceback is the small window of time through which packets can be successfully traced. 
Generally, routers write their IP addresses in the forwarded packets under the sampling 
based schemes. In contrast, packet information (digests or signatures) is written in router's 
memory under the logging based schemes. Each approach has its own pros and cons. We 
believe that developing a hybrid of both approaches, as predicted in [95], can lead to an im­
proved traceback capability. Different than earlier work, we focus on key aspects of an efficient 
traceback scheme. In particular, we show how to provide the victim with more information 
about the path followed by an attack packet using constant space in the packet header in order 
to reduce the number of packets required to localize attack sources, and we address the issue 
of eliminating the attacker's ability to mislead the victim in the traceback process. Also, we 
focus on reducing the router's storage requirement. 
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We propose two alternative implementations of a hybrid marking and logging based IP 
traceback. The first implementation is called Distributed Link-List Traceback (DLLT). DLLT 
has an efficient implementation that combines the good features of both PPM and Hash-based 
schemes based on the idea of preserving the marking information at intermediate routers in 
such a way that it can be collected using a link-list based approach. The second implementation 
is called Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM). This scheme aims at propagating the 
IP addresses of the routers that were involved in marking certain packet by loading them into 
packets going to the same destination. Therefore, preserving these addresses while avoiding 
the need for long term storage at intermediate routers. DLLT and PPPM exhibit the features 
of PMM [51] in the sense that routers mark forwarded packets probabilistically. Also, they 
exhibit the features of Hash-based scheme [62] in the sense that processing and storage at 
intermediate routers are necessary. The main advantage of PPPM scheme over the DLLT 
scheme is that long term storage at intermediate routers is not necessary. 
We discuss the details of both schemes showing the procedures performed by Internet 
routers, the fields need to be allocated in each packet for marking purposes, the methods used 
to collect marking information from intermediate routers, and the attack source identification 
algorithm used by the victim. Practical considerations are discussed as well. We perform 
preliminary theoretical study to evaluate the proposed schemes and compare them with the 
PPM scheme in terms of the number of packets required to conduct the traceback process. 
Also, we quantify the storage requirement of the proposed schemes. New performance metrics 
are defined and used to evaluate the hybrid schemes through extensive simulation experiments. 
4.2 Scheme I: Distributed Link List Traceback (DLLT) 
4.2.1 Distributed Link-List (DLL) Concept 
The main idea of DLL is to keep track of a subset of the routers that are involved in 
forwarding certain packet by establishing a temporary link between them in a distributed 
manner. DLL is based on a "store, mark and forward" approach. A fixed-size marking field 
is allocated in each packet. Any router that decides to mark the packet, stores the current 
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content of the marking field (which was written by the previous marking router) in a special 
data structure called Marking Table maintained at the router. The router generates an ID 
for that packet to index its marking information in the marking table. The router marks the 
packet by overwriting the marking field by its own IP address, and then forwards the packet 
as usual. Any router that decides not to mark the packet just forwards it. 
A link list is inherently established because the marking field serves as a pointer to the last 
router that did the marking for a given packet, and the marking table of that router contains 
a pointer (i.e., the IP address) to the previous marking router, and so on. Therefore, each 
packet received by the destination contains the start point of a link list that is part of the 
packet path. We call it distributed link-list because each router decides by. its own to be on 
the list or not according to certain marking probability. 
We illustrate the main idea of DLL by considering the scenario shown in Fig. 4.2. Let 
packet x be forwarded from Attacker to Victim through the list of routers (i?i, ..., R.%). 
Assume that routers R2, R$, and Rj marked the specified packet according to certain marking 
probability, q. In the DLL approach, an entry will be added to the marking table of each of 
these routers as shown in the figure. The destination in this case receives a packet marked 
by R-j. The remaining marking information (i.e., router's IP addresses) of packet x can be 
obtained by following the link-list at R7 and then propagating to other routers (i.e., R$ and 
R2). The main advantage of this scheme is to keep the size of the packet from growing while 
preserving marking information along the path to be collected if necessary. Obviously, the cost 
paid for this gain is the additional storage requirement at intermediate routers. 
Marking information collection reply 
Attacker floods the victim 
6jgjî8l W 
Attacker |p**et« 
x. m. 
The victim initiates a marking information collection query to collect the marking 
information that belongs to packet x 
Figure 4.2 An example of distributed link-list marking. In this example, 
R<2, R5, and Rj decided to mark packet x. 
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4.2.2 Details of Distributed Link-List Attack Traceback 
Distributed Link-List Traceback (DLLT) uses DLL concept to keep track of the routers that 
have been involved in forwarding malformed packets toward the victim. The basic components 
of this scheme are the marking and storage procedure, and the marking information collection 
protocol. What follows is a discussion of each of these components. 
4.2.2.1 Marking and Storage Procedure 
DLLT employs a probabilistic marking and storage scheme. When a router receives a 
packet, it will mark the packet with probability q. If the packet has previously been marked, 
then the router will store that information before remarking the packet. Therefore, packet 
marking and storage is an integrated procedure. Before going into details of this procedure, 
we show the main data structure used for storing packet information. 
Logging packet information at intermediate routers is not a new idea. Storing the packet 
features was considered in [61]. Also storing packet digests was considered in [62]. The major 
drawback of these schemes, as pointed out in subsection 4.1.2, is that they put a heavy burden 
on routers by requiring them to log information about every forwarded packet. Moreover, there 
is a need to download and search all this information looking for specific packet footprints, 
which results in a tedious and an unnecessary process. Our storage scheme is probabilistic in 
nature, which means that only fraction of the traffic is to be logged at each router. Also, we 
store this information in such a way as to ensure that it can be collected in a predetermined 
manner. For storage implementation, We borrow the idea of using Bloom filters [69] from [62]. 
However, we modify it to satisfy our requirements: 
• Storing the packet digests to be able to verify that a given packet has been forwarded by 
the router. 
• Mapping the digests of a given packet to a certain memory location where the marking 
information of that packet can be stored. 
The first requirement can be achieved exactly the same way as in [62], where a Bloom 
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filter computes j distinct packet digests for each marked packet using j independent uniform 
hash functions, and uses the j (n-bit) results to index the 2n-sized bit Digests Array (DA) 
(please refer to Appendix B for details). The array is initialized to all zeros, and bits are set to 
one as packets are received. The second requirement can be achieved by storing the marking 
information of a given packet in the Marking Information Table (MIT) at the memory location 
indexed by the first hash function that maps to zero bit in the digests array. Fig. 4.3 depicts 
both the DA and MIT with j hash functions. It also shows the marking information of a given 
packet before and after being marked. In each packet, we reserve the following fields to hold 
the marking information: 
• Single 32-bits marking field. This field holds the IP address of the marking router. 
• [log2(j)l bits hash function number. This is the number of the hash function used to 
index the location of the marking information of the given packet in the MIT. 
In the MIT, we store the following information: 
• The IP address of the previous router that marked a given packet. This serves as a 
pointer to that router while collecting marking information. 
• The hash function number (hfn) found in the marked packet. This specifies which hash 
function was used to index the MIT of the router pointed by the IP address. 
It can be realized that probabilistic edge marking (an edge is composed of two adjacent 
routers on the packet path) is simple to implement in our scheme. Whenever a router decides 
to mark a packet, the subsequent router can be forced to mark the same packet. This can be 
achieved by maintaining a 1-bit field called marking flag as part of the marking information to 
be held in the packet. This flag is used to enforce deterministic marking when it is on. When 
it is off, the marking becomes probabilistic. With this flag, the probabilistic edge marking in 
DLLT can be implemented as follows: When a router receives a packet, it checks the marking 
flag. If it is on, it has to do the marking and storage procedure and then reset the flag. 
Otherwise (i.e., when the flag is off), it takes the decision based on some probability, q. If 
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the decision outcome is to mark the packet it will do so, and then set the flag such that the 
next adjacent router will do the marking deterministically. The detailed marking and storage 
procedure is shown in Fig. 4.4. 
Digests Array Marking Information Table 
HA P) 
Marking information before remarking 
(IP, Hash function number) 
32-bit IP 
: Address 
Hash function 
number 
192,129.77.13 2 
]'>2 12<) 156.too 
Marking information after remarking 
(IP, Hash function number) 
Figure 4.3 Digests array (DA) and marking information table (MIT) at 
router R. The marking information of a given packet before 
and after being marked at router R which has the IP address 
of 192.129.156.100. 
We have observed that there will be a lot of unused memory locations in the MIT because 
the actual number of packets whose digests are stored in one DA is certainly less than 2n, and 
it depends on the capacity factor of the DA, which defines how many bits are required in the 
DA in order to store the digests of certain number of packets. For efficient storage utilization, 
the MIT is shared among several DAs. This issue is revisited in subsection 4.5.2. 
4.2.2.2 Marking Information Collection Protocol 
Once an attack is detected, then the first thing to do is to collect marking information from 
intermediate routers. A straightforward approach is to use a centralized scheme as in [62]. Such 
approach requires a central management unit that is responsible for polling each router in its 
domain to download a copy of its currently stored information. Although easy to implement, 
this scheme lacks scalability and efficiency. Moreover, it is an expensive approach since special 
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Marking and Storage Algorithm at Router R 
1. for each packet, P 
(a) i f  (P.marking flag =— 1) Mark and Store ( P )  
(b) else 
i. choose a random number x in [0, 1] 
ii. if ( x < q) Mark and Store (P) 
iii. else forward P 
Procedure Mark and Store (Packet P) 
1. compute H \ ( P ) ,  %(P), H j ( P )  
2. for (i — 1 to j) 
(a) if (Digests Array [ H i ( P ) \  == 0) {index = i; break;} 
3. set Digests Array bits indexed by H \ { P ) ,  % ( P ) ,  • • • >  H j ( P )  
4. store the previous marking information of P  in the MIT at location indexed 
b y  H  i n d e x  ( P )  
5. remark P. (i.e., P.Marking field = R, flip P.Marking flag, P.hash function 
number = index) 
Figure 4.4 DLLT marking and storage algorithm at router R. 
resources (for example central management units) have to be deployed in each Internet domain. 
Instead of downloading the whole marking information from each router, we propose a Marking 
Information Collection Protocol (MIC) to collect relevant marking information from routers 
that are believed to be involved in forwarding attack packets. 
The main objective of the MIC protocol is to collect the addresses of the routers that 
actually marked a particular attack packet. In this protocol, we define three types of packets: 
(i) MIC-request packets, (ii) MIC-reply packets and (iii) MIC-deadend packets. First, we 
describe the format of each of these packet types. Then, we discuss the operation of this 
protocol. All MIC packets have the following general format: <Packet Type, Source Address, 
Destination Address, Victim Address, Hash Function Input, Hash Function Number, Marking 
Routers List>. Where packet type field specifies whether the packet represents request, reply, 
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or deadend. 
• MIC-request packet: It is used to obtain the ordered list of routers that marked a partic­
ular attack packet. Each MIC request packet propagates to the set of marking routers 
of a particular attack packet. Therefore, source address, destination address and hash 
function number fields keep changing from one visited marking router to another. Each 
of the visited marking routers appends its address to the marking routers list. 
• MIC-reply packet: It is generated by a node that identifies itself as the end list point of 
the given attack packet (i.e., when the MIC-request cannot be propagated further). This 
packet is sent back to the victim. It is possible for the attacker to spoof the marking 
field of its outgoing packet such that the first marking router will store this information. 
This has the impact of propagating the MIC-requests to a false router that does not have 
the digests of the given packet. Such router is called a dead-end router. This router is 
responsible of sending the MIC-deadend packet described below to the requesting party. 
• MIC-deadend packet: It is generated by a router called the deadend router in response 
to an invalid MIC request (i.e., when no marking information is available for the given 
attack packet). It is sent back to the requesting party to indicate that party must identify 
itself as the end router of the link list obtained by the given attack packet. Such router 
is called the end-list router. The contents of the received MIC request packets are copied 
into the outgoing MIC-deadend packet except for the packet type, source and destination 
address fields need to be changed accordingly. 
The MIC protocol is initiated by the victim once an attack is detected. Each MIC-request 
packet generated by the victim corresponds to one particular received attack packet. The 
number of generated requests is an input parameter specified by the administrator. Each 
MIC-request packet is sent to the router whose address is found in the marking field of the 
corresponding attack packet. This request propagates to other routers that marked that par­
ticular packet. This is accomplished by processing the MIC-request as follows: the router who 
receives a MIC-request, performs a membership test (by computing j hash functions with the 
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given packet as an input) to check whether the packet belongs to the router's DA or not. If the 
membership test is positive, then the router extracts the marking information of that attack 
packet from its MIT at the location specified by Hhfn(P), where 'hfn' is the hash function 
number found in the MIC-request packet. Also, it appends its own IP address to the Marking 
Routers List and updates the 'hfn' field. Then it propagates the request packet to the next 
marking router. 
It is important to distinguish the deadend router from the end-list router in DLLT. The 
deadend router of a given packet is the router that does not maintain the digests of that packet. 
While the end-list router is by default the router which could store spoofed source address, 
because the attacker is expected to spoof the marking field, (recall that the end-list router is 
the first router on the actual attack path that decides to mark the packet). When the end-list 
router receives a MIC-request, it has to propagate it (after appending its IP address) to the 
router specified by the stored IP address. Since the address is spoofed, there are two cases 
possible: 
1. Valid IP address: It will lead to a router that is not on the actual packet path. This 
router which we call the deadend router realizes that it is not part of the packet path 
(based on not having the packet's digests). Therefore, it sends a reply message to the 
end-list router indicating no farther propagation for the request is possible. 
2. Non-valid IP address: If the MIC-request is forwarded to a router that is not implement­
ing the scheme, or to a non-existing address, then the end-list router will either receive 
an error message or it will time out before receiving any reply. 
In both scenarios, it can be assumed that no farther propagation of the request message is 
possible. Fig. 4.5 depicts the operation of this protocol. Shaded nodes represent routers 
involved in forwarding attack packets to the victim V coming from nodes A\ and Ai- Dashed 
arrows show how the MIC-request for a particular attack packet propagates from the victim 
to X and Y. As no further propagation is possible, Y, which is called end-list router in this 
case, sends an MIC-reply packet back to V. 
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P 
Q 
deadend; 
g 
ena-iist 
(305 Router involved in 
y—forwarding attack packets 
MIC-request MIC-reply MIC-deadend  ^Router not involved in 
forwarding attack packets 
Figure 4.5 Basic messages used in MIC protocol. Notice that the deadend 
router does not have the packet's digests. Therefore, it sends the 
MIC-deadend message to router Y (the end-list corresponding 
to the given MIC-request). 
4.3 Scheme II: Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM) 
A disadvantage of DLLT is that long term storage at intermediate routers is necessary. In 
this section, we propose an alternative scheme, called probabilistic pipelined packet marking 
(PPPM), that takes such issue into account. 
4.3.1 Pipelined Packet Marking Concept 
In computer architecture, pipelining is used to allow more than one instruction to be in 
some stage of execution at the same time. Usually, each instruction passes through sequence 
of stages during its life cycle. The outcome of one stage is forwarded to the next stage before 
being replaced by another instruction from the previous stage. The whole process is repeated 
at each stage until the whole instruction is executed. We propose a similar approach for 
packet marking. In computer architecture analogy, a router that marks a packet represents a 
pipeline stage, the marking process represents the instruction execution, and the propagation 
of marking information from one marking router to another represents the flow of instructions 
in a pipelined system. The main idea is to transfer the marking information that belongs to 
certain packet by propagating it from one marking router to another using subsequent packets 
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traveling to the same destination. 
We propose a packet marking scheme, called probabilistic pipelined packet marking (PPPM), 
based on the pipelined marking concept. The objective of PPPM is to let the destination know 
about all routers that were involved in marking certain packet, P, using constant space in the 
IP packet header without incurring long term storage overhead at intermediate routers. In the 
following discussion we assume that P has enough space to hold the marking information of 
one router1. In its basic form, the marking information field allocated in each packet consists 
of two parts: the IP address of the marking router, MR, and an ID used to link marking done 
for a given packet by different routers2. 
Suppose that m routers (R\ through Rm) decide to mark packet P (based on certain 
marking probability, q). The total marking information to be written by the m routers can 
be viewed as a long message that needs to be transferred to P's destination. The main idea 
is to distribute this message among m packets. For the message to be reassembled at P's 
destination, a unique ID must link the m packets. Distributing the message among several 
packets is accomplished in our scheme through pipelining. The first router3, i?i, that decides 
to mark P, copies its IP and a randomly chosen ID, x, into the corresponding marking fields of 
the packet. The second marking router of P (i..e., router R?) buffers P's marking information 
(MR — Ri,ID — x) in a destination based table, before remarking it by its own. It is 
important to mention that P's ID remains the same. The same process is repeated at each 
marking router. The content of P's marking information field when arriving its destination 
would be (Rm, x). The remaining marking information for packet P, which is still buffered at 
routers % through Rm are transferred to P's destination by loading them into packets going 
to the same destination. 
Fig. 4.6 shows an example of pipelined packet marking. In this example, packets are 
forwarded from S to D through the path consisting of routers R\, R2, R3, and R4. To simplify 
the discussion, we assume that each forwarded packet is marked by at most two routers chosen 
1We discuss where to place this information in 4.4.3.1. 
2 Actual contents of the marking field are discussed in subsection 4.3.2. 
3A router can identify itself as the first marking router of a given packet if the marking field found to be 
empty. 
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arbitrarily. The names of the routers that decide to mark certain packet are shown in the table 
associated with the source S. The figure shows the content of the marking field allocated in 
each packet as it traverse its path from S to D. It also shows the content of the buffer at each 
router. In this example, routers Ri and R3 decide to mark the first packet. Since R\ is the 
first marking router of packet 1, it puts its own mark into the packet. This consists of its IP 
address, i?i, and a randomly chosen ID, x. Notice that nothing is buffered at R\. The same 
packet is remarked by R3. Since the packet is already marked, R3 has to buffer the marking 
information for the packet's destination before writing its own IP address in the packet. Notice 
that Rs keeps the same ID, x, in the marked packet. The buffered information is transferred 
to D when R3 decides to mark another packet destined to D. This happens to be the forth 
packet. Since both packets (i.e., the first and the fourth) hold the same ID, x by the time they 
arrive at D, it is easy for D to conclude that packet x has been marked by R\ and R3. Similar 
discussion applies for other packets in this example. 
m 
Marking 
routers 
1 R,.R3  
2 R2 .  R4  
3 R. 
4 R„R3  
% 
I R,.* I 
K» I 
I I I I 
I R-' I 
JH 
D, Rv x - j R3, x I 
\ EZI 
iSH 
.J rHvx I 
D, R2. y R,y  
R2.y 
Figure 4.6 An example of pipelined-based packet marking. The table 
shows the names of the routers that did the marking for each 
packet. Dashed rectangular boxes represent buffers associated 
with each router. Marking information augmented with each 
packet is shown, in a solid rectangular box, for each packet at 
each router along its path. 
4.3.2 Details of Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM) 
In this subsection, we provide details about PPPM. We start by describing the fields that 
need to be allocated in each packet for marking purposes, then the information that needs to 
be buffered at each marking router and lastly we describe the pipelined marking and buffering 
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algorithm. Similar to DLLT, packet marking and logging in PPPM is an integrated procedure. 
The following fields are allocated in each packet for marking purposes: 
• 32-bit IP address: This field represents the IP address of the marking router. 
• 8-bit TTL: This field is used to obtain the actual distance between the marking router 
and the victim. TTL is normally set to the value of TTL found in the packet before 
remarking it except when the packet is used to transfer a buffered marking information 
t h a t  b e l o n g s  t o  a n o t h e r  p a c k e t ,  s a y  P x .  I n  w h i c h  c a s e ,  t h e  T T L  i s  s e t  t o  ( T T L  +  T ) ,  
where T represents the distance between the previous marking router of Px and the 
current router. 
• c-bit ID: This is an ID that uniquely identifies the marked packet. It is chosen randomly 
by the first marking router (i.e., the first router to mark a certain packet). 
Each PPPM enabled router maintains a destination based buffer for the purpose of marking 
information logging. For each destination, the most recent marking information is buffered. 
This includes the same marking fields found in the marked packet except that instead of storing 
the TTL value, the difference T~TTL-TTL is stored. This difference represents the distance 
between the previous marking router and the current marking router. The advantage of this 
field is to determine the distance of a certain marking router from the destination. For a high 
speed implementation, there should be a mechanism by which a router can directly identify 
whether a given destination has marking information in the buffer, or not. Similar to DLLT, 
we suggest using a Bloom filter at each router to achieve this objective. When a router decides 
to buffer a packet's marking information, it applies j hash functions to the packet's destination 
and set the corresponding bits of the Bloom filter to one. 
Fig. 4.7 shows the marking and buffering algorithm that is to be performed at a PPPM 
enabled router. A router, R, decides to mark a packet, P, based on certain marking probability, 
q. If there is no marking information to be transferred to P's destination and if P is not already 
marked, then R writes its own mark into P. This includes its own IP address, a randomly 
assigned ID, and a TTL value equals to that of P's current TTL. Otherwise (i.e., if P is already 
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marked), R buffers P's marking information before remarking it. On the other hand, if there 
is marking information to be transferred to P's destination, then that information is loaded 
into P before P's current marking information is buffered at R. It is to be noted that, in the 
latter case, the router keeps swapping the marks but cannot perform its own remarking on 
the packets for the same destination. However, we do not consider this as a major problem, 
because in PPPM scheme, it is sufficient to obtain only one mark per router to conduct the 
traceback process. This is based on the fact that each router is associated with a distance 
parameter that specifies its location on the packet path. To ensure that a router writes its 
own mark into at least one packet destined to a given destination during attack, the router 
clears the Bloom filter bits from time to time and writes its own mark probabilistically into 
packets destined to destinations that are not already inserted in the Bloom filter. Recall that, 
a Bloom filter is used in PPPM to indicate whether certain destination has a buffered marking 
information or not. When a router buffers marking information for a given destination, it 
inserts that destination in the Bloom filter by setting the bits indexed by the hash functions 
outputs. It is to be noted that clearing the Bloom filter is also necessary to get rid of any 
marking information that was buffered before the attack. Otherwise, such information will be 
written into packets destined to the victim. 
Fig. 4.8 shows the benefit of using the T T L  field in determining the distance of certain 
marking router from the destination. Let packet Pi be sent from Si along the shown path to 
D. Packet P% is sent from different source, to the same destination D. We assume that Pi 
was sent before P2, and we assume that Pi was marked by routers R and W respectively, and 
that its ID was set to x by router R; while P% was marked by routers F and W and its ID was 
s e t  t o  y  b y  r o u t e r  F .  T h e  f i g u r e  s h o w s  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  ( p a c k e t  I D ,  m a r k i n g  r o u t e r ,  T T L ,  T T L )  
for both packets after they leave each router along their paths. Also, it shows the content of 
the buffer at router W. In this example, P2 is used to transfer the marking information that 
belongs to packet Pi which was buffered at router W. After receiving the two packets, the 
destination can identify that packet x was marked by routers R and W which are 3 and 1 hops 
away, respectively. Determining the distance of each marking router from the destination can 
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Marking and Buffering Algorithm at Router R 
1. for each packet, P 
(a) choose a random number x in [0, 1] 
(b) if ( x > q) forward P 
(c) else 
i. if (P.destination is NOT in R.MB) 
A. if (P.ID == 0) mark P 
B. else buffer P.MI, remark P 
ii. else 
A. save P.MI in a temporary variable 
B. remark P 
C. buffer P.MI 
Figure 4.7 Marking and buffering algorithm at router R. MB denotes 
Marking Buffer. MI denotes Marking Information. 
be easily incorporated in the marking procedure shown in Fig. 4.7. 
Similar to DLLT, probabilistic edge marking can be realized in the proposed marking and 
buffering procedure by adding a 1-bit marking flag. Once a DoS attack is detected, the victim 
starts the source identification process using k attack packets as an input. By realizing that 
packets holding the same ID carry marking information that belongs to the same packet, the 
victim can extract the marking information of each of the distinct IDs found in the k packets 
by running the simple algorithm shown in Fig 4.9. The outcome of this algorithm is an ID 
table with two columns: Packet ID and Marking Routers List and their distances from the 
victim. 
4.4 Practical Considerations 
4.4.1 Choice of the Marking Probability 
The value of the marking probability, q, plays a direct role on the effectiveness of the 
proposed schemes. On one extreme, if we set q to 1 (i.e., deterministic marking) then only 1 
attack packet would be sufficient to locate the attacker in the case of DLLT, while d attack 
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Assumption: 
vp1 was marked by R and W 
• VP8 was marked by F and W 
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Marking 
Buffer 
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Figure 4.8 An example of distance calculation. The values of (packet ID, 
marking router, TTL, TTL) are shown at each route for both 
packets. By receiving Pi and P2, D concludes that packet x 
was marked by W which is 98 — 96 hops away, and by R which 
is 48 — 45 hops away. 
ID Table Construction Algorithm 
1. for each packet, P 
(a) if (P.ID NOT in the ID Table (IDT)) add entry for P.ID in IDT 
(b) append P.MR and (P.TTL - P.TTL) to the ID.mar king routers list 
Figure 4.9 ID table construction algorithm at the victim. P.ID denotes P's 
ID, P.MR denotes P's marking router, and ID.marking routers 
list denotes the list of routers that correspond to the IDT's 
entry that contains ID. 
packets are required in the case of PPPM (where d is the number of of PPPM enabled routers 
in the pipeline between attacker and victim). This choice is excluded in practice to avoid 
excessive overhead on network routers. On the other extreme, if we set q very close to 0, then 
larger amount of packets would be required to reconstruct the attack path. In general, the 
following issues must be considered when choosing q. 
1. Ensuring that at least one router along the attack path will mark a given packet. This 
has the benefit of overwriting any false marking information injected by the attacker if 
he acts as a marking router. 
2. Minimizing the number of packets required for attack traceback. This bound is expressed 
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as a function of q (see Equation (4.2)), where it can be seen that the bound is minimized 
by increasing q. 
3. Minimizing the overhead on network routers. The amount of overhead imposed by 
DLLT/PPPM on network routers can be lowered by decreasing q. 
While issues 1 and 2 are consistent, they conflict with issue 3. Therefore, there is a tradeoff 
between the efficiency of the proposed schemes and the amount of overhead imposed on network 
routers. In [52], it was shown that the ability to hide attacker's location (by injecting false 
marking information into its attack packets) is curtailed by increasing the marking probability, 
however in PPM [51] the degree to which the victim can delimit the attacker's injection of false 
marking information is bounded by the sampling constraints. In DLLT and PPPM, there is no 
maximum bound on the value of q, because information about all marking routers of a given 
packet will eventually propagate to the victim. In our simulation studies (section 4.1), we use 
relatively large values for q to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed schemes. In practice, 
lower values for q would be used to minimize overhead on network routers. The choice of q is 
a design issue that involves a tradeoff between efficiency and router's processing overhead. 
4.4.2 Security of the Proposed Schemes 
4.4.2.1 DLLT security 
The correctness of the DLLT scheme is based on the validity of the information collected 
by the MIC protocol. It is possible that attackers may abuse this protocol in different ways. 
• The protocol can be abused by generating fake MIC-requests and/or fake MIC-replies. 
This is inevitable as it is inherent problem with any protocol and it is not specific to 
the proposed MIC protocol. Fake MIC-requests may increase processing overhead at 
network routers. However, they do not affect the outcome of the traceback process. Fake 
MIC-replies, on the other hand, can affect the traceback outcome, because such replies 
inject false information about the attack path/tree. To overcome this problem, the MIC 
protocol can be modified in such a way to provide light wight authentication of MIC-
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replies. A straightforward modification is to let the victim attach a secret code to each 
generated MIC-request. This code propagates with each MIC-request as it becomes part 
of the request. The same secret code is copied into the the corresponding MIC-reply. 
Fake MIC-replies can be easily filtered as they are not supposed to contain a valid code. 
For increased security, the secret code should be distinct for each MIC-request. 
• The deadend router which may be chosen in advance by the attacker can be compromised. 
For example: (i) it can create looping by propagating an MIC-request packet to one of 
the routers found in the Marking Routers List of that packet (ii) it may ignore any MIC-
request packet (iii) it may propagate received MIC-request packets to wrong routers. 
Issue (i) can be avoided by preventing a router from propagating a MIC-request packet if 
its address is already in the Marking Routers List. Issues (ii) and (iii) can be detected by 
modifying the MIC protocol such that each router acknowledges the requesting router. If 
no acknowledgment is received within a specific amount of time. The requesting router 
detects that some something is wrong, identifies itself to be the end-list router, and 
generates the MIC-reply packet. 
4.4.2.2 PPPM Security 
The PPPM scheme is vulnerable to the following types of attacks. 
• The attacker is expected to behave like a marking router. Therefore, marking its outgoing 
packets with false information before being marked by any router along their path. For 
example, it can spoof the IP-marking field. Also, it can write any value in the TTL field. 
If the attacker uses a TTL value that is less than the original packet's TTL, then it is 
v e r y  e a s y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  a n d  d r o p  a t t a c k  p a c k e t s  b e f o r e  r e a c h i n g  t h e  v i c t i m ,  b e c a u s e  T T L  
must be larger than the TTL value of a given packet. If the TTL written by the attacker 
is larger than the packet's original TTL, then intermediate routers cannot distinguish 
attack packets. This false information is more likely to be overwritten by subsequent 
routers if a reasonable marking probability is used. Unfortunately, there is nothing that 
can prevent the false information from propagating to the victim. For a given packet ID, 
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the victim will include the spoofed marking router in the marking routers list for that 
ID. However, because of the restriction that we have imposed on TTL (i.e., TTL must 
be larger than TTL), the distance obtained at the victim for the spoofed marking router 
will always be larger than that obtained for any other marking router for the same packet. 
Therefore, the victim can easily distinguish and exclude this information. We emphasize 
here that it is impossible to determine whether the first mark is bogus or genuine. What 
we meant here is that the first mark can be identified (Recall that the first mark has 
the largest distance) and it can be ignored as a precaution regardless of being bogus 
or genuine. Given that the marking probability has to be large enough to ensure that 
at least one router along the packet's path do the marking (as discussed in subsection 
4.4.1), this precaution is to be taken into account only if the victim obtains information 
about two or more marking routers of a given packet (because if it obtains one mark 
only, then that mark has to be genuine). In this case, if the first mark happens to be 
from the attacker, then ignoring it does not affect the outcome of the traceback process. 
However, if it happens to be from a genuine router, then ignoring it has the impact of 
not localizing the attacker exactly. 
• As another vulnerability of the PPPM scheme, the attacker may use the same packet ID 
for all its outgoing packets. Worse than that, multiple attackers can coordinate with each 
other to use the same packet ID either continuously or from time to time. In PPPM, 
the first marking router cannot recognize itself as the first router to do the marking for a 
given packet. Therefore, the ID injected by the attacker is used. We suggest the following 
slight modification to the marking and buffering algorithm shown in Fig. 4.7, to prohibit 
attackers from using the same ID for all packets: if a router receives a packet, P, that has 
identical (P.dest, P.ID) to those buffered for previously marked packet, it will drop the 
incoming packet. The suggested modification is based on the fact that it is very unlikely 
for two distinct packets traveling to the same destination within small window of time 
to have identical IDs. 
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4.4.3 Implementation and Deployment Issues 
4.4.3.1 Marking Information - How many bits and Where to Place? 
A major challenge to packet marking schemes in general is the limited space available in the 
IP packet header for marking purposes. Based on the fact that packet fragmentation is very 
infrequent in today's Internet [50], the focus in previous packet marking schemes (e.g., [51, 53, 
54, 55]) has been always on encoding the marking information in the 16-bits ID fragmentation 
field and few other unused bits in the IP packet header. The proposed traceback schemes face 
the same challenge. However, due to design constraints, encoding schemes used in previous 
work cannot be extended to DLLT and PPPM. Fortunately, the marking information in DLLT 
scheme which has a size of 34 bits can be accommodated without encoding by utilizing the 
25 bits recommended by Dean et. al., [54] which include 16 bits ID field, 1 bit fragmentation 
flag, and 8 bits type of service. In addition to these bits, we suggest utilizing the 13 bits 
fragmentation offset, because these bits will anyway go waste if the ID field is overwritten. This 
brings the total space available for packet marking to 38 which satisfies DLLT's requirements. 
However, this does not satisfy the requirement of the PPPM scheme (recall that the marking 
information size in PPPM is 57 bits). To overcome this problem, we propose an implementation 
based modification where the PPPM scheme is restricted to use up to 38 bits for marking 
purposes based on the idea of using Internet topology information for efficient encoding of the 
marking information. 
Our analysis of the raw measurements of the topology information of nine major ISP 
networks, which was obtained from the Rocketfuel project [81], reveals that the majority of 
nodes in these networks have relatively low degrees. The value of this parameter varies based 
on the location of the node. Core nodes usually have high degrees, while edge nodes have low 
degrees. It has been shown earlier [96] that Internet maps follow power law, meaning that 
Internet connectivity is concentrated at few nodes, which can be interpreted by saying that 
few nodes have high degrees, and all other nodes have low degrees. Fig. 4.10 shows the node 
degree distribution for nine major ISP networks. As expected, node degree distribution of a 
given ISP network depends directly on the connectivity of that network. This explains the 
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variation in distribution among the considered ISPs. It can be seen that highly connected ISP 
networks, such as Level3 and VSNL, have higher degree distributions as compared to other 
ISPs. For example, it can be seen that more than 20% of Level3 nodes have degrees that range 
from 20 to 90, while the same percentage of nodes in VSNL have degrees between 11 and 28. 
Telstra 
Sprintlink 
Ebone 
Verio 
Tiscali 
Levels 
Exodus 
VSNL 
AT&T 
node degree 
Figure 4.10 Node degree distribution based on Rocketfuel data [81]. 
Based on these statistical degree distributions, we propose the following modification to 
the original PPPM scheme. Instead of marking a packet by the IP address of the marking 
router, the packet is marked by a codeword of size x that represents the edge through which 
the packet has been received. An edge is a link between two adjacent nodes. It is clear that a 
value of 5 for x would be sufficient to represent an edge at any router along the path because 
most nodes have degrees less than 25. However, to accommodate some exceptional nodes 
(those with high degrees) we suggest using 8 bits (out of the available 38 bits) to represent x. 
This choice is based on the node degree distribution shown in Fig. 4.10. The remaining bits 
(i.e., 30) are used to accommodate the packet ID and auxiliary TTL fields as in the original 
scheme. The impact of this modification is reflected in the fact that the victim receives edge 
codes rather than routers' IP addresses. Decoding of the collected marking information can 
be done by propagating a traceback query starting at router to which the victim is connected. 
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From there, the query is forwarded to the router at the end of the link represented by the first 
codeword in the query. This process is repeated until all routers along a given attack path are 
identified. 
Inspired by the idea of using network topology for encoding marking information, we tried 
to answer the following question: How many bits are required to encode an entire Internet 
path4? To answer this question, we investigated real Internet maps to obtain specific statistical 
topology information. This study is based on five data sets of raw Internet measurements 
obtained from the Internet Mapping project [84] at different dates. Internet mapping project 
is one of the earliest research efforts to construct a full map of the Internet. This project tries 
to identify all reachable Internet hosts from a central measurement point and record the list of 
router IP addresses found along the path to each host. Starting with a raw data representing 
reachable Internet hosts and their corresponding paths, we constructed an Internet tree rooted 
at the measurement point. The tree is then searched to extract the distribution of sum of 
ceiling of log2(node degree) along each Internet path. 
Ceiling of log2(node degree) represents the number of bits required to uniquely encode 
one of its incoming/outgoing links. Therefore, the sum of ceiling of log2(node degree) along 
certain path represents the number of bits required for entire path encoding. This parameter 
captures both node degree and path length in a manner that cannot be obtained from their 
individual distributions. This forms the basis for our claims about space requirement for 
marking purposes. Fig. 4.11 shows the distribution of this parameter based on different data 
sets from the Internet mapping project [84]. It is to be noted that the distributions at different 
dates are not identical. This is due to two reasons. First, applying the ceiling function affects 
the distributions. Second, even if multiple paths have the same length, their corresponding 
node degrees will be different in most cases. The five graphs merge when the value on the 
x-axis equals to 46. At this point the cumulative distribution function is almost 1. Therefore, 
we can safely assume that almost all Internet paths can be encoded using at most 46 bits. 
This does not deny the fact that some exceptional, but very few paths, require larger number 
4This is a general question and it is not related to the proposed DLLT and PPPM schemes. 
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Figure 4.11 Distribution of sum of ceiling of log2(node degree) along Inter­
net paths for five data sets obtained from the Internet Mapping 
Project [84]. 
4.4.3.2 Activation of the Proposed IP Traceback Schemes 
It is obvious that the proposed schemes demand packet-level computation at the routers. 
Therefore, activating packet marking and logging all the time might be unnecessary and it has 
scalability implications. It is possible to adopt existing approaches to activate the traceback 
schemes when necessary. We briefly describe two approaches to achieve this objective. 
1. Router-driven activation: Packet marking and logging could be activated at each router 
independently by following an approach similar to that used in the Path Information 
Cashing and Aggregation (PICA) scheme [60]. Recall that PICA suggested to leverage 
routers forwarding table to keep track of per-subnet traffic aggregate rate, which makes 
it possible to base path message generation (i.e., traceback activation) decisions on traffic 
rate. DLLT/PPPM enabled routers can take advantage of this approach to trigger packet 
marking and logging for packets destined to certain destinations. 
2. Destination-driven activation: The only thing that is common among attack packets 
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is their destination address and, in most cases, their type (i.e., TCP, UDP, ICMP). 
Therefore, it is possible to activate the proposed schemes on packets destined to certain 
destination when that destination indicates its interest of receiving marking information 
about particular type of packets. To achieve this, we adopt an approach similar to 
that used in "intention driven ICMP traceback (iTrace)" scheme [59] to perform packet 
marking and logging on selective flows. It is to be noted that such approach has the 
same practical limitations of the iTrace proposal. 
As discussed, such activation approaches can be integrated into our traceback schemes as 
the former do not interfere with the latter. Such modification would make the proposed hybrid 
schemes more scalable. Scalability analysis based on this modification is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
4.4.3.3 Deployment of the Proposed IP Traceback Schemes 
The proposed schemes do not require cooperation among multi-domain network operators 
to perform the traceback across domains that implement the schemes. In other words, the 
whole process can be automated. In the PPPM scheme, the marking information buffered for 
a certain destination at different routers is transferred within packets destined to the same 
destination. In this regard, PPPM scheme is similar to the PPM scheme, because marking 
information in both schemes is transferred through the packets. On the other hand, DLLT 
scheme requires an explicit protocol to collect the marking information. This makes it similar 
to the Hash-based traceback scheme which deploys a central management unit in each domain 
for digests collection and partial path reconstruction. A full path is then constructed by 
combining the partial paths generated at each domain. 
In a multi-domain scenario, the link list approach enables the victim to retrieve its marking 
information from DLLT enabled routers along the packet path regardless of being in the same 
or different domain. Another issue in this context is the partial deployment of the proposed 
schemes. In such a scenario, attack paths that span the domains which implement the traceback 
schemes will be constructed. This leads to partial path construction. Therefore, the proposed 
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schemes do not require every router on the Internet to implement the marking and buffering 
procedure. In fact, it is sufficient to implement the proposed schemes at ISP's edge routers 
which are assumed to have enough computational resources to perform packet marking and 
logging. Although, this would have the limited benefit of identifying the autonomous system 
that contains the attack sources rather than identifying the sources themselves, it remains as 
the first practical choice. 
4.4.3.4 Applicability to Multiple Attackers Traceback 
Both schemes are applicable to multiple attackers traceback. In the case of multiple at­
tackers, attack paths converge to form a tree rooted at the victim. Therefore, path segments 
close to the victim are expected to be shared among several paths. The marking information 
associated with a given attack packet, P, consists of the end-list router and its predecessor list. 
If P's end-list router appears in the predecessor list of any other router, then all P's mark­
ing information must be added to the predecessor list of that router. Otherwise, P's end-list 
router must be on a distinct path and its predecessor list may or may not be shared among 
other paths (each router in the list must be checked to determine whether it appears in other 
routers predecessor lists or not). By taking this observation into account, it is easy to group 
routers that are shared among different paths and to identify routers that represent the leaves 
of the attack tree. The identification and reconstruction algorithm (Fig. 4.13) is based on this 
observation. Enforcing edge based marking and augmenting packets with distance parameters 
will accelerate the attack tree construction process. 
4.4.3.5 Timely Collection of the Marking Information in DLLT 
Upon detecting an attack, the traceback information preserved for attack packets should 
be collected immediately from the routers. Otherwise, there is a risk for this information to be 
cleared off. This is due to the fact that a Bloom filter of a given size can maintain the digests 
of certain number of packets without exceeding the specified false positives rate. When that 
number is reached, the router has to clear the Bloom filter and use it to store the digests of the 
114 
next round of packets. The probabilistic nature of the proposed schemes and the possibility of 
activating them on selective flows (As discussed earlier in this subsection) increases the window 
of time through which the traceback information can be collected successfully. 
4.5 Performance Evaluation 
We evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes through a combination of theo­
retical and simulation studies. Theoretically, we bound the number of packets required by 
DLLT/PPPM for full path construction and compare it to that required by the PPM scheme 
[51] (subsection 4.5.1), and we quantify the storage requirement of DLLT and PPPM (sub­
section 4.5.2). In addition, we evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes through 
extensive simulation experiments against various performance metrics (subsection 4.5.3). 
4.5.1 Number of Attack Packets Required to Construct Full Attack Path 
It is obvious that the proposed schemes are similar in functionality, in the sense that 
marking information that belongs to a certain packet is preserved to be later collected by the 
victim. While the number of packets required by the victim to construct a full attack path is 
different in both schemes (few additional packets are required by the PPPM scheme to flush 
the pipeline), the number of packets that must be sent by an attacker such that every router 
along the path to the victim is involved in marking at least one of these packets is the same 
in both schemes (assuming the same q in both cases). Our objective is to find a bound on 
the minimum number of packets that has to be sent by the attacker such that every router 
along the path to the victim is involved in marking at least one of these packets with high 
confidence probability it. Let k represent this lower bound. Let the marking probability at 
router R be q. Let Pf be the probability that R fails to mark any packet out of k packets. 
Clearly, Pf = (1 — q)k. Therefore, the probability that R succeeds in marking (we call it the 
success probability) at least one packet is given by: 
P s  =  l - P f  =  l - ( l - q ) k  (4.1) 
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To obtain the desired bound, we can safely assume that the success probability for all routers 
along a path of length d is the same and equal to that of the farthest router (i.e., as given in 
Equation (4.1)). If we define X to be a random variable that represents the number of routers 
out of d that succeed in the marking process, then X follows the binomial distribution with 
s u c c e s s  p r o b a b i l i t y  P s  g i v e n  b y  E q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 1 ) .  W e  n e e d  t o  f i n d  k  s u c h  t h a t :  P ( X  —  d )  >  u  
(i.e., the probability that each router succeeds in marking at least one packet is larger than it). 
But, P(X = d) = (1 — (1 — q)k)d > u, solving for k, we obtain: 
(4;2> 
By following a similar approach, it can be shown that the minimum number of packets 
required by the PPM scheme [51] (here we consider edge sampling technique without edge 
encoding) is given by: 
l°gio(l -v}ld) 
logioU - <?(i - g)d_1) M (4 3) 
It may be argued that the 16-bit mark restriction of existing probabilistic packet marking 
schemes (e.g., PPM [51]) increases their packet requirement. However, it is important to point 
out that this restriction is not the main reason for their requirement of large number of packets 
for traceback. Such schemes require large number of packets originally because downstream 
routers overwrite upstream router's marking. It is important to mention that the bound in 
Equation (4.3) does not assume edge encoding (i.e., no restriction to 16-bit mark). In contrast, 
it assumes that an edge can be represented by three fields (of a total size of 72 bits): start, end, 
and distance. On the other hand, the significant reduction of the number of packets achieved 
in our schemes is due to the marking information preservation, which is part of the hybrid 
design. Therefore, it is not because of the relaxed assumption of a long mark. 
Fig. 4.12 (a) provides a comparison between k and kppm as the marking probability, q, 
varies from 0.05 to 0.3. d and u were set to 15 and 95%, respectively. In PPM, whenever a 
router decides to mark a packet, it overwrites the packet's marking information. Therefore, 
increasing the marking probability, q, implies that the chances for a packet to be marked by 
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a router far away from the victim and not remarked by any subsequent router will decrease. 
For a given q, this explains the sharp increase in the number of packets required by PPM to 
obtain a mark from each router along the path. In contrast, DLLT and PPPM are designed 
to preserve the marking information written by any router along the packet's path (recall that 
whenever a router decides to mark a packet, it preserves the packet's marking information). 
Increasing q implies that more routers are expected to mark a given packet. Since all markings 
are preserved and then collected by the victim, the amount of path information obtained per 
packet increases by increasing the marking probability. It is important to mention that very 
small values of q should be avoided in PPM to prevent the problem of marking field spoofing 
[52]5. 
We also study the effect of path length on the number of packets required for attack path 
reconstruction. Fig. 4.12 (b) provides a comparison between k and kppm as the path length, 
d, varies from 5 to 25. q and u were set to 0.2 and 95%, respectively. Since routers in a 
path appear serially, the probability that a packet will be marked by a router and then left 
unmarked by all downstream routers is a strictly decreasing function of the distance to the 
victim in the case of PPM. Therefore, increasing the path length reduces the chance to obtain 
marks from far away routers. Hence, more packets are required to ensure that all routers 
along the path are represented by at least one mark. Coming to DLLT/PPPM, the number 
of packets required for traceback does not remain constant as path length increases. In fact, 
there is a slight increase which is difficult to notice in the plot because it is too small compared 
to the scale of the Y axis. This increase, though slight, is intuitive because more packets would 
be required to cover a longer path. However, it is not significant because as the path length 
increases more routers are expected to mark a given packet, which means that the amount of 
path information obtained per packet increases as well. 
5Notice that there is no restriction on q under DLLT/PPPM. 
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Figure 4.12 A comparison between the number of packets required by 
DLLT/PPPM and that required by PPM: (a) Effect of mark­
ing probability, q. Attack path length, d, was fixed to 15 (b) 
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to 0.2. 
4.5.2 Storage Analysis 
The amount of storage that needs to be allocated for a traceback scheme is an important 
issue. In this subsection, we quantify the amount of memory required in both DLLT and PPPM 
schemes. First, we review some characteristics of the Bloom filters that would be necessary 
in our analysis (detailed description of Bloom filters is available in Appendix B). A Bloom 
filter is characterized by its size, s bits, the number of hash functions used, j, and its capacity 
factor, /. A Bloom filter of size s and capacity factor / can be used to store the digests of 
at most s/f packets. The effective false positive rate of a Bloom filter is directly dependent 
on the previous parameters. What follows is a quantification of memory requirement at each 
router in the two schemes. 
4.5.2.1 Memory Requirement of DLLT (Mdiu) 
Let b denote the number of bits required to store the marking information of one packet in 
the MIT (i.e., this includes 32-bit IP address plus [log2(j)] bits for the "hash function number" 
field). To store the marking information of x packets, we need an MIT of size xb bits to be 
shared among / digests arrays each of size x bits. Therefore, the total memory requirement 
at each DLLT enabled router, (Mdiit), to store the marking information of x packets is given 
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by: Mdut = x(b + /). Assuming an aggregate incoming link capacity of n  packets/sec and a 
marking probability of value q at each router, x has a binomial distribution with parameters 
(n, q). Therefore, the amount of memory required to store a second's worth of digests has the 
following probability mass function. 
With an average value given by EfM^jt] — Qn(b + /)• 
4.5.2.2 Memory Requirement of PPPM (Mpppm) 
Typically, at each PPPM enabled router, a marking buffer that has 232 entries would be 
required (i.e., one entry for each possible destination). In practice, the number of destinations 
seen by a router during a small window of time is limited. By taking advantage of this 
observation, we limit the size of the marking buffer to 2° entries, where a is the size of the IP 
destination address suffix used to index the buffer. As mentioned in subsection 4.3.2, a Bloom 
filter is also used to indicate whether a given destination has a marking information or not. 
Therefore, at each PPPM enabled router, a fixed size buffer with 2" entries would be required 
to preserve the marking information of the forwarded packets. Each entry has a size of 57 bits, 
which include 32-bit IP address, 17-bit ID, and 8-bit distance field. In addition, a Bloom filter 
of size fx would be required to store the digests of at most x different destination addresses. 
Assuming the percentage of different destination addresses seen by a router in a sample of n 
packets is p, then the number of addresses, x, to be inserted in the Bloom filter within one 
second has a binomial distribution with parameters (n, pq), where n is the aggregate link 
capacity per second, and q is the marking probability. Therefore the memory requirement of 
PPPM, Mpppm, can be expressed as the sum of a fixed memory of size 57 x 2° bits, and a 
Bloom filter of size S, where S has the following probability mass function. 
P{Mdiit = i) = 
if * = &(& + /),& = 0,1,2, . . . ;  
0 otherwise. 
O , W)/f) (<#-»)/'(! - wr-C-'')// ifi = 6 + V, t = o, 1,2, 
P ( S  —  i )  =  "  
0 otherwise. 
With an average value given by E [ S ] = q p n f .  
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4.5.3 Simulation Studies 
The simulation studies presented in this section focus on the process of identifying attack 
sources without specifying the scheme used for packet marking. The assumption made here 
is that marking information that belongs to a certain packet can be collected by the victim 
either under DLLT scheme, or under PPPM scheme. The objective is to show how the victim 
can identify attack sources, reconstruct attack paths, and determine the actual number of at­
tackers. The extensive simulation experiments carried out in this section are: (i) to evaluate 
the proposed schemes in terms of different performance metrics, and (ii) to support our claim 
about their superior performance compared to PPM. We start by discussing the source identi­
fication algorithm performed by the victim. Then, we define the performance metrics, followed 
by a description of the simulation method and the results. 
4.5.3.1 Attack Source Identification 
There is an ongoing debate regarding the outcome of a traceback scheme. Some researchers 
support the notion of locating attackers regardless of providing any information about the paths 
followed by the attack packets. However, other researchers support the notion of constructing 
the complete path followed by the attack packets leading to the attacker's location. We believe 
that such decision must be made based on the actual number of attackers (classifying DoS 
attacks based on the number of attackers was considered in [78]). In the case of having few 
attackers (e.g., less than 50), it will be necessary to locate most of them in order to stop an 
ongoing attack, or to hold attackers accountable. However, in the case of having large number 
of attackers, it would be difficult (technically and administratively) to place filters at their sites. 
Even, knowing all their identities would not be necessary to find out the original attacker (recall 
that the systems identified by a traceback process are those who have been compromised earlier 
by the master machine which is under the control of the original attacker). Therefore, it would 
be more useful to have knowledge about the paths followed by attack packets such that filters 
can be placed at their intersection points. 
We propose an algorithm, called Identification and Reconstruction (IR) algorithm, that is 
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able to identify attack sources and/or reconstruct attack paths. For any router R, recall from 
section 4.1 that the set of routers on the attack path between the victim and R is called the 
predecessor set of R, whereas the set of routers on the attack path between R and the source 
is called the successor set of R. Clearly, if we are interested in locating attackers, then we 
have to find routers that have an empty successor set. The IR algorithm, shown in Fig.4.13, 
takes the marking information that belongs to k attack packets as an input. The algorithm 
performs two passes on the given input. In the first pass, IR algorithm creates a table with 
two columns: end-list routers and their partial predecessor lists. For each subset of routers 
that marked a certain packet (i.e., routers found in a MIC-reply packet if DLLT is used, or 
routers found in the packets that have the same ID if PPPM is used), it adds a new entry for 
the end-list router if it does not already exist and adds its predecessors found in that packet. 
In the second pass, IR eliminates the end-list routers that appears in the predecessor lists of 
other routers. The remaining end-list routers represent the set of identified attack sources. If 
each router is associated with distance parameter (as in the PPPM scheme), then the routes 
within each predecessor list can be ordered according to their positions in the actual path, 
which helps in the process of full path construction. 
4.5.3.2 Performance Metrics 
We define and use the following new metrics to evaluate the proposed schemes: 
• Path coverage ratio (PC): This metric is defined as the ratio of the length of the recon­
structed attack path to the length of the actual attack path. A value of 1 indicates that 
the path is fully reconstructed. 
• Attack source localization distance (ALD): This metric defines the distance between the 
identified attack source and the actual attack source. If more than one attack path is 
discovered by the algorithm, then an average ALD is computed for all paths. A value of 
zero for ALD means that the exact attack source is identified. 
e Number of attackers ratio (AR): This metric is defined as the number of leaves in the 
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IR (Marking Info, of k Attack Packets) 
F55#I 
1. for each subset of routers that marked certain packet (P) 
(a) if (f .end-list router is not in the table) 
i. add new entry for P.end-list router 
ii. add P.remaining routers to the predecessor list of P.end-list router 
(b) else add P.remaining routers to the predecessor list of P.end-list router 
Pass II 
1. for each end-list router, ERX, in the table 
(a) i f  ( E R X  appears in the predecessor list of any other end-list router, E R y )  
i. append predecessor list of ERX to the predecessor list of ERy 
ii. remove ERX and its predecessor list from the table 
Figure 4.13 Identification and reconstruction (IR) algorithm. Remaining 
end-list routers represent the identified attack sources, and 
their predecessor lists represent attack paths. 
reconstructed attack tree to the number of leaves in the actual attack tree (recall that 
attack paths converge at the victim to form an attack tree). Typically, this ratio should 
be 1. However, in the proposed identification and reconstruction algorithm, it is possible 
to identify more than one node on the same actual attack path to be attack sources (i.e., 
tree leaves). This represents a deviation from the desirable outcome of identifying only 
one attack source (the farthest from the victim among the identified sources on the same 
path) for each attack path. AR captures this deviation. 
• Detection percentage (DP)-. This metric is defined as the percentage of exactly identified 
attack sources. For example, if j attack sources are exactly located out of m attack 
sources, then we express the detection percentage as ^ x 100 %. 
122 
Table 4.1 Simulation parameters 
parameter range (default value) 
number of attackers ( m )  1, 100 
number of attack packets used ( k )  5 ... 100 
marking probability ( q )  0.05 ... 0.15 
attack path length ( d )  (20) 
4.5.3.3 Simulation Method 
In each simulation experiment we generated a random attack tree with m attackers and 
one victim. The attack path length, d, was the same for all attackers. Packets were marked 
according to the specified marking probability, q. Attackers were instructed to inject their 
packets simultaneously with a rate of 1000 packets/attacker. Table 4.1 shows the range of each 
parameter (values in parenthesis represent the default values of the corresponding parameters 
when applicable). We performed simulation experiments under the assumption that: (i) Edge 
based marking is not enforced by the underlying marking scheme. We use the letter (n) to 
refer to this assumption, (ii) Edge based marking is enforced by the underlying marking 
scheme. We use the letter (e) to refer to this assumption. In the graphs, the legend (n, 
q) represents assumption (n) under the given marking probability, q. While legend (e, q) 
represents assumption (e) under the given marking probability, q. Each of the following results 
represents the average of 200 independent simulation runs based on the simulation parameters 
values shown in Table 4.1 unless otherwise specified. In a practical scenario, the only parameter 
under the control of the victim is the number of packets, k, for which the marking information 
has to be collected. We take this fact into account by making this parameter the main variable 
in our simulation6 . 
6In the case of having m attackers, mk packets were actually used by the victim. However, only variable k 
is shown in the graphs. 
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4.5.3.4 Simulation Results 
Figures 4.14 (a) through 4.14 (d) show the path coverage ratio, the attack localization 
distance, the detection percentage, and the number of attackers ratio, respectively, as a function 
of the number of packets used, k, for different values of q, under both assumptions (n) and (e). 
These figures correspond to single attacker case (i.e., m = 1). Figures 4.15 (a) through 4.15 (d) 
show the same performance metrics, but correspond to multiple attackers case (m was set to 
100). The following discussion applies for both cases (i.e., single and multiple attackers). The 
main difference to be observed between them is that the multiple attackers case corresponds 
to smoother graphs and better performance in general. This is due to the fact that we obtain 
more marking information about the same path (or parts of the path) when it is shared among 
several attackers. 
Path coverage ratio: This parameter depends on the amount of information obtained by 
the victim about the path followed by the attack packets. Therefore, it is natural to see this 
parameter increasing by increasing the value of the marking probability, q, or by increasing the 
number of packets, k, used by the victim, or by increasing both of them as can be seen in Fig. 
4.14 (a). It can also be seen that enforcing edge based packet marking leads to better path 
coverage in general, because obtaining edge information facilitates full path reconstruction 
compared to the case in which separate router information is obtained. It is also important to 
point out that the simulation results agree with the theoretical analysis regarding the number 
of packets required for full path reconstruction. For example, when q = 0.1, 60 packets are 
required, which is very close to the minimum bound specified by Equation (4.2) which suggests 
using 55 packets under similar conditions. 
Attack localization distance: Fig. 4.14 (b) compares the average attack localization 
distance obtained for different values of q under assumptions (n) and (e). By increasing the 
number of packets used, more path information is obtained, and the victim starts to realize the 
actual shape of the attack path. This explains the continuous decrease of the average attack 
localization distance as k increases. Increasing the marking probability has similar effect as 
can be seen in the figure. It is also clear that enforcing edge based packet marking reveals 
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more details about attack path, contributing to locating attacker's location precisely. 
Attack source detection percentage: As pointed out earlier, in some cases it is impor­
tant to detect attack source without necessarily reconstructing the complete attack path. To 
be able to identify an attack source (i.e., the closest router to the attacker), the victim must 
obtain the IP address of that router, and must recognize it as an end-list router along some 
path. This does not depend on whether the marking scheme enforces edge-based marking or 
not, which is reflected in the results shown in Fig. 4.14 (c), where the attack source detection 
percentage is the same under both assumptions (n) and (e). As expected, the attack source 
identification percentage increases by increasing k, q, or both of them. 
Number of attackers ratio: The number of nodes identified by the victim as an attack 
nodes exhibits an interesting behavior as k increase. This is depicted in Fig. 4.14 (d). Initially, 
if only one packet is used (i.e., k = 1), then one node will be identified as an attack source 
(this node may not necessarily be the actual attack node). By increasing k, more nodes will 
be identified as attack sources. This increase will continue until enough path information is 
obtained, where the victim becomes able to place nodes into their right positions, eliminating 
false attack source identification. In practice, the victim can determine the actual number of 
attackers by observing that the number of identified attack sources remains constant no matter 
how much k is increased. The ratio of the number of identified attack sources is a measure of 
how much information is required by the victim to determine the exact number of attackers. 
It can be seen that increasing q, enforcing edge based marking, or both, results in lower ratio. 
Comparison of PPPM/DLLT with PPM scheme: We performed extensive simula­
tion experiments to compare the performance of the proposed schemes to that of the PPM [51] 
scheme. Packet marking in the forward direction was performed based on the hybrid schemes 
(i.e., DLLT/PPPM) in our case, and based on the PPM scheme in another case. The number 
of packets used for traceback, k, was varied from 5 to 100 in steps of 5. To capture the effect of 
the marking probability, q, the results were taken for q — 0.10 and q = 0.15. For the purpose 
of discussion, we consider single attacker case (i.e., m — 1) with attack path length of 20 hops. 
Figures 4.16 (a) through 4.16 (d) show the performance comparison between the proposed 
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Figure 4.14 Single attacker case, (a) Path coverage ratio, (b) Average 
attack localization distance, (c) Attack source identification 
percentage, (d) Number of attackers ratio. 
schemes and the PPM scheme. It is obvious that the hybrid schemes outperform the PPM 
scheme significantly. By increasing k, DLLT/PPPM converges very fast to the actual path. 
For example, path coverage ratio, average attack localization distance, detection percentage, 
and number of attackers ratio are exactly, 1, 0, 100%, and 1, respectively, when k = 50. At 
the same time, the path obtained by PPM remains far away from the real one for the range 
of k used in this part7. This is reflected in the low path coverage ratio (Fig. 4.16 (a)), high 
attack localization distance (Fig. 4.16 (b)), zero attack detection percentage (Fig. 4.16 (c)), 
and relatively large number of attackers ratio (Fig. 4.16 (d)). 
7PPM requires a lot of packets to converge to the actual path. 
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Figure 4.15 Multiple attacker case, (a) Path coverage ratio, (b) Average 
attack localization distance, (c) Attack source identification 
percentage, (d) Number of attackers ratio. 
4.6 Chapter Conclusions 
An efficient traceback scheme is necessary to identify the sources of DoS attacks which 
impose an imminent threat to the availability of Internet services. The work presented in this 
chapter adopts a hybrid traceback approach in which packet marking and packet logging are 
integrated to achieve the best of both worlds (i.e., small number of attack packets to conduct 
the traceback process, and small amount of resources to be allocated at intermediate routers 
for packet logging purposes). Based on this notion, two traceback schemes were proposed. The 
first scheme, called Distributed Link-List Traceback (DLLT), is based on the idea of preserving 
the marking information at intermediate routers in such a way that it can be collected in an 
efficient manner. The second scheme, called Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM), 
employs the concept of "pipeline" for propagating marking information from one marking 
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Figure 4.16 Comparison between DLLT/PPPM and PPM [51] in terms of: 
(a) Path coverage ratio, (b) Average attack localization dis­
tance. (c) Attack source identification percentage, (d) Number 
of attackers ratio. 
router to another so that it eventually reaches the destination. 
The proposed schemes enjoy many of the features mentioned in section 4.1. Their proba­
bilistic nature of marking and storage offers the advantage of minimizing router's processing 
and storage overhead. Also, both schemes eliminate attacker's ability to mislead the victim. 
This is achieved in DLLT by storing the packet digests at intermediate routers, which pro­
vides an authentic way to verify that a given router has actually forwarded certain packet. In 
PPPM, spoofed marking information written by the attacker can be discarded by observing 
that the distance associated with it is always the largest among distances obtained for marking 
information that correspond to the same packet. Marking information is collected from inter­
mediate routers efficiently. For example, DLLT collects relevant marking information from 
specific routers in a predetermined manner using the link list approach. PPPM collects the 
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marking information by loading them into packets going to the same destination. 
The analysis carried out in section 4.5 provides a theoretical background about the per­
formance of DLLT and PPPM in terms of the number of packets required for full attack path 
reconstruction and in terms of their storage requirements. It has been shown also that the 
number of packets required in DLLT/PPPM is substantially less than that required by PPM 
[51]. 
We draw the following conclusions from the simulation results presented in subsection 4.5.3: 
• DLLT/PPPM offer high detection percentage under different design parameters. 
• Enforcing edge based packet marking results in better traceback capability. 
• Attack path(s) reconstruction is one way in determining the number of attackers partic­
ipating in the attack. 
• The source of attack can be localized exactly if reasonable number of packets are used 
for traceback. 
• There is a trade-off between different parameters. We showed how different parameters 
can affect the performance metrics in various ways. 
We do not claim that DLLT and PPPM are perfect IP traceback schemes. In general, for 
such schemes to be practically efficient they must be secure, backward compatible and requires 
low storage. A study in terms of saving information for "selective packet flows" instead of "per 
packet information" may improve the scalability of the proposed hybrid IP traceback schemes. 
Also, it is possible to use some machine learning algorithms to initiate the proposed schemes 
on the suspected paths so as to capture enough information for IP traceback. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Denial of service attacks represent an imminent threat to the availability of Internet ser­
vices. These attacks can quickly incapacitate a targeted business, leading to lost revenue and 
productivity. The alarming increase in the number of these attacks against e-commerce com­
panies and other organizations coupled with the emergence of newly sophisticated attacks have 
increased the fear from potential powerful coordinated attacks. All these factors have led to a 
significant amount of research in recent years aiming at countering these attacks on all fronts. 
Given that attack packets differ from the legitimate ones in intent but not in content, the 
focus has been always on developing mechanisms to distinguish attack packets from legitimate 
packets, and on the issue of locating actual sources of attack packets. This has resulted into 
three major approaches to counter DoS attacks, namely, prevention, mitigation, and traceback. 
Although DoS prevention is the most desirable solution, it is very difficult to achieve due to: 
(1) the fact that DoS attacks are emerging in various forms and becoming more complicated, 
and (2) the proactive nature of prevention schemes makes their deployment less incentive, es­
pecially because DoS attacks are the exception rather than the norm. This explains why most 
of the research efforts in this area have been mainly on DoS mitigation and IP traceback. 
The work presented in this dissertation advances the state of the art in DoS mitigation and 
IP traceback. In particular, we have shown that it is possible to perform online perimeter-
based DoS mitigation. Also, we have shown that it is possible to combine packet marking and 
packet logging in a novel manner such as to achieve efficient IP traceback functionality. More 
specifically, the following is a summary of the work presented in this dissertation. 
• In Chapter 1, we discussed the problem of DoS attacks focusing on their original causes, 
and on their various mechanisms. We also identified several attributes to characterize 
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DoS attacks. These attributes include header spoofing, attack indirection, attack ampli­
fication factor, attack rate dynamics, number of attackers vs. number of victims, and 
attacker's awareness to the defense mechanism. In addition, we projected known and 
potential DoS attacks onto a means-based taxonomy as well as onto an impact-based 
taxonomy, and we discussed the main research challenges associated with the DoS at­
tacks problem. 
• In Chapter 2, we provided an extensive discussion of the state of the art research in 
countering DoS attacks, focusing mainly on the major defense mechanisms including 
prevention, mitigation, and IP traceback. In addition, we discussed the main approaches 
in each category including source-based prevention, network-based prevention, victim-
based DoS prevention, rate limiting-based mitigation, statistical-based mitigation, path-
based mitigation, packet marking-based traceback, packet logging-based traceback, and 
traffic engineering-based traceback. 
• In Chapter 3, two novel concepts were proposed for DoS mitigation, namely, victim-
assistance and protocol-determinism. These concepts were mainly proposed to supple­
ment edge routers of an ISP network by mechanisms that enable them to distinguish 
attack traffic from legitimate traffic. In this context, the novelty of the proposed con­
cepts is due to their benefit in performing online DoS mitigation at an ISP perimeter. A 
feature that is not available in current perimeter-based DoS mitigation schemes. 
• In Chapter 4, two novel IP traceback schemes were presented. The first scheme, called 
Distributed Link-List Traceback (DLLT), is based on the idea of preserving the marking 
information at intermediate routers in such a way that it can be collected using a link 
list based approach. The second scheme, called Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking 
(PPPM), employs the concept of a "pipeline" for propagating marking information from 
one marking router to another so that it eventually reaches the destination. We evaluated 
the effectiveness of the proposed traceback schemes against various performance metrics 
through a combination of analytical and simulation studies. Our studies show that the 
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proposed schemes offer a drastic reduction of the number of packets required to conduct 
the traceback process in comparison to the well known PPM scheme. 
Despite the significant amount of research that has been made in the area of DoS attacks 
in the past few years, there is no real evidence that these efforts have fully succeeded in 
countering these attacks. On the contrary, the recent reports about DoS attacks confirm that 
the Internet infrastructure is still exposed to the danger of these attacks, and the problem 
will not disappear any time soon. We believe that the work presented in this dissertation 
represents an important step towards reducing the impact of. these attacks. However, several 
issues still need to be investigated. In particular, we identify the following issues which open 
up new research directions in the field of DoS attacks. 
• Employing the concept of protocol-determinism in mitigating protocol exploitation-based 
DoS attacks. As discussed in Chapter 1, protocol exploitation-based DoS attacks (also 
known as control flow-based DoS attacks) take advantage of the deterministic nature of 
Internet protocols. We believe that an approach similar to the one we proposed for SYN 
flooding mitigation (which is a special case of control flow-based DoS attacks) can be 
followed for mitigation of other types of control flow-based DoS attacks. 
• Employing the concept of victim-assistance in mitigating direct DoS attacks. We have 
shown that the concept of victim-assistance aids significantly in the mitigation of RDoS 
attacks. It would be interesting to investigate the viability of employing this concept 
in defending against direct DoS attacks as well. In order to achieve this goal, several 
issues need to be addressed. For example, what information should be provided by 
the victim? How this information is to be communicated to edge routers? When to 
activate/terminate the mitigation scheme and on which edge routers? How to extend 
the concept of victim-assistance to inter-domain setting? Does collaboration among edge 
routers help in anyway? 
• Improving the scalability of the proposed traceback schemes. In general, for DLLT/PPPM 
schemes to be practically efficient they must be secure, backward compatible and requires 
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low storage. A study in terms of saving information for "selective packet flows" instead of 
"per packet information" may improve the scalability of the proposed hybrid IP traceback 
schemes. Also, it is possible to investigate using some machine learning algorithms to 
initiate the proposed schemes on the suspected paths so as to capture enough information 
for IP traceback. 
• Designing hardware components to support the proposed schemes. A major challenge in 
dealing with DoS attacks, in any countermeasure, is the need to perform per packet pro­
cessing at very high Internet speeds. The proposed DoS mitigation and traceback schemes 
(PF, SNF, intentional dropping, DLLT, and PPPM) are not an exception. In fact, these 
schemes introduce additional processing delays due to TCP header inspection (mitiga­
tion), or due to packet marking and logging logging (traceback). A possible research is 
to (1) study the impact of this overhead on the performance of the proposed schemes, 
and (2) design hardware components that support the operation of these schemes at very 
high Internet speeds. 
• DoS detection and mitigation using edge routers cooperation. Cooperation among an 
ISP's edge routers can aid significantly in detecting attacks of type multi-attackers multi-
victims, which is one of the most complex form of attacks. We suggest investigating the 
following two approaches to determine which one is more suitable for detecting this type 
of DoS attacks. 
— Approach 1: IDS-based DoS attack detection. Usually, an intrusion detection system 
(IDS) raises an alarm indicating the existence of a DoS attack only if the rate of the 
attack traffic reaching the monitored system is above certain threshold. This means 
that the system will not be considered to be under attack even if it receives attack 
traffic unless the rate of this traffic is high enough. In our view, the fact that there is 
some sort of unwanted traffic reaching the system, even at a low rate, should be taken 
seriously. By recalling that such traffic can be part of an engineered attack that 
aims at disturbing the ISP's network operation rather than bringing that particular 
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system down. If each system ignores such attack, then attack traffic will overload 
the ISP's network without being detected. We believe that sharing the information 
about incoming attack traffic among these systems can provide complete picture 
about the actual threat level. By exchanging this information, each edge router will 
have complete attack rate information. Hence, all edge routers will come to the 
same conclusion about the existence of an attack. 
- Approach 2: Health-based, DoS attack detection. In this approach, there is no need 
for individual systems to report attack rates. The existence of DoS attacks is usu­
ally reflected on the ISP's network health (i.e., delay, loss rate, etc.) immediately, 
especially if the attack is very intense. By sharing information about delay and 
packet loss parameters, edge routers obtain global approximate picture about the 
state of the network. A decision about whether the network is under attack or not 
can be made accordingly. 
• Internet worms: detection and containment. Internet worms represent another persistent 
threat to the Internet infrastructure. Despite their devastating effects, the research done 
so far in the area of detection and containment of Internet worms is very limited and has 
been focused mainly on issues such as the analysis of Internet worm impact, and modeling 
of Internet worm propagation. However, only few and not very effective mechanisms have 
been proposed for detection and preventing propagation of Internet worms. 
• Developing a comprehensive defense strategy. We believe that integrating the major de­
fense paradigms (i.e., prevention, mitigation, and traceback) may lead to an effective DoS 
defense strategy. In fact, very few research efforts had been made in this direction. For 
example, the authors in [43] proposed a DoS mitigation scheme that takes advantage of 
existing IP traceback schemes. As another example, the authors in [56] showed that their 
distributed packet filtering architecture (which is basically intended for DoS prevention) 
can localize the attacker's source AS's within 5 sites. These research efforts represent 
an important step toward realizing the vision of integrated prevention, mitigation, and 
traceback. 
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF THE EXPECTED VALUE OF A r e a c t i v e  
First, we outline the basic steps of finding the distribution of 
Dv 
* r e a c t i v e  —  Da + Dv 
1. We find an expression for /A,y(a,u),  the the joint PDF of Da and Dv. 
(A.l) 
2. We obtain an expression for fu,z(ui z), the joint PDF of the two random variables U and 
Z. Where, 
U = DV (A.2) 
and 
Z  —  - A r e a c t i v e  — n _l H (A.3) &a H" J-^v 
3. The PDF of Z  is obtained by integrating fu,z{u , z )  with respect to u  from 0 to oo. 
What follows is a detailed derivation of f z { z )  based on the above outline. 
Da and Dv are assumed to have exponential distributions with rates fia and fiv, respectively. 
Therefore, 
/ a  (a) = Mae~'iaa (A.4) 
and 
(A.5) 
Since Da and Dv are independent, their joint PDF is given by: 
fA , v { a , v )  = ixanve-flaae-fJ'»v (A.6) 
It is to be noted that U and Z satisfy the following conditions: 
1. The equations u = v and z — have as their solution v — u, a = v~zzv. 
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2. u  and z have continuous partial derivatives at all points ( v ,  a )  and are such that the 
following determinant 
J ( D v , D a )  =  
ac/ dU 
aD„ m: 
az dZ 
dDv dDv 
(v + a)2 
at all points (a,v), where 3(Dv,Da) is the Jacobian matrix. 
It follows that the desired density is: 
fu,z(u, z) = /v,a( v i  a )  x  
f 0 
-1 
f u , z ( u , z )  =  / v , A ( y , a )  
J ( D v ,  D a )  
( v  +  a ) 2  
substituting v = u and a = v zzv, we obtain 
Therefore, 
f z { z )  =  /  
Jo 
u^ a H v c_(fJv_/Ja+e±)udu _ 
( z f l v  -  Z/JLa + /Lia)2 
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
(A.9) 
(A.10) 
(A.ll) 
^ 2 (log it + ^ - 1) (/A; Ma) f ^ a  f ^ v  (A.12) 
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APPENDIX B. BLOOM FILTERS 
A Bloom filter [69] is a data structure for representing a set of n elements (also called keys) 
to support membership queries. The idea (illustrated in Fig. B.l) is to allocate a vector R of 
m bits, initially all set to 0, and then choose k independent hash functions, each with range 
{l,...,m}. For each element, A, the bits at positions H\(A), H2(A), ..., Hk(A) in R are set to 
1. (A particular bit might be set to 1 multiple times.) Given a query for B, we check the bits 
at positions Hi(B), %(B), ..., Hk{B). If any of them is 0, then certainly B is not inserted in 
the filter. Otherwise we conjecture that B is inserted in the filter although there is a certain 
probability that we are wrong. This is called a "false positive". The parameters k and m 
should be chosen such that the probability of a false positive is acceptable. 
Bit Vector 
Source Address A 
H,(A; 
m bits 
hja;  
Figure B.l A Bloom filter with k hash functions 
The false positive rate of a Bloom filters is given by the following equation: 
P /  =  ( l - ( l - ^ ) f e n ) f c « ( l - e ^ ) f c  (B.l) 
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